August 20, 1914
Not surprisingly, the OHL realized they had insufficient cavalry on the right wing. Whentrying to screen his two armies on the far-right flank, Bülow complained vehemently about his shortage of horsemen.Moltke responded that “A strong cavalry force west of the Meuse is desirable. Therefore, HKK 1 will clear away from the front of Third and Fourth Army and begin moving around the northern side of Namur. Once it has arrived on the right bank of Meuse, it will pass under orders of Second Army.”
This directive from OHL was remarkable: It indicated that only two days after the general advance started, Moltke realized his deployment of cavalry divisions was wrong and ordered HKK 1 to move to the right of Second Army—changing armies and calling it a “long detour” around Namur. Operationally, this redirection was huge. Troschke was of the opinion that Moltke wanted to have the same five-division cavalry strike force that Schlieffen had in his original plan. The cavalry would do little good sandwiched between the French and German armies as the front line grew closer. HKK 1 was badly needed in the open fields of Belgium. HKK1 was currently situated in rough terrain with little chance to use their high mobility.
Translated to specifics, Moltke was ordering a cavalry force of two divisions to break contact, withdraw several miles, and conduct a major river crossing. After crossing the river, they would come under theoperational control of Second Army. That meant HKK 1 was to move at a ninety-degree angle across the communications zone of Second Army without disrupting the flow of troops and supplies, also avoiding entrapment in the developing siege of Namur. Next. HKK 1 was to move entirely around the communications zone of Second Army, establish two cavalry divisions on the right flank of Second Army, and make contact with the enemy. As a result, Poseck said, “much time was lost and the HKK was able to work its way only slowly toward the front of the [Second] Army, with the result that the HKK was again until August 28 making its way to the front of the army advance.” It took eight days to complete this maneuver at a time when hours were proving vital! Richthofen moved by forced marches around Namur from the left to the right wing of Second Army. Bülow expected HKK 1 was then supposed to take over the reconnaissance in front of the left wing of the First and the right wing of the Second Army, The first day wasa day of heavy marching, from about 0400 hours until 1900 hours. There was a repeated complaint that the horses had been through heat, rain, and dirt and were rapidly losing their conditioning.
Cavalry Corps Richthofen [HKK 1] was stuck between the marching columns of Second Army in a most unfortunate way. Now he had no space to move freely and had to squeeze through with his exhausted horses, without having any aim and everywhere regarded with disapproval. But this was not the fault of the cavalry leader. . . . We will later see how this happened repeatedly in the following days and how it affected the whole negatively.
The roads designated for this maneuver were absolutely clogged. The HKK 1 had to find clearance space not only around the combat troops, but all of the wagon trains in the communication zone bringing supplies to the front of Second Army. What HKK 1 had to do was to approach each of these roads at ninety degrees and try to cross the road when another unit had priority. Think of it as a 1914 game of frogger. Based on the way logistics were organized, the cavalry divisions had to get supplies by changing army corps as they moved. This accounts for the comment about being unwelcome.
Second Army also issued an order directing Second Cavalry Division to remain ahead of the right wing of First Army, coordinating with Second Army Corps about how the limited available roads were to be used. Second Cavalry Division began operations around the village of Wolverthem, pursuing the most important mission of reconnoitering for approaching British forces between Brussels and Antwerp.[i]In a skirmish with the Lifeguard Hussar Brigade, the Belgian cavalry lost one of the squadron standards for the Fifth Lancers to the Second Cavalry Division. The HKK 2 also skirmished with Sordet’s French Cavalry Corps. Long-range patrols were sent out to the south. It is instructive to note that when Fourth Cavalry Division withdrew into bivouac, they went all the way behind Second Army’s infantry. What that often required was a retrograde march of about thirty kilometers. The distance would have to be traversed again the following day.
Late in the afternoon Ninth Cavalry Division reached Marbais. There, Captain von Lobbecke, commanding Fifth Squadron Thirteenth Uhlans, received orders to reconnoiter westward in the area: Marbais–Nivelles–Braine le Comte (north boundary)–old road Marbais–Binche (south boundary). The same evening, the patrol on the left flank of the reconnaissance squadron clashed with hostile French outposts on the banks of the Pieton River west of Gosselies. As these outposts were not British, the reconnaissance zone for August 21 was limited in the south to the Canal du Centre as far as Condé, but prolonged in the north to Lille. Sordet’s French Cavalry Corps, on the point of ineffectiveness from being over-marched and undersupplied, withdrew.
First Army continued its advance to the west. “According to press reports received at army headquarters, the BEF had completed its disembarkation in French ports on August 18 [in reality, August 16]. The direction of the BEF’s advance was still unknown but it had to be assumed that it might close up via Lille.” First Army correspondingly eyed the horizon warily for the potential arrival of the British from the west. Headquarters now entertained a different fear that an advance to Ninove would be too far forward and expose the army’s flank to attack by the British. Brussels was the intellectual and financial center of Belgium as well as its capital. It had 650,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, Fourth Army Corps entered the city without struggle.
Bülow now instructed First Army to hold both of its reserve army co rps in readiness for use against Antwerp. Remember, Kluck had said that the forces in Antwerp could no longer be feared. Their presence was clearly scaring somebody. This raised the issue of splitting up forces for accessory tasks. First Army began to wonder if it had enough troops for a broad sweeping movement. The fear of moving the right flank forward to Ninove became a subject of discussion and disagreement between the liaison of Second Army and First Army HQ. As a result, the commander of First Army, General von Kluck, issued a short order. “To be prepared for its further tasks, First Army will make only a short march forward on the twenty-first, covering toward Antwerp.”
Undeterred by the loss of long-range reconnaissance on the nineteenth, First Army HQ’s FFA 12 sent another sortie over Ghent–Bruges–Ostend, an unusually long flight of three hundred kilometers. Upon returning, the observer reported the entire area “free of the enemy.” Further air reconnaissance was carried each Army Corps one area was Louvain–Mons–Charleroi–Wavre. All of these were desperately looking for any indication of the BEF or the left wing of the French Army.