Artillery Doctrine-4

The field artillery adopted a lofty attitude to the less mobile foot artillery, shaking their heads at the sluggish siege trains. In 1891, under the decisive influence of Schlieffen, the heavy artillery developed from fortress and siege artillery into field usable foot artillery. At first the foot artillery received a new long 15 cm howitzer to replace the old and immobile 15 cm ring-cannon. Soon after, a heavy 15 cm howitzer developed by Krupp entered service. This howitzer was the real turning point in the development of the foot artillery into heavy artillery deployable in the field. This gun was comparatively lightweight, could easily be moved by the crew and was capable of firing more than 6,000 meters. Soon after it was fielded, Krupp began the construction of a new 21 cm howitzer.

Between the years 1893 and 1902, the foot artillery developed four strong foot artillery detachments intended to smash French frontier fortresses. The 21cm C/82 round filled with smokeless cordite explosives (Schießbaumwolle) delivered such an increase in explosive power that the French had to reinforce their fortresses. In 1888, 1896, and 1904, more modern HE rounds with even greater explosive power were developed for use against fortifications. However, by 1900, many of the foot artillery commanders felt that the forts represented impregnable structures. As a result, the Chief of Staff focused on using the light howitzers of the field artillery in the counter-battery role. The foot artillery continued to argue that, given enough horses, they could reinforce the field artillery during the counter-battery battle and then turn on the enemy infantry. A shooting competition in 1900 demonstrated that heavy howitzers were far more effective in countering dug-in enemy batteries than the light howitzers. By 1904, the Great General Staff provided guidance to the corps commanders to use 150 mm heavy howitzers at every opportunity. While there were only 10 horse-drawn heavy foot artillery regiments in 1904, almost every army corps had at least one by the start of the war.

A new edition of the German artillery drill regulations appeared in 1907. It emphasized rates of concentrated fire for effect rather than the mere massing of guns. There was a discussion concerning the balance of advantage between open and covered firing positions. Open ones offered rapid engagement times, and the latter afforded protection. The regulations emphasized the need to continually suppress the enemy artillery during the infantry attack. This compromise brokered a middle course between the arguments of the traditionalists, who favored open positions and rapid engagement, and the reformers, who sought the use of covered positions based on the lessons of the 1905 Russian–Japanese War. The middle ground was that both schools of thought shared a common goal to support the infantry attack “in the most effective manner possible.” All doctrinal writers emphasized the requirement to work closely and inseparably with the infantry. While the principle of infantry/artillery combination was accepted, discussed, and practiced, there were numerous communication problems to overcome and these were made much worse by the chronic shortage of telephones and wire right up until the early months of the Great War.

The influence of Moltke the Younger led to more realistic and “war-like” (kriegsnahe) doctrine and training. With the appearance of the 1907 field artillery manual, indirect fire became the main tactical approach and was equally applied to field guns and field howitzers. During the years before the war, indirect fire was intensively trained through live firing in the corps training centers. During maneuvers, this new tactical doctrine led to complaints that artillery was no longer visible except during marches. Certainly following the changes in infantry doctrine, artillery developments contributed to the creation of what was called later the “void of the battlefield.” Right up to 1914, the German field artillery made good progress with the development of doctrine. It absorbed developments made by other armies, as well as the experience of contemporary wars, although some traditionalists still favored the traditional role and the heroic pictures of galloping horses and guns firing from open positions. But what was really striking with the German artillery prior to 1914 was the emphasis upon heavy artillery. Here the German army of 1914 was far superior to all of her Western enemies. Schlieffen paved the way for the heavy artillery’s fast and diverse development. One of Schlieffen’s major concerns had been the fortresses along the French eastern border and in Belgium. Reinforced and equipped with good quality artillery, those fortresses threatened to pose major problems to the German Army and its doctrine of fast pre-emptive attacks into enemy territory.

In 1914, the heavy German artillery was equipped with mortars (heavy howitzers), field howitzers, and heavy field guns. To smash forts and fortresses, the foot artillery had the 15 cm schwere Feldhaubitze 02 (heavy field howitzer Model 02), an outdated gun without a recoil mechanism, but with a range of 7,450 k meters and the very modern 21 cm mortar. For long-range tasks, the foot artillery had numerous pieces including the modern 10 cm “Kanone 04” and some of the older heavy 12, 13, and 15 cm guns. Usually the 12, 13, and 15 cm guns belonged to siege forces and were not fielded with the regular foot artillery regiments. In 1914, the backbone of the German heavy artillery was the 21 cm mortar introduced in 1910 that possessed good mobility and a range of 9,400 meters.  In addition, there were 10 cm cannons. In all a total of 630 pieces could be fielded, compared with the 372 heavy artillery pieces of the French and British armies. Imperial Germany had only 256 of the 21 cm mortars, of which 112 were fielded with foot artillery formations, 32 belonged to fortresses, and 112 were held back as a reserve.

Within the foot artillery, there was a theoretical division concerning their employment. One side focused on mobility and a need to keep the calibers smaller. The other side concentrated on fortress reduction and a need to increase the size of the calibers. The dividing line seemed to come around the 210 mm level. Max Bauer conducted a one-man campaign within the general staff to get approval for a monster gun. The product was a 42 cm super heavy howitzer—the so called ϒ-Gerät model 1912—capable of hurling a 2000 pound shell over 14,200 meters. Since the ϒ-Gerät had to be fired from a concrete bedding and moved by railroad, it was virtually immobile. The general staff and the Artillerie-Prüfungskommission therefore asked Krupp for a more mobile version that resulted in the 42 cm mortar M-Gerät model 1914 that had a shorter barrel than the ϒ-Gerät and a shorter range of 12,500 meters. In 1914, five M-Geräte and two ϒ-Geräte were available and could be mobilized in batteries of two guns each; the fifth ϒ-Gerät was mobilized a little later as a half-battery.