August 19, 1914
Second Army reached the line between Wavre and Namur. First Army was driving west of Louvain. Both were still a significant distance east of Brussels. There was one cavalry division (Second Cavalry Division) in the far north assigned to First Army. Two more divisions (Fourth and Ninth) were assigned to HKK 2, positioned in front of Second Army. Those two cavalry divisions had been skirmishing with the French, losing strength, and fighting power incrementally. Very far to the south were the two divisions of HKK 1, still in the area of Dinant, certainly too far away to reinforce the overworked troopers in central Belgium.
Scrambling to cover long range reconnaissance, First Army started sending out single aircraft on two-hundred-mile trips to the coast of the English Channel. They desperately were trying to find the BEF. First Army’s FFA 12 sent an aircraft on a long-distance patrol on the line Namur–Ostend–Bruges. During the flight, the plane ran out of gas and was forced to land in neutral Holland, where the crew was interned for the duration of the war.
The hard-pressed Second Cavalry Division was once again brought to a standstill due to supply difficulties. Ironically, the loss of one thousand horses on August 12 by Fourth Cavalry Division made the requirement for fodder less acute in that organization.The HKK 1 held the high ground to the east of Dinant and used the day to focus on maintenance: horseshoe repair and sharpening lance points. Of the five divisions between the two HKK, three were stopped for the day. No patrolling. This makes operational reconnaissance quite ineffective. Second Cavalry Division’s situation became even more problematic for First Army. It was suffering from a shortage of oats and was lagging behind the right flank. It did not arrive at Wolverthem until the twentieth. As has been noted, changes in the command relationship had a direct impact on the logistics of the division. “A change in the command to which the Army cavalry is assigned usually leads to different employment and to its being shoved about from place to place, which is detrimental to its efficiency.” The commander of First Army now saw the role of Second Cavalry Division as advancing between Antwerp and Brussels, specifically to observe the approach of the British. With rumors flying about the location of the BEF, reconnaissance of the area between Antwerp and Brussels was vital. The Germans really had no idea where they might be. Aviation and cavalry reconnaissance both had distance limits. Negative reports of contact could not be accepted carte blanche.
The Belgian Army, which been defending the River Gette, continued to fall back toward Antwerp. The Germans’ failure to shoulder it away from Antwerp resulted in a force in being that could sortie dangerously against the German flank. In order to contain the Belgian Army, Third Reserve Corps was detached from the main body of First Army, and later augmented by Ninth Reserve Corps from northern Germany. Ninth Reserve Corps was the strategic reserve of the OHL. Its use against this threat was considered more vital by the OHL than the coastal security mission it had previously planned for. The loss of Third Reserve Corps would be a telling reduction in the forces trying to sweep around the French left flank. Based on some intercepted letters, the German staff started to believe that the British could be in Antwerp on the left flank of the Belgian field army. There was no direct confirmation of this but it certainly posed a new threat. One major accomplishment of Second Cavalry Division was its reconnaissance toward Antwerp. First Squadron, Lifeguard Second Hussar Regiment was able to report that the British had not landed at Antwerp and that there were no British troops in the city at this time. But if the British were not there, where were they? It is instructive to note that in October 1914, the Royal Naval Division was sent to Antwerp. Far too late for this operation, however; proof that the British were not a static opponent.
