The Development of Infantry Doctrine – part three
Traditionally, the German military had always distinguished between geleitetem Feuerand Schützenfeuer. Geleitetes Feuer or directed fire was where officers controlled distance, target, and direction. Schützenfeuer, on the other hand, was used mostly by Jäger units that had better-trained, independent marksmen, who were beyond the direct control of their officers. Schützenfeuer made the more traditional officers feel uncomfortable due to the perceived loss of control. Unfortunately the war against France came too quickly after Moltke’s 1869 guidance, and the required doctrinal change in tactics did not happen. These shortfalls led to several very bloody lessons for the Germans. The German armies won that war starting with a series of swift victories over the imperial French Army. Those victories were accomplished through significant numerical superiority and were often bought at the cost of very high losses.
In particular, the bloody assault of the Guard Corps on the strong French position at St Privat created the myth of the brave guard infantry dodging fire and facing death to earn victory for their king. Guard units performed intricate maneuvers in their prescribed battle order, and then they marched up the steep slope where the French Chassepot rifle started taking its toll at 1,200 m. On that slope, 30,000 Germans attacked for three hours sustaining 8,000 casualties, more than Pickett’s charge during the battle of Gettysburg.
At the same time, the consequences of St Privat started a fierce discussion about infantry tactics and the optimum way to attack such strongly defended positions. Fritz Hoenig, a well-known German military author at the time, even called the assault of St Privat a pointless slaughterhouse achieving little more than emptying the ammo pouches of the defending French regiments. Nevertheless, this tactic became the standard of martial behavior. Objectives could be seized and accomplished if the unit had the correct attitude and discipline. This standard was repeated constantly in countless books and reports as the vision of what drove German victory.
But even after the experience of 1870 and 1871, the 1847 manual was neither changed nor replaced. Instead the myth was perpetuated. St Privat-style attacks across more than 1,000 meters of open ground and ascending glacis against a well-defended position were considered brave and were systematically incorporated into training. The company column continued as the regular attack formation of the German infantry during the Franco-Prussian War. Regiments heading into attack first broke up into their battalions, one next to another, and then again into company columns. A company forming an attack column had its first and second platoons three lines deep, each following one another. The third platoon was put in front, usually half of the platoon forming a skirmish line advancing about 100 meters ahead of the battalion.