Halen 33-Belgian Reinforcements Arrived – 2
Their speed seemed insufficient. Two officers of the Cav Div Staff coming by urged them on more, but as Lt.C Beernaerts later wrote, did not bring instructions regarding their future gun positions. The artillery arrived at the sunken road 700 meters northwest of the Loksbergen bell tower, where the batteries were required to wait at the crossroad Oude Leuvensebaan-Rozenstraat. The Cav Div Staff officers picked up the artillery before Waanrode, leading them east as the road meandered along the Liefkensrode ridge. Civilians watched the scene from a large farm on the right side. Among them was Louise from the IJzerwinning Farm. She could not know then that within a few hours these guns would set ablaze her stables and barn. Flor Stroobants, then only five years old, was happy there were no Guides among the troops. These big men with hairy hats riding horses had seemed like giants to her when she had met them when leaving the IJzerwinning Farm. Seventy years later, she still had not forgotten.
The 4th Mixed Bde’s artillery commander must have been quite angry. After speeding to arrive, he reached the battlefield only to discover that no one could show him where to position his guns. With his three battery commanders, he rode toward the gun positions at the Bokkenberg hoping to receive at least some information there, but obtained none. They knew nothing about the fight—they had only fired some shells during the charges.
For this reason, Van Acker decided to take position near the Loksbergen Mill. As they started to position, Lt. Van Overstraeten (an artillery officer himself) appeared, bringing the order to return one battery to Loksbergen. The 9th Batt that had ridden in the last position executed this order and went up to the church. The battery commander rode up to Lt. Gen. de Witte, who stood just outside the village, pointing out a position in an orchard across from the church. The twelve artillery guns were handled carelessly and inefficiently. The 9th Batt would fire some 250 shells in all; the two other batteries far fewer. The German FAR Nr 35, having moved on to Velpen, started shelling the Belgian gunners at their poetical windmill site. The 7th Batt gun crews immediately plunged into the sunken road, not to fire a single shot during the whole battle. The 8th Batt crews were luckier due to their positions beneath the trees. They had not been shelled by the Germans and had fired eighty-five shells on the enemy.
According to Van Overstraeten, de Witte had initially planned for two battalions to relieve the Lancers. The main body of the infantry brigade would advance on Halen along both banks of the Velp Creek. The artillery would be positioned at the Loksbergen Mill, minus one battery that would have to support the right wing positioned in the small woods south of the Loksbergen Road.
I [Van Overstraeten] escort the 9th Batt/4th Mixed Bde assigned to support the right flank to its position near the road leading to Loksbergen. Because of lack of telephone lines, the battery commander and the commander of the 1st Bn/4th Line Inf Regt agree that by 1600 hours 1st B/4th Line Inf Regt will stand in skirmishing line in front of Velpen. The Guides, despite orders directing them to do so, do not occupy Velpen.
Rademakers only knew that Halen had fallen. He had no intelligence about the enemy or information on friendly troop locations. He asked officers of the Guides whether Velpen was occupied, and they answered, “No, but you have to hurry up.” The Guides already knew that Velpen was unoccupied and Rademakers had just found out, but de Witte did not know. When Rademaker’s men passed the southeastern point of Loksbergen Wood, they saw the 1st Guides Regt shooting at something but could not determine what. The Guides were positioned higher on the terrain, so that they were able to dominate the plain. “Suddenly, the Guides stopped firing; we saw them waving with their busbies and shout,” recalled the 4th Mixed Bde Adjutant. The Guides had fired on the last of the cavalry charges. These were their first and last shots, because once the 1st Bn/4th Line Inf Regt passed the Guides, the horsemen departed. Not only had the Guides left Velpen unoccupied, they had left swiftly in order to reassemble at the southeastern edge of the Loksbergen Wood. The cavalry immediately left the battlefield as the infantry appeared.
Several staff officers had left to meet up with 4th Mixed Bde. The units had not been assigned or deployed on the battlefield according to any planned scheme, but practically in their order of appearance. Even the report de Witte made 16 August did not accord the real events. By lack of intelligence and cohesion, these cavalry staff officers had simply directed the infantry battalions toward where they judged the greatest danger.
Before considering the 4th Mixed Bde performance, it is important to point out a few truths. The 4th Mixed Bde was mainly composed of mobilized national service men, equating in age to the German reservists. The state of the leadership was miserable. Many companies had only two officers whose training was frequently outdated. This instability stood in sharp contrast to the Cav Div, where all officer postings—from second lieutenant to lieutenant general—were manned. The 4th Mixed Bde had just sustained a hard march and entered the battle uncoordinated and without intelligence—and at the same moment the cavalry was retreating. They immediately came up against the well-trained German infantry and a huge number of machine guns. They had come to a battlefield littered with the dead and crying wounded, not an ideal environment for this brigade’s initial fight. Unlike the cavalry who sat and waited, these poor men had to take the offense.
The 1st Bn/4th Line Inf Regt continued its advance across the fields up to the road where they deployed. Their first shots, at 400 meters, were aimed at the last German cavalry charges. When they came closer to the Velpen crossroads, the first enemy bullets started to whistle. The small group with the major reached the road and followed it, marching in the ditch at the roadside. North of them, 2nd and 4th Comp/1st Bn jumped forward toward the Betserbaan. Capt.-Commandant Libert, Adjutant of the Belgian 4th Mixed Bde Commander, noted:
Both leading companies are now deployed before Velpen. Machine gun fire starts again the moment men rise. Losses are already high. . . . Hedges and brushwood surround the Velp meadows, so we cannot see what happens at our right [ 3rd Bn/24th Line Inf Regt flank guard]. . . . Two shells crashed into a house about 250 meters from the crossroad with the Betserbaan, south of the Velpen Road. This was where the Rademakers battalion was housed. Fire ravaged the farm.
The commander of the German G MG-Abt Nr 2 reported first one, then six, Belgian companies 400 to 500 meters away. He positioned all six guns in a way to maximize the field of fire and come nearer to the Belgians. The Belgian Infantry appeared in a dense marching column at nearly 400 meters on the Velpen-Loksbergen Road. “I ordered to open fire. The result was terrible. What did not fall down crawled for cover. . . . An artillery officer came and asked whether we had some wishes. I told him about the house where we had noticed a Belgian spotter on the roof. The large barn went up in flames.”
Before advancing on Velpen, Rademakers had coordinated with the artillery to have Velpen shelled at about 1600 hours—after this bombardment, he would attack. This was all done internally—in the infantry brigade—with no help from the cavalry division. The shelling turned out to be a failure, as only a few shells were used and the coordinating information had not been properly passed down. As a result, the shells crashed down near Velpen before the Germans had occupied the hamlet in force. The Belgian infantry came attacking from the west, while at the same time German infantry advanced from the fields and meadows around the Betserbaan and the Loksbergen Road. The 1st Bn/4th Line Inf Regt was pinned down about 200 meters in front of the Betserbaan crossroad.
The losses near Velpen were severe, especially among the officers. The commander of 2nd Comp/1st Bn/4thLine Inf Regt was killed. His only other officer was evacuated due to wounds, as was the battalion commander. The commander of 4th Comp also fell. Both companies retreated. The men were demoralized and exhausted.
The two remaining companies of the 3rd Bn/4th Inf Regt arrived at the battle site. Although passing the Cav Div Staff, they received no order, so they followed the vanguard (1st Bn/4th Line Inf Regt) to operate with them. Their commander was wounded, so both remaining companies of 3rd Bn connected about 300 meters from the vanguard. Rademakers ordered the 3rd Bn/4th Line Inf Regt to operate at his right.
Both machine-gun sections advanced. The dogs that drew the machine-gun carts were completely exhausted by the heat and dust during the march and had to be left behind with farmers. Soldiers themselves now drew the carts. When the Maxim company commander asked a captain-commandant of the Guides for intelligence, he receive the answer, “Come on, hurry up, the Germans are about to flee. Where is the 4th Line Infantry Regiment?” With the dogs left behind, the Maxim company now consisted of only two sections.
Next, a company of the 2nd Bn/24th Inf Regt arrived. Their machine gunners could not identify the German machine-gun positions. Therefore, their captain ordered them to lay fire upon the haystacks, hedges, windows, and roof windows. The whole area from the Velp Creek meadows to the fields near the road were thus swept by Belgian machine-gun fire looking for an enemy that could not be seen. One Belgian machine gun jammed and was no longer able to fire. Lt. Pott of the German Jäger Bn Nr 9’s MG Komp reported, “the Belgian strange way of fighting, hurrying from house to house firing, showed this.” The Belgians admitted to their own lack in skills and drill, and to German supremacy, as they wrote, “The enemy shoots back in bursts. . . . The captain and a sergeant quartermaster positioned themselves behind the machine guns, as training for the men proved too rudimentary.” Two Belgian machine guns became incapacitated by enemy fire.