Introduction
The success of a coup de main depends absolutely upon luck rather than judgment.
–Napoleon[1]
Everybody knew it had to be perfect. With the Great General Staff (GGS) considered to be one of the five perfect institutions of Europe at the turn of the 20th century, any military plan that came from that source had to be pretty much perfect. There could be no doubt. Military planners did their stuff in secret while political honchos maneuvered Imperial Germany into war like political positions. War could not be feared, as Germany represented the absolute best of the best in land power. The planning was meticulous. Railroad tables, which moved hundreds of thousands of soldiers across the empire, had been worked out in incredible detail: individual stops, coffee-break areas, bridges, tunnels, timetables. Germany was a nation embodied and propelled towards the border into the grand plan of mobilization. Nothing was overlooked. Every detail had been analyzed to death. Eight specific armies were positioned in a plan that was updated annually; not only updated but improved. Hidden screwdrivers would tighten up any problems that existed in the old plan to prepare a “more improved” version for the current year. Everything was based upon winning a short war. Speed was of the essence. Troops would need to be sent to the East to deal with the slow-moving Russians. Speed, speed, speed.
[1]. Peter G. Tsouras, Warriors’ Words: A Quotation Book: From Sesostris III to Schwarzkopf 1871 BC to AD 1991 (New York: Cassell, 1992).
