GERMAN STRATEGY IN CAMEROON IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR
I wrote an article on here before about the general defensive strategies of the German colonies in the First World War. All of us have heard of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Schutztruppe in East Africa fighting on for the entire war, so the obvious question to me was; why didn’t Cameroon or German South West Africa last as long? They both had Schutztruppe garrisons, why did they both fall after a year or so of fighting?
Governor Karl Ebermaier initially appealed to Britain and France to respect the 1885 Treaty of Berlin by guaranteeing neutrality in the Congo Basin including German Cameroon or Kamerun. When it was clear that Britain and France had no intention of abiding by the treaty, the governor left the conduct of the military campaign in the hands of his Schutztruppe commander, Carl Zimmermann. This was in direct contrast to the situation in German East Africa where Governor Schnee continually clashed with the Schutztruppe commander, von Lettow-Vorbeck.
German Cameroon had a peacetime Schutztruppe of 185 German Officers, NCOs and staff and 1,550 African other ranks organised into 12 field companies and an artillery detachment. By comparison the East African Schutztruppe had around 300 German officers, NCOs and staff and 2,700 askari other ranks organised into 14 field companies with an artillery detachment.
(* A small note on terminology that is often mistaken. The word Askari comes from Arabic and spread down the East Coast of Africa. The African soldiers of the German East African Schutztruppe were therefore called ‘Askari’ but the African soldier of the Cameroon Schutztruppe were not. They are usually referred to in the German of the day as ‘Farbige Soldner’, literally ‘Coloured mercenaries’. I think in modern terminology ‘African Soldier’ will suffice.)
There was also an armed police force or ‘Polizeitruppe’ of around 40 German Officers and NCOs and 1,225 African other ranks. Once the Polizeitruppe, reservists and re-enlisted soldiers had been added to their strength the wartime peak of the Schutztruppe in Cameroon was 1,460 Germans and 6,550 Africans. This full strength was however impeded by shortages of weapons and ammunition.
Similarly to the situation in German East Africa, local labour and resources were made the most of. They used of captured enemy weapons when possible and even improvised their own bullets using mining explosives- these proved to be unreliable and often dangerous for the user but the fact is they tried it, they were on a total war footing.
The surrounding British and French colonies both launched invasions of Cameroon in August 1914. The French from French Equatorial Africa the east, and the British from Nigeria the north and west. The Belgians also later began an advance from the Belgian Congo in the south-east.
The Germans held certain strong points such as Mora and.Garua in the north but mostly fought defensive actions as they retreated towards their new capital of Jaunde in the centre of the colony. They made the most of the jungle and mountainous terrain as they went which along with the rainy season, continuously delayed Allied advances.
The Allies also had the problem that there was little or no co-ordination and communication between them. The French were doing their bit, the British were doing theirs but there was no planned meet up point. In fact that was the Allies’ largest problem. They didn’t know where the Schutztruppe intended to stand and fight. Where was their strong point, what was the aim of the campaign?
The original coastal capital, Duala had been surrendered early on with barely a fight. The Germans, as in other colonies rarely chose to fight in their developed areas. They were saving their infra-structure for after the victory in Europe.
The British and French continued to close in on the Schutztruppe throughout 1915, yet despite Allied victories Garua and Ngaundere the Schutztruppe had not been decisively defeated. In actual fact the Cameroon Schutztruppe were planning an escape route into neutral Spanish Muni territory, so the border with Muni should have been the allies objective to cut off. Instead they were conducting campaigns to conquer the central highlands and defeat the Schutztruppe there.
In January 1916, the German force crossed into Spanish Muni territory where they accepted neutral internment. This included 975 Germans of whom 575 were combatants and 14,400 Africans of whom around 6,000 were soldiers but also included whole families and communities, especially of the Beti tribe. Meanwhile the allies fought on against the last German garrison at Mora in Northern Cameroon until February 1916. Britain and France now split the German territory between themselves. However, they had missed the point. The Cameroon Schutztruppe had not surrendered nor given up hope.
The bulk of the Schutztruppe was now in nominal Spanish custody but they far outnumbered their Spanish hosts who struggled to deal with the influx of refugees. They were then moved to a Spanish island off the coast of Cameroon called Fernando Po (now called Bioko). It is directly opposite Duala, about twenty miles from the coast.
There the undefeated Schutztruppe played the waiting game, re-arming and re-training. During this time they kept the original pre-war organisation of twelve field companies but the strength of each was now doubled. They drew up several plans to re-take Duala, which they were aware was now manned by a garrison much smaller than their own.
Britain and France protested several times to Spain for allowing (and possibly supplying) a combatant army on its territory. The Spanish reluctantly relented step by step. Removing the Schutztruppe’s machine guns (!) was one step, sending Ebermaier, Zimmerman and other leaders to mainland Spain was another. Nevertheless a large and partially armed Schutztruppe force remained just off the coast of Cameroon throughout the war in the hope of the European victory that never came. The African soldiers and remaining Germans were eventually repatriated to their respective homelands in 1919.
I would argue that this was the best strategic situation the Germans could have hoped for, certainly better than surrendering to the allies somewhere in the central highlands after the loss of many more casualties. As in East Africa, the Schutztruppe by 1918 could only hope to regain their colony by a victory in Europe but in Cameroon less bloodshed was caused to achieve the same result. Unlike the other colonies Cameroon retained an armed presence in the area, ready to re-take the colony as soon as the elusive German victory in Europe was achieved.
I’m happy to hear other’s opinions on the Cameroon campaign in the comments below.