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August 11, 1914
By late afternoon of August 11, the 21-centimeter mortars had pounded Fort d’Evegnée into submission. Even before the arrival of the main body of the German siege artillery, six of the formidable 21-centimeter mortars had reduced two more adjacent forts on the northeast side of Liège. This created a three-kilometer gap that no Belgian artillery could cover.
The situation around Liège otherwise appeared unchanged. Second Army considered that there was not sufficient heavy artillery, and no one could say how long it might be before the northern forts were captured. Moreover, before they fell, it would be impossible for Ninth Corps to clear the roads between Aachen and the Meuse so that the advance north of Liège could begin. Nevertheless, the OHL had ordered rapid preparations made for that advance. Time was wasting. From information received, the Belgian Army appeared to be deployed on the Antwerp–Louvain–Namur front. The HKK 2 remained east of St. Trond, with its Ninth Cavalry Division southwest of Liège, and HKK 1 was still marching on Dinant.
German reinforcing troops started closing up on the eastern and southern fronts. Ninth, Seventh, and Tenth Army Corps had reached their deployment areas, and Guard Corps disembarked near Malmedy. The aerial reconnaissance assets on the right army wing were considerably reinforced by the FFAs of these four army corps. The destruction of three further Meuse bridges was observed: near Amay, at Engis, and the northernmost Liège Bridge. Good aerial photographs were taken of the Forts Chaudfontaine and Flemalle in the Liège fortification belt and of Fort Andoy (southeast of Namur). The FFA 9 conducted sorties in the circular sector of Aachen–Antwerp–Brussels–Namur–Rochefort. The observer on a mission of a Rumpler-Taube aircraft along the line Aachen–Antwerp–Brussels–Namur over a distance of 325 kilometers (201 miles) located the Belgian field army near Tirlemont. An airfield with three airplanes and dense troop movements in Leuven indicated the presence of the Belgian SHQ, positioned there six days earlier on August 5. The road leading to Tirlemont (Tienen) was packed with troops and vehicles all the way from Boutersem (approximately ten kilometers southeast of Leuven). These were the first signs of the Belgian field army deployment in the Gette River position.
In an endeavor to shift the invasion’s priority from tactics and the taking of Liège and onto the operational dimension of reconnaissance, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Jäger Battalions were detached back to HKK 2. Each was returned, but in various conditions after the losses of the Handstreichand the efforts to complete mobilization. Some had to march farther than did the others. Seventh and Ninth Jäger Battalions were up north and had already started joining HKK 2.
It is important to note that when the cavalry divisions did engage an enemy, they broke contact at dusk in order to bivouac, as was their standard procedure. Contact with the enemy was suspended for the night. Fourth German Cavalry Division stopped and bivouacked at Borgloon (Loozon the German maps). This was a small hilltop town in an area covered with high fruit trees. Much German movement was to be seen. From 1500 hours on, swarms ofFeldgrauen(field grays) had arrived and could be observed moving between the trees. Because the Belgian telephone system was still functioning, it could well be expected that reports of this movement reached the Belgian HQ.
The German Second Cavalry Division had to be taken out of the line due to starving and exhausted horses. The HKK 2 commander lamented his men as well had very little rest and were suffering from the shortage of food and forage: “Advance by these weakened troops seems impossible and their further employment should not be considered.” Second Army directed Ninth Army Corps to bring up forage for the horses and instructed HKK 2 to slow down if necessary. Second Army also told the cavalry to “requisition and live off the land.” The diet of the horses was bad. The war diary of HKK 2 lamented how the horses had to go hungry because the industrial country did not provide enough food:
From the rear area, nothing happened to supply enough oat. Repeatedly it was asked for help but the answer was always the same: “Collect and live out of the country,” and finally, when we were told that there would be no oat supply for three days, the directive was amended: “Slow down movement, if necessary.” But this was very undesirable for operational reasons and was entirely due to the lack of foresight of higher authorities.
The two cavalry divisions pulled back to a bivouac position east of St. Truiden (St. Trond), about halfway between the northern and central roads, where they rested on August 11. By then, the Germans had identified elements of First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Belgian Infantry Divisions. In addition, the Belgian Army had its Cavalry Division to the north of the infantry divisions. Marwitz did not have enough fighting power to engage the infantry directly and to delay their withdrawal. He decided to go north, or right, and match his two divisions against the one Belgian cavalry division. The Second Army Commander also ordered Ninth Cavalry Division, which for some time had been on the right bank of the Meuse southwest of Liège, to rejoin HKK 2 and Marwitz—a further logistics problem fordivisions already suffering from want of oats and ammunition.
The Germans were consistently trying to move to the right and to the north in an effort to envelop the left flank of the Belgian army. The Belgians were trying to deny the Germans this option and to withdraw into Antwerp. The German intent was somehow to turn the Belgian Army away from Antwerp. If, however, the Germans had in fact imposed themselves between the Belgian Army and the city of Antwerp, what could two cavalry divisions have accomplished? Although the Belgian Army may have been small compared to the main German armies, it certainly was large enough to deal with one understrength HKK. This operational situation literally begged for a second or third HKK, as Schlieffen had envisioned, to provide enough force at least to threaten, and hopefully turn, the left flank of the Belgian army.
