Halen 31 – The Belgian Cavalry Division Withdraws
The taking of Halen by the Jäger Battalion and the eight successive cavalry charges that followed were intended to defeat the Belgian forces. At the end of these charges, the Belgian 4th Mixed Brigade arrived on the field to “save the day.” Until that time, and despite the interaction of the Guides Brigade, the little Belgian Cav Division had inflicted a crushing defeat to the haughty German Cavalry. However, a German cavalry division consisted of more than just horsemen. There were Jäger, machine gun, and artillery battalions. A brigade of HKK 2’s 2nd Kav Division had arrived on the field, dismounted, and joined the fray; and an artillery battalion of the 2nd Kav Division was already in action against the Belgians. Lt. Gen de Witte had to decide what to do. One of the hardest things to do in combat is to determine that you won. Frequently, the winner of an engagement is determined by who possessed the battlefield at the end. But confusion reigned supreme in the Belgian lines, and it was not clear what the Cav Division should do. De Witte needed to keep his division intact. They could not stand alone in a firefight against the rest of the German Cavalry. As a result, the Belgian Cav Division started to withdraw and leave the battlefield to the Germans. (Amessenger had informed de Witte that he would receive reinforcements. With these additional troops, he would have to push the enemy back over the Gete.) Even some Germans had the impression that de Witte should have pursued.
1630 Hours. The 3rd and 4th Squadron/5 L moved back to Loksbergen under heavy machine-gun and artillery fire. After half an hour, at about 1700 hours, the commander of the 4th Squadron/5 L tried to avoid the artillery shells that were coming down on Loksbergen by retreating further. This started a general retreat towards Kapellen that went on for about twelve kilometers! The Belgian Cav Division line of defense was cracking—and 4th Mixed Brigade would arrive just in time.
Stabsartzt Dr. Hänisch of the Kürassiere determined, “This was our first fight, clearly not led well, that went badly wrong. It is only because the enemy did not pursue us grimly that we were able to avoid even heavier losses.”
When describing their last charges, the Germans often spoke about fire they received from the direction of Loksbergen and Velpen. This had come from 2nd Guides Regt and from the first elements of 4th Mixed Brigade—1st Bn/4th Line Inf Regt—that had just arrived at the battlefield. These units had been anxiously awaited. De Witte admitted, “Still, 4th Mixed Brigade has not yet arrived! For two hours now my staff officers gallop around, looking for them, while I wait for them. Alas, a mistake in the transmission of messages had kept them waiting. It is only by 1030 hours that they started marching on.” Although a staff officer did find the 4th Mixed Brigade near Miskom, de Witte again honestly admitted the situation after the German charges: “Within the Belgian Cav Division, panic had arrived!
1500 Hours. At the Mettenberg Hill, the Belgian Artillery pulled back. After waiting a while, 1st Batt/A Ch repositioned 300 meters further east and did not fire again in the engagement.
1510 Hours. The German 2nd Kav Division’s artillery—FAR Nr 35—took positions 1,500 meters southwest of Halen. The Leibhusaren Brigade, as Gen.Lt von der Marwitz had ordered, moved through Halen behind the German 4th Kav Division units. Later, 5th and 8th Brigade/2nd Kav Division would follow. Jäger Bn Nr 9 and one squadron of Leibhusaren (LH) Regt Nr 2, dismounted, advanced to the sunken road (Betersbaan).
With the 1st Belgian Cav Brigade (Guides) fearing friendly fire, Velpen lay completely unoccupied by Belgian troops. The other Belgian cavalry brigade, 2nd Cav Brigade (Lancers), became uneasy, as the Cyclists were no longer in position in front of them to screen the German infantry. Jäger Bn Nr 9, with the company of Jäger Bn Nr 7 that had taken Halen, then re-entered the action. They advanced and occupied the sunken Betserbaan, from where they fired on the IJzerwinning positions. They were not alone. The G MG-Abt Nr 2 reinforced them. Jäger Bn Nr 9 recalled, “At about 1600 hours (1500 hours Belgian time), 1st and 2nd Komp rose from their positions. They were deployed under cover of the village, at the battalion’s left wing in the area west of Velpen. The hamlet was occupied by 3rd Komp and the MG-Abt.” The commander of the G MG-Abt Nr 2 later witnessed, “As fire came in our direction from a wheat field and from sheaves south of the IJzerwinning Farm, I aimed our fire towards there. Soon some silhouettes could be seen running for cover in the farm.” A bit further, he wrote, he had met the 3rd Kav Brigade commander crying out, “Where is my proud brigade?” But more importantly, he pointed out that it had happened “left in the crossroad of two sunken roads.” This was the cutting of the Lansiersstraat with the Betserbaan. Testimonies show that from the Velpen houses far above the Betserbaan, a great many Germans had deployed and positioned machine guns. As a result, the Belgian 4th Mixed Brigade would arrive in the middle of the advancing German infantry. Especially near Velpen, this would later prove to have nasty consequences.
1530 Hours. The battery harnessed and disappeared. The commander of the 1st Squadron/5 L was astonished, as he had not received orders to accompany them.
1600 Hours. Lt. Robin and the 1st Squadron/5 L retreat. “We leave the Mettenberg. We only leave behind a small guard party.” Even the two machine-gun sections of the cavalry positioned at the sides of the Mettenberg Hill left. They would eventually be found back at kilometer marker 7 of the Tienen-Diest main road, approximately fifteen kilometers away from the battlefield!
The 4th Mixed Brigade replaced 1st Squadron/4 L. Sometime between 1530 and 1600, the squadrons of both Lancers regiments withdrew. Lt. de Heusch, who had spent his day at the barricade with 4th Squadron/4 L as well as two platoons from 2nd Comp/Cy Bn, now rejoined the main body.
In the meantime, the commanding officer had left his position without notifying me. Then, Maj. Siron, Commanding Officer of the Cyclist Battalion, allowed me to retreat towards the Loksbergen heights. I was completely confused, as I had no idea where my commander had gone. To me it seemed logical to go towards Loksbergen where the fight raged on. However, near Loksbergen we were assigned to defend the regimental standards of the 1st and 2nd Guides Regiments, by the commanding officer of the 2nd Guides Regiment. As we complied, we noticed about three squadrons pass by assigned with the fantastic mission to pursue the enemy[!]
As fantastic and unbelievable as this may sound, around 1600 hours a message from de Witte to the commander of the 1st Cav Brigade (Guides) directed, “Assemble the brigade’s available squadron and direct them via Loksbergen Wood and the Bokkenberg Heights towards the enemy’s right flank. Your mission: an hour later, depending on the circumstances, launch an assault by fire and force a breakthrough.” De Witte wanted to move this brigade all the way around to his left and threaten the German right flank.
The Lancers were then subjected to German machine-gun fire from a distance of about 500 meters. “The charges had just stopped as we receive rifle and machine-gun fire. Fortunately, the fire is aimed too high. Capt. Demaret, Commander of the 2nd Squadron/4 L, and Adjutant (WO2) Rousselet were killed in the farm’s attic as they showed themselves in the roof window. They were trying to figure out the positions of the German machine guns.”
For many years, a small stone wreath had hung in the farm courtyard—a wreath that Demaret’s fiancé had put on his grave during the war. The captain was buried then near the Ijzerwinning Farm. Flor Stroobants, who was 75 years old in 1984, recalled that her mother had given a “white silk handkerchief” she had found on his body to that lady.
“The situation became critical now. Of the 190 rounds every man received that morning, not much is left now. The battlefield looks horrible. The meadow is full of bodies and wounded. The road and the ditches are filled, hooting increases. Enemy infantry is at 150 meters!”
According to de Witte, “Situation is to become critical now, especially by the action by the enemy machine guns having a devastating impact on the men’s moral, even more as they are not able to determine from where it comes.”
The 3rd Squadron/4 L moved back to the 1st Squadron/4 L line past the farm. The 4th Pl at the farm held its position as the rear guard and sent out a patrol to its left flank. The farm was shelled then, for the first time. As 4th Pl had no visibility to the north, it went back, man by man, to just behind the brick factory. They barricaded the farm. This intermediate position offered no good field of fire; therefore they took a second position behind the hedges 200 meters west. It was there the platoon received the order to rejoin their horses. A few Lancers stayed behind with the quartermaster and a Wachtmeester (Belgian cavalry sergeant). The Germans did not attack the farm immediately; they only occupied it for a short time at about 1800 hours.
As 5th Lancers prepared to scramble back and follow the 4th Lancers, 4th Mixed Brigade became engaged. The 2nd Squadron/5 L had been informed that it would be allowed to withdraw the moment the infantry arrived—and so it did. The moment the line soldiers were in sight, the Lancers withdrew to Loksbergen. Things were different for the Guides, though. The 1st Guides, positioned east of Loksbergen Wood, scrambled off as 4th Mixed Brigade passed—as the commander of the Belgian 1st Cav Brigade had ordered. He wanted to regroup at the southwest edge of the wood, fairly far away from the turmoil of battle. Alternately, it might have been good methodology for the brigade commander to follow de Witte’s guidance and move the Guides Brigade around to the left.
The telegram de Witte transmitted to SQH summarized, “Cavalry Division fought the whole day from 0800 hours till dusk. 4th Mixed Brigade arrived at about 1500 hours. The men were exhausted and due to a shortage of cadre it had been impossible to pursue the enemy. . . . Losses are three KIA and 200 WIA. . . . The conduct of all Cavalry Division has been extraordinarily brilliant.” After the war, he said that they did not arrive until 1530. The controversy about the brigade’s arrival time—and who would get the glory—continued long after the war.