August 13, 1914
Forts Çhaudfontaine, Embourg, and Pontisse fell. Adding to the fire of the 21-centimeter guns, the 42-centimeter monsters continued shelling Fort Pontisse, firing another forty-three rounds. The shocked Belgian defenders then surrendered. This was a tactical victory: Pontisse offered the best possible opportunity for interdiction of the northern road that the Belgians still possessed. Fort d’Embourg and Fort Chaudefontaine surrendered after being bombarded by 21-centimeter mortars. These two forts straddled the main rail line into Liège. The victory was tempered, however, by the fact that the Nasproue Tunnel would not be open for another two days. The main double-line track between Aachen and Liège was still closed far east of the bridge.
First Army began its advance through Aachen on August 13. Second Army had by then vacated the roads north of Liège, allowing First Army to pass. Second, Third, and Fourth Army Corps marched first; Third and Fourth Reserve Corps followed. Their routes of advance closely paralleled each other. Based on the resulting congestion, each road was required to support the movement of two separate army corps. Although the lead elements reached the river on August 14, it took four to five days to march all of the German troops through Aachen’s narrow streets. The active army corps completed their concentration and detraining on August 14, including all ammunition columns and trains. The two reserve corps finished their concentration one day later, on the fifteenth. Despite the possibilities for entanglement, in such a large-scale operation, all of this movement went smoothly—a reflection of the systematic peacetime planning so significantly absent at the sharp end.
The BEF initially arrived in the harbor of Le Harve on August 13, but Kluck had completely different ideas about its position. The bulk of the BEF crossed the English Channel between August 12 and August 19. Based on newspaper reports, still First Army’s best source of strategic intelligence, Kluck thought the British were disembarking in small numbers at Ostend and with larger forces at Dunkirk and Calais. In truth, the BEF did not use these ports.
The FFA 9 resumed its reconnaissance missions against the Belgian field army. In Tirlemont, the Abteilung observed the movement of cavalry and baggage trains toward Leuven, as well as concentration of vehicles at the market square and a locomotive under steam at the railway station. These were elements of Belgian Third Division, which had previously departed Liège bound for Leuven. After the Halen fight, the Belgian Cavalry Division had fallen back behind the Gette River near Diest in entrenched positions. The Belgian Third Division was to advance in order to protect the Belgian Army’s left wing against the threat of being encircled by HKK 2 from the direction of Diest–Halen. The reconnaissance flights confirming these movements considerably improved German insight into the intentions of the Belgian Field Army—and meant there was no threat for the German troops that stood before Liège.
While effective at the close reconnaissance, the airmen did nothing to extend out long-range and find the BEF or the left wing of the French Army. Due to the structural lack of an aviation staff officer, aviation reports, messages, and intelligence snippets frequently did not find their way to the army intelligence staff officer. These messages often went to staff officers who were otherwise burdened and became neglected or even ignored. A conscious decision had to be made at the corps level to forward air reports to the army level. This was then, of course, subjected to communications shortfalls in mounted messengers and wire. It is claimed that First Army was never made aware of about fifty percent of the air reports.
Second German Cavalry Division continued to suffer from severe shortages of supplies and rations for men and horses while still on the eastern bank of the River Meuse. The logistical system was even more haphazard on the west side of the river. The division had progressed only between thirty-five and forty kilometers from the German border—hardly a spectacular advance. Although the shortages most affected Second Cavalry Division, they applied to all HKK elements around Liège at the same time. The condition of Fourth Cavalry Division was lamented
Only a few soldiers had still lances. Almost all of them were broken or lost in Halen. Many helmets had disappeared or had no spike anymore or were replaced by the most fantastic headgears. Horses of all kinds of formations were present in the regiment because everybody tried first thing after the attack to find a replacement for his own dead or wounded horse among the countless horses galloping to and fro. Who did not find one anymore seized a bike at the first opportunity and followed the division in this way. Who considered it possible before that the outward appearance of the regiment would change in this way within ten days?
This did not bode well for its prospects as the cavalry advanced deeper into enemy territory. The shortages soon pushed the First Army Motor Transport commander to mobilize twelve more improvised columns equipped with light civilian vehicles. But this fixed one problem by creating another: these civilian vehicles were not built to withstand heavy-duty military use and quickly broke down.
The one brigade of Fourth Cavalry Division that was not involved in the battle of Halen continued to patrol further to the south. Given that this was somewhat distant from the bulk of the division, they also took a light radio set with them. Fifteenth and Sixteenth Hussar Regiments got involved in a series of engagements which were quickly radioed back to the division HQ. Unfortunately, in addition to many of the troopers, the radio became a casualty. This was one of the two radios available to the division and one of six available to HKK 2.
