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Still in pitch darkness, the regiment assembled at the southern exit of Westrozebeke on 3 November and marched forward to about 800 m west of Spriet on the road to Poelkapelle. There they turned off the road to reach the staging area. The III Battalion was to attack in the front line, the I Battalion behind in reserve, the II Battalion remained in Spriet. The regimental command post was Poelkapelle.

Lieutenants Schanzleh and Teicke were in charge of the front companies, Major von Rosenghal followed immediately behind with the reserve. The battalion entered the battle with three officers. The night was eerily dark and remarkably quiet. Around 5 o’clock in the morning, the commanded storm exit line was reached. Suddenly, mild infantry fire erupted from the left wing of the regiment. The fire came from the rear, apparently from the right wing of the 52 reserve division. As a result, heavy casualties occurred in the forward companies and everyone tried to find cover from friendly fire. Lieutenant Schanslech was badly wounded in the first minute (he died of his wounds on 6.11), leaving the front companies without leader. Major von Rosenthal took personal action with a firm hand, and succeeded in getting the battalion to dig in on the spot. The fire on the left wing naturally spread to the enemy. He was alive for sure, firing from all guns into dawn. The planned surprise had failed completely. The attack was broken off. The III Battalion dug in in the morning and had to surrender to heavy artillery and infantry fire. Its commander, Major von Rosenthal, was wounded and Lieutenant Teicke took his place. But he too was wounded soon afterwards and Lieutenant Wette took over as the last officer to lead III Battalion. The I Battalion, as a reserve behind the III Battalion, was somewhat more protected and therefore suffered fewer casualties. The regiment’s commander, Major Bredt, was also wounded for the second time in the morning and had to retire for good. The division commissioned Captain von Gack. At the same time, he received the order to put sappers forward during the night under all circumstances, since the attack was to be continued in the next few days by order of the army. On 4 and 5 November, an attempt was made to comply with the order to approach the enemy by sapping. this was also successful, but only with considerable losses, as the enemy was very alert.

The brave III Battalion, which had won the most ground within the division. But with what sacrifices! It was completely exhausted and was therefore relieved on 6.11 by the II Battalion to take up quarters at Spriet. The II Battalion continued the III Battalion’s attempts on 7.11 with fresher forces and was even able to dig a new trench about 100 m in front of the previous position and repel an enemy counterattack under the command of Officer Ferreau. However, the continuous fierce fire of the French prevented any further advance in the completely uncovered country.( The line reached here remained the forefront until the later gas attack in the spring of 1915. only then could the majority of the fallen be laid to rest some of them could be brought in at night by their comrades at the risk of their own lives.) The brave doctor Rollmann fell while bringing in a severely wounded man. On 8.11, Major von Mengersen took over command of the regiment, which he was to lead for more than three years. Von Mengersen immediately took action everywhere and first of all issued orders. The first thing to be done was to reorganise the command of the regimental section. Only two companies remained in the front line, the other two occupied a second line behind them, albeit one that was only hinting at it at first. The reserve battalion, which had previously been distributed in the country immediately behind the combat battalions, was withdrawn to Spriet. So von Menersen organised his combat troops according to depth. The last battalion took up quarters in Westrozebeke as a divisional reserve. Lieutenant Lissinger was appointed regimental adjudant. The leadership of Battalion II was taken over by Lieutenant Schneider, who replaced Captain Houwald. The attack was not abandoned on 9.11, but preparations were made for a new, larger advance on the 10th . To this end, the I Battalion was brought forward to Spriet and the III Battalion fired from Spriet closer to Poelkapelle. The 23rd reserve Jaeger battalion was placed under the regiment. The corps order stated that the decisive battle on the Ypres front would now begin. But the enemy had also realised what was at stake, and was on guard when the strong artillery preparations for the corps’ planned attack began, even resorting to counterattacks, especially against the front of II Battalion. Our landings in the regimental section were small, with heavy losses. Only the Jaegers made some progress. We were also to advance on 11.11. The breakthrough on Ieper was to be achieved at all costs. The corps next to us had captured 2,000 Frenchmen west of Langemark and had entered Diksmuide. The commander pointed to this success and repeatedly called for an energetic advance. Although the troops did their utmost to carry out the orders of the command, the forces of nature finally called a halt. The weather had changed and the Flanders winter set in, with grey skies and constant rain. The temporary trenches silted up and sank into the groundwater. Under such conditions, a major advance was impossible, and the enemy also suffered from the bad weather, so that their attempts to attack became weaker. General Major von Kleist took over the command of the division during these days. Although the enemy’s infantry activity was somewhat weaker, their artillery was all the more active. Poelkapelle received regular fire attacks day and night with grenades and shrapnel. Heavy artillery fire lay on Spriet and Westrozebeke and constantly scattered the approach roads. In one of these fire raids from Spriet, Lieutenant der reserve “Stuhl”, was killed. After the bloody assault battles of Langemark and Poelkapelle had ended and the fight had turned into trench war fighting on this section of the front, new physical and mental demands were placed on the young men These demands, which lacked the drive and enthusiasm of success in the attack, appealed to a high degree of self-discipline. The battle was not only against the enemy, but also against the rain and mud of the Flanders plain. The fighting was still very lively, since the enemy, still extremely nervous and obviously fearing new attacks by the Germans, maintained a very lively infantry fire, especially at dusk and at night. With the still completely undeveloped trenches and no communication routes, this fire caused daily casualties.

at that time the regiment had only one trench, which formed the front line, for lack of any other trenches the traffic to the rear could only take place at night. This traffic was mainly for fetching food and ammunition. It was always a difficult walk for the fetchers of food through the enemy’s bullets , and often they had to use their harnesses to “jump up, march, march” as they had practised during the attack. As long as the soup was thick enough, the food in the harnesses arrived undiminished in the trenches, but if it had turned out a little thinner, then some of the harnesses had already leaked on the way. but what mattered most to the soldier in the trenches was the coffee, and that landed without loss in the well-filled canteens. When the food had been “eaten”, the soldiers went to the little stream that cut the line of the trench to clean the dishes

Then the digging began. The occupation of this single line of battle was very thin, given the severely weakened companies. All the companies had only about 60-70 men. The assigned sections, however, were very long, so that posts and entrenchments had to be held continuously throughout the night. Great care had to be taken. The enemy fired a lot, and the eye of the guard peered sharply into the darkness, supported by the ear, which listened for any suspicious noise . There were still cattle and above all pigs, roaming around, and when such an old sow approached the trench grunting, a fierce gunfight would break out at first, until the supposed enemy’s peaceful intentions were recognised. The entrenchment work consisted only of scooping out what had turned to mud in the course of the day and pouring it over the breastworks, without, however, increasing the height of the breastworks, for a piece of it fell away again every day. some work was also done on the trench defences, gloomy shelters were created, consisting of a door placed over an extension of the trench, and a tent runway served as a closure. Slowly, parts of the houses and sheds of Poelkapelle were moved into the trenches. At that time, however, not too much was done in this direction, as for the time being it was still expected that soon things would move on again. After all, in the trenches one often had to wade through the mud, it was not uncommon for one or the other to be so exhausted by fatigue while standing on guard at night that he fell asleep standing up until he fell flat on his face in the trench. During the day it was usually very quiet. everyone who didn’t have to stand on guard was asleep. For hours on end there was often not a shot fired, and this attracted a few daring men, who also wanted a bit of variety in the daily monotony , to venture along a hedge over a ditch into gardens to hunt down poultry which could still be found occasionally.

And here we end with RIR 235 for a while.