Georg Cornelius Adalbert von der Marwitz was born on July 7, 1856 in Stolp (now Słupsk, Poland), located in the province of Pomerania. At the age of nineteen, he received a commission into the German Army. In 1881, Marwitz married Helene von Kameke (daughter of Prussian War Minister Georg von Kameke). The couple had five children.
From 1883 to 1886, Marwitz attended the Prussian Military Academy. His background was cavalry, and he led a cavalry regiment for five years from 1900 before being appointed Chief of Staff of XVIII Corps. In 1912, Marwitz was named Inspector-General of Cavalry.
GUNS EAST AND WEST
Upon the outbreak of the First World War in the summer of 1914, Major-General Marwitz was assigned to the Western Front as commander of II Cavalry Corps. His unit participated in the Battle of Haelen on August 12, 1914, the first cavalry engagement of the war.
However, the war on the Western Front did not lend itself well to cavalry as a form of offensive warfare. In truth, the fight at Haalen was a tactical victory for the Belgian cavalry, but it did little to delay the German onslaught through Belgium.
Later on, Marwitz’s cavalry served to protect the flank of Kluck’s German First Army during its retreat in the wake of the Battle of the Marne in September 1914. Three months later, his group was dissolved by the German High Command.
As 1915 opened, Marwitz was transferred to the Eastern Front to take command of the newly formed XXXVIII Reserve Corps. He led this unit against the Russians in the Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes, which began in a heavy snowstorm on February 7, 1915. Soon the weather changed to rain… and when the ground thawed, the roads turned into knee-deep mud! By mid-month, the Germans reached Augustowo, and Marwitz’s XXXVIII Corps captured Suwałki just beyond the East Prussian frontier. However, the Cossacks staged a counterattack that blocked any further advances.
The Winter Battle of the Masurian Lakes ended on February 22, 1915 with the Germans securing a toehold on Russian soil. In the weeks that followed, the Russians were driven out of their remaining small enclaves in East Prussia. For his service, Marwitz was awarded the coveted Pour le Mérite on March 7, 1915 (oak leaves were added to his Blue Max two months later).
Late in March, Marwitz and his army corps were transferred south to Miskolcz, Hungary in the Carpathians. Together, they fought with the armies of Austria-Hungary against the Russian steamroller as head of a specially assembled ski corps, the Beskidenkorps (named after the Beskid mountain range in the Carpathians). The Austrians had just lost the fortress of Przemysl on March 22nd, and during the Easter season, Marwitz assembled his troops at Mezö Laborcz (Laborcza Tal) to fight off the Russians as they attempted to cross into Hungary. In heavy snow over the next few weeks, the Germans countered and fought the Russians to a stalemate in the Wirawa Gorge area.
After being sent to fight with Gallwitz against the Serbs, Marwitz became very ill. He spent a few weeks of convalescence in October and November 1915. Upon recovery, Marwitz was sent to the Western Front as commander of VI Corps. But his time in the post was short… and soon he was sent back to the East.
In the summer of 1916, Marwitz returned to the Eastern Front and participated in the successful halting of Russia’s last great push, the Brusilov Offensive. On October 6th of that year, he became adjutant to Kaiser Wilhelm II, a post that he would hold for two months. Then on December 17, 1916, Marwitz was named commander of the German Second Army on the Western Front, replacing Max von Gallwitz.
CAMBRAI
In the West, the German Army formed along the Siegfried-Stellung line to Havrincourt Wood to la Vacquerie, with the Hindenburg Support Line one mile to the rear. To the front was a strongly fortified line of trenches. Behind the Hindenburg Support Line was yet another system called the Beaurevoir-Masnieres-Marcoing Line. Each system was built with deep concrete bunkers, massed machine guns in cover, and as much as fifty yards of barbed wire in front.
However, the planned Wotan Line to Cambrai (where Marwitz’s German Second Army was situated) was never completed. He now commanded four infantry divisions.
Opposite Marwitz was the British Third Army
led by Sir Julian Byng. He along with the commander of the Tank Corps (Brigadier General Sir Hugh Elles) had been planning to use armor en masse, and the countryside southwest of Cambrai was selected. The seven-mile wide stretch of land between the Saint-Quentin and Nord Canals was deemed suitable for armored maneuvers.
Byng had twelve divisions at his disposal, along with seven more from the Ypres front. Of the available 324 tanks, two-thirds would be used against the Hindenburg Line… with the rest being held in reserve. The objectives were (1) to crash the enemy front on a width of 13,000 yards, (2) capture Cambrai, and (3) seize all Germans between the two canals.
Per instructions from his superior, Field Marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht, Marwitz sent out patrols into British trenches to take prisoners. In his report on November 18, 1917, Marwitz thought troop dispositions remained unchanged. Despite statements by prisoners, the presence of camouflaged tanks, and air reconnaissance revealing a build-up in the rear, the conclusion was any attack was unlikely.
As a result, Marwitz was still in bed at HQ in Le Cateau two days later when he first heard of a British tank offensive toward Bourlon Ridge, which they had identified as a vital strategic target. It was the start of the battle for Cambrai.
When the tank assault began, the Germans were taken wholly by surprise, because there was no preceding bombardment. It was disabling to Marwitz’s, further exacerbated by cuts in the communication lines. Crown Prince Rupprecht, commanding the northern group, informed Berlin… and Marwitz was forced to contemplate total withdrawal.
On the morning of November 21st, Fontaine had already fallen, but the German Second Army soon knew the Allied strength and its dispositions. They ordered up reserves: the 214th, 119th, and Third Guards Divisions (all from the north Aisne and Flanders). Rupprecht ordered even more support to beef up Marwitz’s position.
The Battle of Cambrai witnessed the most extensive use of tanks to date, more than twice the previous number in one engagement, as well as new combined arms tactics. More ground was won at Cambrai in six hours than had been taken at Third Ypres in four months! The BEF lost only four thousand men, but 180 tanks were out of action by first night (sixty-five were victims of enemy fire). To add to their woes, the British had not adequately prepared for the strength of German defenses. Three days after the fight began, the British were still three miles from Cambrai. A pocket five miles in depth and seven miles in width was created by the armored assault.
At Le Cateau on the morning of November 26, 1917, both Rupprecht and Marwitz planned the first counteroffensive against the British since April 1915. The following afternoon, they were joined by Lieutenant-General von Kuhl (the group chief of staff) at a special conference of all group commanders. Marwitz, who was under pressure from Ludendorff, remained silent, subdued, still reeling and shocked by the unconventional speed of the Allied attack. His storm-troops destroyed many hundreds of tanks, but the Allies had many more in reserve!
However, as November came to an end, the attack had stalled, and the Allied tanks went into winter quarters. Marwitz and staff were now determined to proceed with a counterattack and recover the lost ground. They also did their best to recover any enemy machinery…
Finally, a severe blizzard put an end to the fighting on December 7th. The British lost 44,000 men, with six thousand of them in enemy hands.
Of the 50,000 German casualties, over one-fifth were taken prisoner. Many of those imprisoned were due to ammunition shortages which were prevalent during the counteroffensive.
SIGNS OF WEAKNESS
At the time of Cambrai, Georg von der Marwitz was a highly experienced soldier, sporting a noticeable white moustache. Opposite British III Corps, he held a vital part of the line from the town of Albert to Hargicourt. His men opposed both the French and British, comprising three corps and fourteen divisions.
However by mid-1918, the German Second Army was at “paper” strength, revealing serious manpower shortages. Its weakness lay in the fact that half the troops were of inferior quality. The Germans had become restless, insubordinate, mutinous… and the ground was not as well defended as expected! Isolated positions did not possess deeply dug trenches, and communications were permanently under Allied bombardment. It was becoming apparent that the Kaiser’s troops were losing confidence…
The biggest issues facing the German Army were (1) the arrival of fresh Americans troops in France at a rate of 10,000 a day, and (2) the manpower shortages in the Teutonic reservoir. The German High Command calculated 200,000 replacements would be needed each month to continue the fight. Even with the next class of eighteen-year-olds, only 300,000 recruits stood available! The class of 1920 had to be drawn to meet the demand! Roughly 70,000 convalescents returned to the front from hospital each month, but their fitness and will to fight were questionable.
In the first six months of 1918, the strength of the German Army had fallen by twenty percent! The Germans also had soldiers in Italy, the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, and Russia. To add to their plight, the Germans had half a million troops laid low with the first outbreak of the deadly Spanish influenza. Their resistance to the epidemic was lower than the Allies mainly due to poor diet and near starvation… thanks to the British naval blockade.
Another factor was the near disdain of a tank program. In the aftermath of Cambrai, the First Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff was unimpressed with the tank in battle; he believed only in the infantry. But half-heartedly, he ordered a tank program. Nevertheless, the lack of armor did even more damage to the Teutonic war machine. Wherever Germany looked on the Western Front, there were no longer any soft spots!
On August 9, 1918, Marwitz’s commanders advised a retreat to a line behind the Somme River. Crown Prince Rupprecht warned that only a complete retreat to reform in a stronger position alongside the German Ninth Army would suffice. However, Ludendorff flatly turned down any idea of retreat; the line was to be held at all costs… this after declaring the “black day of the German Army” (on August 8th) when all was seemingly lost!
On August 11th, the German Second Army was defeated in the Battle of Amiens. The loss was attributed to the success of the Allied tanks. But OHL blamed Marwitz… and shifted the burden onto his chief of staff, Major-General Erich von Tschischwitz. As a result, Marwitz’s command was subjected to a reorganization with the German Eighteenth and Ninth Armies. The High Command threw every available reserve into the Hindenburg Line.
On August 24th, Marwitz had decorated one officer who put fourteen Allied tanks out of action. Tanks generally struck terror in the ranks, and multiple grenades were used in dealing with these armored machines. Rifles were abandoned for heavy machine-guns, leaving artillery unprotected in the rear guard.
Meanwhile, the Allies planned ‘masses of maneuver’ to encircle Marwitz’s German Second Army from both the north and south. They were to outflank the town of Montdidier in an elaborate pincer movement.
While the Allies prepared for everything, Marwitz left much to chance, knowing his forces were overstretched. One of the strongest positions held by German forces was the village of Peronne, which was surrounded by marshes. Marwitz had ordered the destruction of all bridges in the sector.
On August 26th, Monash and his Australians planned an assault over open ground, providing an opportunity for Marwitz’s men. The attack began at 5 A.M. on August 30th towards the heavily-defended town of Mont Saint Quentin. Elite German units defended the pock-marked trenches… as the Kaiser Alexander Regiment held the hilltop with six hundred men each in three battalions.
However, a battalion of Australian veterans pushed the Germans out of an area that had been occupied since 1916. It was a big blow to morale, and Marwitz took the defeat badly. The Germans had fought hard against the youthful Australians, but Marwitz’s formations were facing attrition. But both the Second Guards Reserve Division and Fourth Bavarian Division had long been in the line without relief. They were desperately tired, hungry, and without the necessary reinforcements to make a full complement. Desertion had become an epidemic; three battalions of the 55th Infantry Regiment had simply “melted away”. In his diary, Marwitz noted that the battle of attrition was taking its inevitable toll. In his diary, he summarized his complaints the men had endured:
“…unspeakably hard conditions for such a terribly long time”.
Air attacks were a problem for Marwitz’s German Second Army. Railway connections had become disrupted by Allied bombing. In fact, Marwitz was himself a victim of an “army of fliers”, his staff stood with the men as one dud bomb penetrated HQ! In one day alone, 120 bombs fell on Cambrai.
On September 3, 1918, the Germans retired to the Hindenburg Line. Nearly all of the spring and summer gains from the Kaiserschlacht and Fridensturm were wiped out!
DISINTEGRATION, DOWNFALL, AND DEATH
Marwitz was finally relieved of command on September 22, 1918… and promoted to command the German Fifth Army, which consisted of nine divisions. He attempted to instill discipline in troops fleeing before Allied tanks. In an diary entry from September 29th, Marwitz wrote:
“…it’s just the fear of those things and not their actual effect”.
All along the Meuse-Argonne Front, Franco-American forces were making progress to the north via tank support. The Germans tried to reply with artillery and machine-gun fire, proving that resistance remained stiff.
Soon, the Allied offensive grounded to a halt, with American soldiers refusing to be stopped by withering machine-gun fire. On October 3rd, Marwitz drove out to the forward observation posts and noticed that his troops were occupying the high ground. The U.S. First Army faced an uphill climb from the plain into an area covered by woods, where built-in machine guns, individual guns, mortars, and surveillance posts concealed enemy troops. Although despondent, the Germans held their ground grimly.
American operations commenced at 5:30 A.M. on October 5, 1918 from the banks of the Meuse. Almost immediately the U.S. forces stalled in the dark fog. The tactics had changed, and the Germans appeared to have the upper hand. But rumors of a possible peace sapped their morale.
By November, there were barely seven exhausted divisions on an eleven-mile front at Barricourt Heights. Marwitz’s manouevrability was further hampered by shelled-out roads and sliced communications lines that ran from HQ to the front line commanders. Marwitz was in favor of withdrawing the German Fifth Army to relative safety behind the east bank of the Meuse in order to regroup and get some much needed rest. But OHL refused, sending strict orders to stand and fight.
On November 2nd, the Americans finally achieved success, sweeping uphill over the German positions, and breaching Marwitz’s center line. U.S. General Hunter Liggett took the action as a sign that the German Army was clearly beaten and worn down. The capture of Barricount Heights sparked a general rout.
Despite the inevitable, Marwitz remained patriotically loyal. He issued an order that the German Fifth Army must fight on for the sake of the Fatherland. Despite his unrealistic order, the armies began to disintegrate; battalions were at less than half fighting strength.
On November 10th, Marwitz left his post on the Meuse and went to see Gallwitz. He demanded an armistice; the loss of Barricourt Heights had been the end… and the retreating Germans had left behind considerable quantities of equipment. The French (with help from the Americans) had reached Sedan three days earlier, avenging the humiliation of both 1870 and 1914. At 11 A.M. on November 11, 1918, the guns finally fell silent.
After the war, Georg von der Marwitz withdrew from public life. He died at Wundichow on October 27, 1929 at the age of seventy-three.
DECORATIONS AND AWARDS
-Order of the Crown, First Class (Prussia)
– Order of Saint John (Bailiwick of Brandenburg)
– Service Award (Prussia)
– Commander Second Class of the Order of Philip (Hesse)
– Honorary Grand Cross of the House and Merit Order of Peter Frederick Louis (Oldenburg)
– Commander of the House Order of the White Falcon (Weimar)
– Merit Cross, Second Class(Waldeck)
– Order of the Double Dragon, Second Level, First Class (China)
– Commander of the Order of Saints Maurice and Lazarus
– Commander of the Order of Franz Joseph (Austria)
– Commander of the Order of the Lion and the Sun (Persia)
– Grand Cross of the Order of the Sword (Sweden)
– Commander of the Order of the Crown of Thailand
– Iron Cross of 1914, First and Second Class
– Pour le Mérite (March 7, 1915) with Oak Leaves (May 14, 1915)
– Grand Cross of the Order of the Red Eagle with Oak Leaves and Swords
– Star of the Commander of the House Order of Hohenzollern with Swords