Artillery Doctrine-3
When trials for a new German artillery system began, two companies were in competition for the contract. The first company, Ehrhardt (later renamed as the better known Rheinmetall), offered a very modern system equipped with an improved carriage, that featured a sliding mechanism to absorb the recoil of the barrel after each shot. The Ehrhardt field gun basically remained still during firing. Krupp, the second company, only offered an improvement of the C73 system they had sold so successfully. Compared with the Ehrhardt gun, the Krupp model still featured a traditional carriage that jumped up and rolled backwards due to the recoil after each shot. After intensive trials, the Prussian War Ministry chose the Krupp model in 1896 and introduced their 7.7 cm field gun as Feldkanone 96. They were proud to maintain continuity in their artillery systems. Ehrhardt then started selling their system to the British Army and others.
But this time, the Prussian War Ministry had overestimated its technological and tactical advantage. Just as had been the case earlier for rifles, the French gained a significant lead over the German artillery by introducing their revolutionary new 75 mm field gun Model 1897. The French gun had two major features. which gave it superiority over German field guns: a steel shield providing at least some protection for the crew against shrapnel and infantry fire and an improved carriage with a hydro-pneumatic mechanism, which absorbing the recoil of the barrel and thereby rendering the carriage as stable as the Ehrhardt gun during firing. Since it was no longer necessary to push the gun back into firing position after each shot and to relocate the target, the new French 75 mm gun could develop a rate of fire more than twice as fast as the German field guns. It was believed that one French battery (with only four guns) would have the same firepower as two to three German batteries each with six guns. Furthermore, French Model 1897 guns carried about 2.5 times the load of ammunition in their limbers as the German Feldkanonen 96
The new French gun came as a shock to the German army; it had excellent accuracy, superior range, and rapid-fire capability. The French soon introduced a new doctrine with their November 1901 artillery manual—indirect rapid-fire assaults called rafale in French. This early kind of indirect fire was a very simple system. Gun lines were established on reverse slopes and the batteries then fired to clear the crest line, while being directed by the battery commander from an observation post within sight of the battery.
The new French 75 mm field gun (like the German Feldkanone 96) fired smokeless rounds. It now became very difficult to identify battery positions and to engage them through counter-battery fire if the muzzle flash could not be seen. In addition, the new procedures meant that French field artillery could now hit their enemy from concealed positions with well-directed rapid fire, and the result was clear superiority over German field artillery. Like a bolt out of the blue, a French battery could silence or even completely wipe out an opposing battery without risking direct counter fire. A side effect of indirect artillery fire with modern guns and recoil mechanisms carriages was a huge increase in the consumption of ammunition. The industrialized warfare of the Russo-Japanese War was already casting a shadow!
Due to this “French revolution” in artillery technology and tactical doctrine, an intense German effort began to completely overhaul (if not re-invent) German field artillery to keep up with the French. This discussion fed into the introduction of the Feldkanone 96 neuer Art (field gun 96 new model) in 1905. Doctrinally, the argument between open positions using direct fire and concealed positions really became an argument between the offensive and defensive use of forces.
This model included all the features of the French system. Using the barrel and the breechblock of the Model 96, the field guns were also equipped with shields and improved carriages with a recoil mechanism. Ironically, Krupp also carried out this modification and so managed to earn money with the Model 96 guns twice over—even though it was already obsolete at the time of its introduction. The affair of the field gun Model 96 made it clear how powerful Friedrich Krupp was. Although the Ehrhardt system was more modern than the Krupp system, Krupp persuaded the War Ministry to buy his guns. When the French 75 mm gun proved to be better than the Krupp guns, Krupp was not penalized, but simply asked to improve the Model 96 guns to meet French standard.
Although field guns had significantly increased their range, they could not hit dug-in infantry from concealed positions behind hills due to the low trajectory of their guns. The answer was to equip the field artillery with howitzers able to exploit high angle fire capable of taking on targets in dead ground. Germany took the lead in this by introducing the 10.5 cm Model 98 light field howitzer. Once more Krupp earned money twice by first producing the guns and later in 1909 modifying them with shields and recoil mechanisms into leichte Feldhaubitzen 98/09.
Most German field artillery regiments now received a third battalion equipped with field howitzers. This gave the German field artillery a competitive edge over the French. A basic field artillery regiment still had two battalions (Abteilungen) with three batteries of six field guns Model 96 (new model) each. A few regiments had an extra riding battalion; others had a third battalion equipped with field howitzer Model 98/09. During mobilization, the riding battalions were usually taken out of the field artillery regiments and assigned to the cavalry divisions.
German artillery doctrine had to keep up with that of the French, and indirect fire procedure was introduced into the field artillery. In the 1899 field artillery manual, indirect fire was exclusively described for the (then still very few) field howitzers, while the bulk of the field artillery was still drilled according to classical methods. During maneuvers, the artillery was expected to feature batteries galloping into open firing positions and then unlimbering gallantly in front of the enemy. Galloping horses, dust clouds, and very fast opening of fire were considered the most important features of artillery tactics. That way the field artillerymen could also feel themselves the equal to the cavalry in dash and spirit.
Meanwhile the artillery manual began to emphasize that indirect fire from covered positions was of increasing importance. The 1907 field artillery manual was based upon the experience of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 in Manchuria. However, use of indirect fire was time-consuming and demanding as it did the preparation of observation posts, range finders, scissor scopes, and firing positions. In addition, the various locations positions had to be connected by field-telephone. Although the manual listed the tactical advantages of indirect fire from covered positions, it did contain one paragraph that could be exploited by the traditionalists
“To push for decision by bolstering the fighting infantry, the field artillery will often be forced to abandon the advantages of indirect fire to support the infantry with direct fire delivered from open positions.”
Because this sentence was highlighted in print, it delivered the perfect excuse to continue with the traditional methods. As a nod in the direction of the manual, usually some improvised cover was hastily dug out around the guns. As a result, the artillery practiced unrealistic maneuvers until the war taught, with bloody lessons, that well-prepared indirect fire from covered positions was infinitely preferable.