Artillery Doctrine-5

This new development came as a complete surprise to the allies. The 42 cm super heavy howitzers appeared on the battlefields around the fortresses of Liège, Namur, Fort Manonviller, and Antwerp in August and September 1914. Developed under perfect secrecy and based upon specifications from the General Staff—most probably from Ludendorff and Bauer—these Krupp mortars were fielded under the camouflage of being Navy-owned, “short-cannon batteries” (kurze Marine-Kanonen Batterien). Yes They were operated by Krupp personnel and men of the Artillerie-Prüfungskommission in navy and, later, army uniforms.  Initially, the 2^nd (ϒ -Gerät) and 3^rd (M-Gerät) 42cm batteries were deployed under control of the OHL; whereas, the 3^rd (ϒ –Gerät) battery was subordinated to Sixth Army. The super-heavies smashed the forts at Liège and paved the way for the infantry to take the city. On 12 August, the bombardment of Fort Pontisse started and soon after Fort Loncin exploded after a direct hit into its ammunition magazine.

At Liège, the Germans also tried to employ super-heavy 30.5 cm howitzers type β-Gerät as well as Austrian made model 1911 30.5 cm mortars manufactured at the Skoda plant in Bohemia and borrowed at mobilization from their Austrian ally. The German army had its own 30.5 cm mortars introduced in 1898 and reworked in 1909 to extend their range from 8,700 to 11,900 meters. The β-Gerät mortars also operated under the camouflage of being Navy operated “heavy coastal mortars” (schwere Küstenmörser). In 1914, twelve of these mortars were available, but since most of them could only be operated on a railroad, the more mobile Austrian models were preferred. Crews in Austrian uniforms operated the Austrian mortars openly.  Based upon the mobilization plan, the 3^rd and 4^th (β-Gerät) batteries were under direct control of OHL, to be used against fortresses in the main thrust. Deployment against Liége was not intended since the General Staff believed that that place would be taken by a coup de main. The 2^nd (β-Gerät) battery was with the Sixth Army in Lorraine. As soon as the advance was checked at Liége, the 3^rd and 4^th batteries were employed to join the 42cm mortars The 2^nd battery followed on 16 and 17 August.

These 30.5 and 42 cm mortars were handled with such secrecy that no hints concerning their existence could be found in the top-secret Manual for General Staff Officers (Taschenbuch des Generalstabsoffiziers). The 30.5 cm Skoda mortar could fire an 800-pound shell over 12,300 meters. Also a super-heavy gun, it was more mobile than the 42cm Krupp mortar and could change firing positions faster.

Starting in 1911, the idea of breaking through France’s fortress wall re-emerged. Ludendorff in the General Staff championed attacking the fortresses on the Belgian frontier instead of bypassing them. While reawakening the heavy artillery fortress-smashing concept, the Army ran into budgetary reluctance on the part of the War Ministry. Not only were fewer guns provided than requested, but also the amount of ammunition provided was significantly less than that which was desirable. The 21 cm howitzers deployed with fewer than 600 shells per weapon as opposed to usage estimates of 800 to 1000. Technical capabilities were starting once again to affect operational planning. Shortages of heavy guns and munitions would mean that the German armies could not take on both the French fortresses and the Belgian fortresses at the same time.

In short, the artillery can be considered the best prepared and trained for the coming war. The technical and doctrinal development of the field and foot artillery prior to 1914 hinted already at the industrialized battles of attrition along the Western Front in the years after 1914. If the infantry was considered the Queen of Battle before 1914, the artillery became the King once the war stalled in the trenches of France and Flanders.