August 12, 1914
German aerial reconnaissance now focused on the Meuse between Namur and Givet: the area from which relief attempts for Liège could be expected. No activity was observed on roads and railways, and no defensive fieldworks were present at the Givet Fortress. Near Namur, intensified movement and traffic to the east, north, and northwest were spotted. Between Huy and Engis, the Hermalle Meuse Bridge beneath Huy was now reported as destroyed.
Remarkably, the previous day’s successful reconnaissance of the SHQ at Leuven was not repeated. This might have been due to the successive costly mishaps that overcame FFA 1. Four aircraft were dispatched but due to the heat and squalls that day, none were able to accomplish its mission. One airplane crashed just after takeoff, killing the two-man crew. The crew of another aircraft was able to rejoin the Abteilung after an emergency landing in enemy territory. These accidents convinced the command of Second Army to direct Einem to use aircraft sparingly, “especially as reconnaissance.”
The same day Einem, issued a Weiβung für die Luftaufklärung, Directive for Aerial Reconnaissance. With this directive, the aerial reconnaissance sectors for Ninth, Seventh, and Tenth Army Corps were pinpointed at approximately sixty kilometers (37½ miles) in depth, measured from the eastern line of the Liège forts. The FFA 9 was tasked with long-distance reconnaissance of about 150 kilometers (ninety-three miles) up to Antwerp and Brussels. With its issue, all Second and Third Army FFAs were operational for reconnaissance in front of the German right wing.
A watershed event known as the Battle of the Silver Helmets took place at Halen. The HKK 2 sought to unhinge the Belgian defensive positions along the River Gette. Storming across the river at the village of Halen was intended to be the first stage of forcing the defensive position and outflanking the Belgian Army. No less than eight separate mounted cavalry charges were conducted that day, and two entire brigades of German cavalry were decimated. These cavalry charges were the ones often imagined in peacetime, with hundreds of horses thundering into combat as their riders wielded sabers and lances. This was the last time the German cavalry would try to force a position with mounted cavalry against a dismounted opponent. The small, untried Belgian forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the premier land army of its time. As a matter of comparison, the Charge of the Light Brigade involved six hundred men. A German cavalry regiment consisted of over seven hundred troopers. During the battle of Halen, four German cavalry regiments charged and were destroyed. The entire right wing of the invasion had only nine brigades of cavalry. Two of them were badly mauled for no result in one day. This was only eight days after the start of the war.
At the end of the day, twenty-four German officers, 468 men, and 843 horses were lost—a handful, paling in comparison with future endeavors. However, the loss of nearly one thousand horses took two cavalry brigades off the operational board. Yet, they still existed but in an absolutely crippled state. Seventeenth and Eighteenth Dragoons, Ninth Uhlans, and Second Kürassiers had shrunk to two squadrons each. Also, the horse artillery battalion supporting Eighteenth Cavalry Brigade had very high losses. According to the history of Sixteenth Hussar Regiment, the horse artillery battalion Hanstein had marched out with 170 men on August 9 to fulfil a mission. Ten days later, there were just 68 men left. It had lost fifty percent of its horses and had ridden 333 kilometers. Except for the commander, all officers were either wounded or captured. Henceforth, wherever Fourth Cavalry Division was assigned, it would be incapable of covering a full division’s worth of ground. Unit symbols on large scale maps give the impression the division was an organization with multiple capabilities. Mounted reconnaissance, however, was severely impacted and that was this division’s primary mission.
The Germans held the field but then abandoned it, moving east back across the Gette to bivouac and reorganize—again, standard operating procedure. The Belgian Cavalry Division was certainly on its back foot. Belgian Fourth Mixed Brigade, also roughly handled by the German machine guns at Halen, was in a state of disarray. But the Belgian flank was not turned.
Meanwhile, German artillery started the final silencing ofthe surviving Liège forts. Because the Aachen–Liège rail line was unserviceable, the 42-centimeter battery unloaded at Herbesthal on the border, and by 2200 hours, had road-marched a respectable fifteen kilometers. The 42-centimeter battery went into an open-firing position on high ground five hundred meters northeast of Mortier and fired eight shells at Fort Pontisse. French Cavalry Corps Sordet conductedsecurity operations by their cavalry against the advancing German cavalry screen. Fog and friction shaped the results about the condition of the reconnaissance forces on both sides.
It is hot; our horses are very tired. To water them during the route, we disobey orders, for we are forbidden to stop. Enormous losses! Outside of animals that die suddenly on the road, many are those that we find stopped on the edge of a ditch, head carried low, within the flanks, dying eyes looking for a place to fall. It seems that our squadron melts quickly on these marches and we feel that our horses, still up, have not the strength of the past week.
The fact that it was midsummer and the heavily laden horses became tired easily in the heat made frequent watering all the more necessary. The routes became marked by horses in agony, who, partly from lack of water—unable to throw off the poisons which fatigue had accumulated in their system—were seized by rigor mortis before dying.
Replacement mounts were provided for but not in sufficient numbers. They were also considered to be mediocre, out of condition, and with limited or no training as troop horses. As a rule, they lasted for about ten days before dying or being abandoned. This had two significant operational impacts. Both French and German columns were forced to resort to walking horses and leading them by their reins, which slowed movements. As horse losses were far more significant than the loss of the riders, the count of horses became most important.