Losses of cavalry at the beginning of the war show numbers that are minuscule compared to infantry losses later in the war. Some critics dismiss those losses as insignificant. However, it is not the number of losses that is important at this stage, but rather the elimination of entire units from the map. If a unit of the highly specialized reconnaissance cavalry was eliminated, there was no way to replace them. The Germans started with only nine brigades of cavalry on the right wing. Two of those brigades were eliminated eight days after the start of the war in the battle of Halen. Dismissed as an insignificant action by some German authors, you would think that perhaps this scarce resource might be used judiciously.
The 2nd Squadron Dragoon Regiment 17 conducted the initial charge in this battle. The squadron left the village of Halen in marching order. Marching order meant four horses abreast. Our memories trace back to cavalry in motion pictures, John Wayne ordering a routine march in columns of two: marching order was double that width. It was used as a normal movement formation to lessen the amount of road space required by a squadron, as well as to permit easy formation changes to maximize frontage and impact the enemy. Inherent in this is the obvious requirement to change formation into some sort of line prior to charging. The obvious disadvantage of four horses abreast is that it presents a very tightly packed target for both artillery and rifle fire. Therefore, an attacking cavalry endeavored to change formations outside of rifle range; a defending infantry endeavored to catch the cavalry in movement formation before they could make that change.
Rittmeister Hans von Bodecker, who survived the battle and became a Belgian POW, commanded this lead squadron. The squadron was marching at a moderate pace, four horses abreast. He was not aware of the great many wire fences or that the entrance to Zelk itself was barricaded. Either side of the street was bordered with wire and ditches. “We had to stay in the four-row column, not able to spread out…We have to stay on the road. Then I notice the barricade [at Zelk], and all hell breaks loose. Horses and troopers crash down.” Of the ninety horsemen in the squadron, only fifteen returned. The road itself was surfaced with cobblestones; trees lined either side. According to the unpublished account of Lt. Robert de Heusch, the Belgian officer stationed at the barricade near the De Boerendans Inn, stated:
Our troops open fire, calmly. It is sheer slaughter. The Germans fall as flies; those that escape the bullets crash into the barricade. Ten horses without riders manage to come just in front of the barricade. The complete squadron is destroyed, forty KIA [killed in action], some thirty WIA [wounded in action], and twenty-five POW. The wounded are immediately taken care of by our medical officer. We captured ten horses, they are in good shape. The Squadron Commander, Rittm. von Bodecker, is made prisoner and hands over his military items. He blames us for the having declared war on Germany. He also states that the Germans will be in Brussels by 15 August and in Paris ten days later.