As not a single person gave me a hint of what they wanted I am doing a subject that always fascinated me. This was heavily foot noted and attributed to Jack Sheldon who did the vast majority of the research. Fascinating topic that needs more explanation-(Sheldon, The German Army at Ypres 1914, 2010).-
Falkenhayn Mobilizations
Mobilization had only been prepared for the predicted number of reserve, Ersatz, Landwehr, and Landsturm units. For additional formations, there were neither arms (except the totally outdated rifles Model 1871 and 71/84), nor uniforms, helmets, nor other equipment. There were neither train formations nor supply columns. There was no artillery; there were no reserve or Landwehr officers or NCOs to be mobilized as potential leaders. It soon became clear that this mass of unarmed, non-uniformed, and disorganized men had to be structured into field formations if the operational plan in the west was to have any chance of success.
On 16 August 1914, the War Minister, General v. Falkenhayn ordered the mobilization of six further reserve corps [Initially Falkenhayn ordered mobilization of five new reserve corps (XXII-XXVI). Number seven (XXVII reserve corps) was built up in co-operation with the Saxon War Ministry, and its mobilization was ordered a little later than the initial five reserve corps. The 6 Bavarian Reserve Division was mobilized in co-operation with the Bavarian War Ministry.] and a Bavarian reserve division, which were supposed to be operationally ready on 10 October 1914. The mobilization of these formations was ordered only two weeks after the war broke out; it was driven by a kind of desperation that can be seen from their structure, their skimped training, and the unrealistic rush in which they had to be fielded. Unlike other active, reserve, or even Landwehr formations, no infantry brigades had been formed. Thus, there were initially no brigade commanders in the division. The division staff had to attempt to command all four reserve infantry regiments and the artillery. Controlling the inexperienced, cursorily trained men and officers, who generally had no field experience, was an almost impossible task.
Thus, in September 1914, the XXII–XXVII Reserve Corps were mobilized. These formations were made up of the 43d-54th Reserve Divisions and the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division. Reserve Infantry Regiments 201-248 and Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiments 16, 17, 20, and 21 belonged to those corps. Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 16, known as Regiment “List” after the regimental commander, was dispatched to Flanders with the Kriegsfreiwilliger, Adolf Hitler marching in its ranks. A battalion of these regiments consisted of 21 officers (the commander, adjutant, four company commanders, 12 platoon commanders, one Stabsarzt, and two medical officers) and 947 NCOs and enlisted men. Original reserve regiments mobilized in August 1914 had 26 officers and 1,038 NCOs and EM. There was a real shortage of junior leadership. Older men from the Landwehr or the Landsturm replaced the junior NCOs and lieutenants, who were normally found at the company level. These men were not only older, but senior in rank and had to be trained before they could train others. The doctrinal training of the retired officers was overwhelmingly out of date and not up to modern standards. They had neither a good understanding of weaponry, nor were there any trained staffs. The equipment was desperately short in every category, especially footwear. Some of the uniforms were as much as 40 years old. Much of the equipment was not delivered to the units until just prior to deployment, eliminating the chance for the troops to train and familiarize themselves with the equipment.
There was also a shortage of training pamphlets and live ammunition. In Reserve Infantry Regiment 239, 48 men had only civilian clothes as late as 25 September. This quote from Reserve Infantry Regiment 236 sums up the situation clearly:
On the other hand nothing at all was ready for the unplanned formations called into life during mobilization in 1914. To clothe the flood of Kriegsfreiwilligen who came into the Army, there were peacetime uniforms but no wartime field gray clothing. In addition there were no rifles or machine guns and no personal equipment such as knapsacks or ammunition pouches, etc. There were also no vehicles, no field kitchens, or other mobilization stores necessary to equip troops. All the necessary instruction manuals were also lacking.
There was also a lack of artillery in the reserve divisions. There was only one reserve field artillery regiment (the first and second battalions were equipped with field guns, the third battalion with field howitzers) in the division; consequently, there was no brigade organization. The artillery brigade commander and the artillery officer, normally the primary consultant to the division commander in artillery matters, were not present. The recruits had no experience or training in dealing with the horses or horse teams. Not only could the recruits not drive the horse-wagons, but also, given the terrain and the weather, they had no concept of caring for the horses. Many horses died or fell ill. The state of gunnery training was equally bad. Their training was cut short, and live training with ammunition had been reduced to 40 shrapnel and ten high explosive shells per battery. This resulted in badly misfiring batteries that were not trained to direct their fire in co-operation with the infantry.
Despite these problems, after an inspection, these organizations were deemed ready for war by the end of September 1914. One of the inspectors, General Alfred von Loewenfeld was quite downhearted about the new units.
Everything in the way of training that could be done, was done. The infantry, which is still rather cautious in its movements, may be regarded as trained. Within the field artillery, the lack of officers is painfully evident. . . . The tactical ability of the commanders, especially at company and battery level is not good. These appointments have, for the most part, been filled with non-active officers of advanced age. In general they have found it difficult to meet the demands of modern warfare. Furthermore, their physical robustness and horsemanship, mounted as they are on mostly untrained and barely broken horses, is in many cases deficient. One particular fault is their lack of awareness of the risk posed by enemy artillery, even at long-range. This manifests itself in a willingness to maneuver ineffectually in massed formations only a short distance from the enemy. In addition there is a lack of awareness of cooperation between the arms in the context of the all-arms battle. This applies not only to the artillery but also to the infantry.
Based on perceived requirements, these formations received an extremely short period of training as little as eight weeks. Again, despite these problems the decision was made to press these formations into service in the so-called “Race to the Sea.” By 8 October, four of the new army corps were headed for Flanders.
Because these reserve corps had almost no time for systematic battalion, regimental, or divisional training, the mobilization of these reserve corps directly fed into the disaster of the first battle of Ypres and Langemarck. There is an overwhelming belief that the majority of these troops were volunteers—students or Kriegfreiwillige. This led to an enduring myth about the singing attacks by young student troops. The Nazis later used this “Spirit of Langemarck” in their public relations campaigns. While singing attacks are recorded in almost every German regimental history that was even remotely connected to the area, many of those were published in the late 1930s under Nazi supervision. The majority of men in the reserve regiments were not even students. Research indicates that only 18 percent were Kriegsfreiwillige and that included teachers, not quite the band of students of later legend. The picture that is included was done in the 1930s as a propaganda peice.
