August 17, 1914
German reconnaissance determined that Belgian field army were still at the Gette River position. The expansion of Namur’s fortifications with fieldworks and the occupation of the Meuse down to Givet had been identified. Advanced elements of the French Fifth Army and of the Cavalry Corps Sordet were also identified near Namur. The French cavalry corps was now moving in forced marches to cover the left wing of the French forces. The Germans view that formation was. “Though it was probably not half starved like our cavalry, it was nonetheless very exhausted and worn out by the extraordinary marches…” The German First Army continued its advance on the seventeenth, moving abreast of Second Army. Second Army halted in place as First Army pivoted around its right.
Moltke issued new orders for the main German thrust into Belgium. At 1630 hours, the following order arrived from Supreme Command:
First and Second Army and Second Cavalry Corps (HKK 2 Marwitz) will be under the orders of the commander of Second Army during the advance north of the Meuse. This advance will begin on August 18. It is most important that the enemy’s forces reported to be in position between Diest–Tirlemont–Wavre should be shouldered away from Antwerp.It is intended to initiate further operations of both [numbered] armies from the line Brussels–Namur, and measures must be taken to secure their flank against Antwerp.
Speed was of the essence. First and Second Army had to pass through a dangerous eighty-kilometer-wide corridor between the fortresses of Namur and Antwerp, all the while securing their left flanks against suspected French forces south of the Sambre. The HKK 2 was supposed to be under the control of the OHL once the advance began. . So who was now responsible for finding and tracking the BEF?The Germans were operating with the belief that the Belgian Army would delay in position until the French arrived on their right flank and the British on their left. The overarching thought in German higher HQwas that the Belgians could be dealt with first and then in turn the British. Dealing with the BEF would in turn provide the opportunity to turn the French left flank.
Kluck argued against being put under the command of Second Army, stating it would have been more suitable if HKK 2 was under command of First Army, and First Army remained independent of Second Army. In Kluck’s view, Second Army would then be free to pursue tactical objectives to its front, and First Army could follow the operational objective of falling on the French flank. Kluck must have then intervened at the OHL on August 17, The result was a compromise. The OHL removed Second Cavalry Division from HKK 2 and attached it directly to First Army.
A major disagreement increasingly developed between the chiefs of staff of First Army and Second Army. Kuhl from First Army wanted to launch an immediate attack on the Belgian Army. Gen. Otto von Lauenstein, Chief of Staff of the Second Army, agreed with the concept of attack, but wanted to begin with envelopment of the Belgian forces by way of Beeringen-Pael. Kuhl disagreed, saying that the Belgian Army would not wait, but would be able to evade the enveloping movement in plenty of time. He strenuously argued that the only way to keep the Belgians out of Antwerp was to attack them in force at once with First Army, which was ready to launch such an operation. This well-known battle maneuver is designed to deprive the objective army’s freedom of movement. Sometimes known in the American vernacular of “holding them by the nose and then kicking them in the . . . ”The decision was made by Second Army deciding—to use the envelopment. Classic military tactical and operational planning would tell the perpetrators to fix the enemy front with an attack and then envelop. Bülow and Lauenstein were, seen in retrospect, putting the cart before the horse. Maneuvering against the flank of the Belgians without fixing the front in place assumes they were static, not dynamic. Instead, this decision kept Belgian freedom of maneuver intact. There is always the argument that this decision reflects leadership style. One course of action was very aggressive and the other one very cautious. These were not experienced armies. It is up to readers and analysts to determine if this methodology was reflected in other decisions of timing during the Marne campaign.It reflected a significant, and as of yet unjustified, dismissal of the Belgian Army as an opponent.
Roads held the keys to operational maneuver. A soldier marching on a road could go much faster than marching across an open field. The way that roads were designated by the German military was by listing connecting cities. So, if you read what seems a laundry list of towns, it really is presenting the roads that connect them. Those roads are assigned to a unit, and that unit has priority of movement on the road. The more roads that are available, the easier it is to maneuver. Unit length and road space used is a well-known tool that can be calculated during peacetime. The staff officer would look that amount of space up in his handbook which listed the road space distances for every conceivable kind of unit. If an army corps was limited to marching on one road the combat units would occupy thirty-one kilometers of road space; the logistics units, would occupy a further 21 kilometers of road space. If two roads were available and one division was able to have its own independent road, the division alone would take up fifteen kilometers of road space.
The First Army Order for August 18 was issued from its HQ at Glons at 2315 hours on August 17.
The movement would start with Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Corps marching abreast. Each of these had but one road. Two of these roads, those used by Second and Third Army Corps, were being used by two additional army corps, Third Reserve Corps following Second Army Corps; and Fourth Reserve Corps, the Third Army Corps.