Infantry Doctrine-4
The most important changes provided by both the Lebel and the commission rifle were range and the use of smokeless powder. Almost instantly, this change made many of the traditional infantry drill and tactics obsolete. Many of the densely manned line and column formations that still could be successfully employed on the smoke-covered battle fields of the black powder era would lead to disastrous losses under the conditions of rapid infantry fire by magazine-fed rifles firing smokeless rounds. With the introduction of the model 1888 rifle, a change in infantry tactics became inevitable, leading to an ongoing discussion between reform and traditional German officers. Triggered by Moltke’s Verordnung from 1869 and fueled by the evaluation of the bloody experience of 1870 and 1871, as well as reports from the American Civil War, the discussion ran between these two parties.
General-Major Wilhelm v. Scherff and and Oberst Albert v. Boguslawski represented the traditionalists. They helped to create the St. Privat myth that only dense formations and so-called “closed” (geschlossene) firing lines could really be under the full control of their officers, as opposed to loosely populated skirmish lines. Under the conditions of modern rifles, only these lines could develop enough firepower to win fire superiority over the enemy. They still believed that only the bayonet attack against an enemy shaken by the impact of fire superiority could achieve final victory. Scherff concluded that soldiers had to be supervised and closely led in combat. Only then would they overcome their fear and expose themselves to enemy fire. Even in the era of breechloaders, a soldier taking cover against fire and digging himself in appeared somehow contradictory to the “spirit of assault and heroism” that would be necessary to accomplish victory.
The reformers, represented by General Lieutenant Sisigmund v. Schlichting, saw the impact of technological development on combat. The Dreyse rifle had set off a development that would make it impossible now to just put men against fire. The increased range, rate, and precision of fire from magazine-fed repeating rifles would make it necessary to change the traditional formations. He championed ever-thinner skirmish lines of more independently acting riflemen who took cover by employing the terrain around them and by engaging their respective enemies at will. That would require an entirely different training of the individual soldier.
The reformers seemed to have better arguments, and Schlichting was asked to prepare the core second part of the new infantry manual. Although the 1889 infantry manual still listed company columns as a regular combat formation, there was a clear tendency towards a broader use of line formations and skirmish lines. Now an entire company of the battalion formed the skirmish line followed by the other two companies as soutiens. The traditionalists were pleased by the fact that company and even battalion columns could still be drilled in the 1889 manual. The reformers saw themselves justified by the core chapter about “infantry in combat” that Schlichting had written by himself. In it, emphasis was clearly put on more open line formations.
Tactically, the reformers were envisioning company columns that would deploy into lines at 1,500 to 2,000 meters. Then the formation would further disperse into random assault groups somewhere between 600 and 800 meters. This movement was a slow process, envisioned as taking two or three days to close within a distance of a couple of hundred meters. Only after those dispersed groups had established fire superiority would they perform a final charge. The decision to make this charge and how it was to be conducted was known as “delegated tactics.” This lack of centralized control was one of the main points of the 1889 regulation. It also became the center of controversy between traditionalists who wanted control and the reformists who wanted to delegate it. Knowing that the manual was open to interpretations, the Kaiser stated in the foreword that any acts against the first part (describing the formal drill from company up to brigade level) and third (about parades) part would be seriously reprimanded, whereas misunderstandings concerning the second part would be corrected during training.
The second part of the manual also introduced a general change in leadership. Fighting in skirmish lines spelled the end of any direct control by commanding officers. NCOs as well as the individual musketeers and fusiliers would have to take a stronger role. As a result, army training introduced the previously explained Auftragstaktik as a leadership philosophy. Auftragstaktik meant that officers would no longer issue precise orders but instead would assign tasks and objectives to their men. The men, in turn, would exercise their own judgment to accomplish the task. This concept was also formally known as “delegated tactics.” Scherff and Boguslawski continued to argue against Auftragstaktik, as they believed this leadership style would undermine the authority of commanding officers. The reformers prevailed, and the 1889 manual not only improved the tactical set-up of infantry attacks but also significantly changed the leadership philosophy within the Prussian army. In addition to the infantry manual, Schlichting’s writings acted as kind of comment and higher explanation of the spirit of the manual. Controversy did not end there as the execution of the new manual during maneuvers in 1891, 1895, 1896, and 1897 saw a stronger tendency for infantry units—often division sized—attacking en masse.