Halen 12 – German Jaeger’s Attack 4

Halen 12 – German Jaeger’s Attack 4

 

One of de Witte’s staff officers, Van Overstraeten, was to play a leading role in the battle and reported his recollections in 1964. He was present near the bridge. As he first entered the town, arriving at the square, he heard a heavy explosion. Had the bridge been detonated? He saw Cyclist Battalion Commander Maj. Siron just in front of the church, then heard another detonation. “This is artillery,” Siron shouted. Shot rained down from the roofs—shrapnel shells. This was the first time the Cyclists had been shelled by artillery. Van Overstraeten viewed the advance of the Jäger from the second story of the brewery. “From the attic window we watch the progress of the attack. Infantrymen, in a meadow south of the road, stand up, run a few paces, drop, and fire. Clad in their green-gray uniforms they are barely recognizable. . . . Bullets strike the brick walls, all in all, just a meager performance.” Derenne recalled, “The moment to blow up the bridge had come. The Germans had come close now. We had to draw back the defenders of the barricade. That same moment, German artillery opened fire. The first shells severely damaged the brewery. No chance now to go back to take positions there. In 1964, Van Overstraeten claimed he then proposed to throw up a barricade on the Velp Bridge. “I propose that the Cyclists erect a barricade at the second bridge, out of view of the enemy. Influenced by the baptism by the enemy artillery, they disappear . . . one by one. . . . Maj. Siron decides that he cannot stand and hold here any longer—and decides to retreat to the edge of the village.”

The Belgians went back and attempted to blow up the Gete River Bridge. Their attempt would not be completely successful. The dynamite they used seemed to have lost its strength. Later, it was said that it had only one-quarter of its power. Col. Dujardin recalled in 1956, “The organization of the Platoon of Engineers Cyclists I commanded on 12 August as a Captain-Commandant was zero. We got old, foldable bicycles and out-of-date material handed over by the Cyclists. We had been equipped with ‘material’ from the Antwerp Engineer Depot.”

            1000 Hours. The German main body halted at Herk-de-Stad to feed and water the horses. Dragoner Regt Nr 18 was in Herk-de-Stad.

            After the Belgian Lancer’s positions had been changed at 0800, something went terribly wrong with the Guides Brigade. This event would have serious consequences for the Belgians when the 4th Mixed Brigade came to the battlefield. As previously noted, de Witte had verbally ordered Gen. de Monge of the Guides Brigade to operate mounted in the enemy’s flank; dismounted Lancers would halt the Germans. How these verbal messages were passed is not clear. It seems that 2nd Guides Regt initially thought they had to defend Velpen with its 1st and 2nd Squadron (the 4th Squadron was at Budingen; the 3rd Squadron had been sent to the Bokkenberg to protect the artillery). A 1st Cav Brigade reconnaissance had determined that at Velpen there was a “lack of field of fire and too many houses alongside the main road, the most probable way of approach for the Germans.” As a result, 2nd Guides Regt positioned itself about 400 to 500 meters southwest, leaving Velpen undefended. Neither division-level leaders nor the reinforcing 4th Mixed Brigade understood this major change.