August 18, 1914
The first day of the German general advance was a failure. Yet, compared to all the work done on the German decisions at the Marne, this has been paid almost no attention. Perhaps this is because it predated the German’s battle with the BEF. In his order of August 17, Moltke, stressed that the result of keeping the Belgians away from Antwerp was “most important.”The subordinate orders and concepts were focused on keeping the Belgian Army out of Antwerp. The intention was to turn the Belgian’s left flank, cutting off their line of retreat. Second Cavalry Division had been sent widely to the right with specific orders to cut off any withdrawal. Instead, the Germans failed completely in this task. The Belgians got away and established a position on the vulnerable right flank of the German Army. It was incumbent upon First Army to limit the Belgian Army’s freedom of maneuver. The way to do this was to fix the Belgian front. Even under the conditions imposed by terrain and firepower, the cavalry could have then cut it off from behind. That did not happen. This is all Kluck said about it:
The enemy withdrew in places before contact with the attacking troops, though in front of Second Corps at Diest and of Ninth Corps at Tirlemont considerable resistance was first offered.,, By the evening of the eighteenth, the pursuing troops of First Army did not stop the Belgians No French troops had been observed with the Belgians. The cautious withdrawal of the Belgian Army led to the conclusion that . . . [they] preferred to take advantage of the Brialmont defenses round Antwerp rather than accept an unequal combat in the field. A further rapid advance of First Army toward Brussels would no doubt clear up the situation.
That last sentence combined wish and hindsight. The objective of this operation was the army—the force—and not the city of Brussels, which lay in the wrong direction. As Clausewitz said in On War, Book 7, Chapter 6: “Destruction of the enemy’s armed forces is the means to the end.” Why would it now be appropriate to leave a strong enemy on your flank and rear,strong enough that you were required to commit forces to keep it bottled up? Now there was a sudden new task and a major one. Task: keep the Belgian Army contained in Antwerp. Purpose: to keep the Belgian Army from attacking First Army’s flank and rear. The force requiredeventually amounted tomore than two reserve army corps.This should have been a very aggressive pursuit designed to deny the Belgians freedom of movement—and the Germans certainly missed the opportunity. There was no quid pro quo. The Germans had gained nothing from this and now had to deal with the threat. The earlier objectives had been laid out pretty clearly—disperse the Belgian Army. But who was in charge? Which direction were the Belgians going? Had the objectives changed? The aggressiveness Moltke required failed to impress Bülow, given Auftragstaktik. “Most important” to the boss did not matter to Bülow.
The Belgians had cooperated with the German Army. They had stayed outside of the Antwerp redoubt and were very catchable. There is a school of thought that says such a pursuit could not succeed in 1914 because cavalry lacked the combat power needed to overcome infantry forces and survive in the face of modern fire. Clausewitz counters by explaining the power of parallel lines for pursuit. Gross reinforces that notion by highlighting the mobility of the pursuing forces. Parallel pursuit is to have a separate column moving on a parallel road overtakes the retreating force and, if the pursuer’s mobility is adequate get behind the withdrawing force. A speed advantage is essential and the strength of the force must be sufficient to get the enemy to stand and fight.
Second Cavalry Division by itself, however, was certain to befound wanting in combat strength. The question is, how much contact does this more mobile force need? The retreating force would not know the size and composition of the pursuer. To use the analogy of the early chess grandmaster William Steinmetz, “The threat is stronger than the execution.” Outflanking cavalry, using parallel lines that were available in abundance, did not have to fight through infantry forces. The threat should be enough. The Germans did not execute.
First Army issued its next order at 2200 hrs. Each of the corps had a different objective. This was the norm. The catchphrase hammered into every German staff officer’s mind was, “March separately but fight together.” The objective was to provide as many roads as possible separately to the different army corps. Each would march along its own dedicated road and then come together at a critical point for combat. Each division would have its own road.
The separate routes led the different army corps through different villages. Reconnaissance was supposed to identify critical points should the army corps have to consolidate for battle. All of this had to be worked out prior to issuing the orders. There was no thought of using the cavalry division for pursuit of the Belgian Army. Second Cavalry Division was to advance through Aerschot toward Brussels, reconnoitering toward Antwerp and westward on both sides of Brussels. Army HQ was to be at Winghe St. Georges, and all corps were required to be in telephonic communication with it by 1030 hours. Air reconnaissance was to be carried out by Second Corps toward Antwerp; by Fourth Corps in a westerly direction past the north of Brussels; by Third Corps in a westerly direction south of Brussels; and by Ninth Corps in a southwesterly direction over Wavre.
The HKK 2 skirmished with French Cavalry Corps Sordet at Perwez.[i]Kluck described this encounter as forcing the French Fifth Cavalry Division away from the town of Perwez (Pervez) with heavy losses. Sordet’s Corps was indeed driven back, even though they fielded three divisions. Kluck went on to say that serious interference with the advance from the forces in Antwerp could not be feared!
The concept of the operation changed with the successful Belgian retreat; it was now irreconcilable with previously established intentions. As detailed by the First Army Commander, “The ultimate objective . . . was to disperse first the Belgian Army, then the British Expeditionary Force, and finally to fall on the French armies.” Moltke saw this requirement on the seventeenth and ordered its accomplishment as “most important.” The Germans let the Belgians escape and then minimized the impact. Without the Belgian Army, the course of the war would have been dramatically altered. An aggressive pursuit at this time might well have caught, fixed, and perhaps scattered the Belgians as they attempted to withdraw into Antwerp. Many historians have debated the German decision to retreat from the Marne. It has been proposed that that was a failure to enforce will because of Auftragstaktik. What about this one!
Now the Belgian Army had to be screened, placed in a bottle and corked up. The Belgian Army could not be let out of the bottle without opening the German logistical rear area to complete destruction. Sorties from behind the fortifications would actually be attempted three times. Screening would take a huge number of troops. Much has been made of the decision by Moltke on August 20 to send two army corps to the east front. In Belgium, two more army corps, albeit reservists, as well as some Landwehr were diverted from the primary stated mission. Would Kluck have enough force to outflank all of his opponents after leaving behind elements to screen Antwerp?