August 2, 1914
We are going to make use of the month of August as an anniversary. Similar to the book, we are going to follow some of the events day by day. You might want to take a look at an old blog called tunnels as it will give you some idea of the terrain.
Germany gave its ultimatum to Belgium. Claiming to have “reliable information” regarding French preparations to invade Belgium on the way to invade Germany, this ultimatum announced that German troops were about to advance into Belgium preemptively. It urged the Belgians to adopt “benevolent neutrality,” permitting the German Army to pass through the kingdom unhindered. In return, Germany promised to guarantee the country’s “integrity and independence,” to purchase all supplies in cash, and to make good any damages caused by troops. If Belgium resisted, the Germans would regard the kingdom as an enemy.
The Germans demanded the Belgian response by 0700 hours, only twelve hours after they presented their demands. The ultimatum, moreover, was written in German, in hopes the Belgians would spend at least one of the allotted hours translating the note—not all that different from the Japanese in December 1941.The concept of the ultimatum as detailed in the mobilization plan had a few twists. The Belgians were not only to open the forts immediately to the Germans, but to defend the fortress at Namur against a possible French raid. They were supposed as well to prevent English landings.
Belgium had mobilized its army on July 31, 1914, but was not yet fully ready to resist when it received Germany’s ultimatum. The Crown Council met that night, needing to make a decision. Belgium had three courses of action. It could give in to the demands of the ultimatum, withdraw their army and keep it intact for a withdrawal to Antwerp, or position all their forces along the River Meuse and try to hold off the Germans. Some Belgian Crown Council members actually pushed for a fourth option—to abandon these three courses of action and attack Germany before the German mobilization was complete. While the reply to the ultimatum was polished, Belgium’s military situation was again discussed. When it was proposed to blow up the Meuse bridges, the army’s impulsive second-in-command Gen. Louis de Ryckel protested: “We need to drive the Germans back to where they came from”. In accordance with this concept, the Belgians could not blow up the railroad bridges over the rivers because they would need the bridges for an attack on Germany. There was no unanimity as to the Germans intent. Would they cross the River Meuse? Would they try to advance south of the river toward France? Preemption might be Belgium’s most promising course. Belgian Chief of Staff Gen. Antonin de Selliers de Moranville successfully convinced the entire group. He was unwilling to risk Belgium’s entire mobile army in one stroke against Germany because a defeat would bring into question the army’s ability to retreat to the fortifications of Antwerp. Moranville instead urged concentrating the main body of the army behind the River Gette, midway between the Meuse and Brussels. There the Belgians could await French and British reinforcements. King Albert I reluctantly acquiesced, insisting however that two divisions (Third Infantry, Fourth Infantry) and one brigade (Fifteenth) from the mobile army be sent to reinforce the garrisons of Liège and Namur. They would defend en masse along the Namur–Gette River–Diest–Antwerp line.
Faced with a foe of overwhelming size, the Belgians had few choices. If they proposed to remain neutral, feigning a three-way defense would make it quite difficult for the Belgian Army to defend Liège with its entire force. Logically, Belgium hoped its army could join with that of France and England to stop the German onslaught. To that end, however, the Belgian Army had to stay in existence. It could not allow itself to be trapped or destroyed; it had to remain a “force in being.” If Belgium fought on its own, the advantages of timing and position Clausewitz claimed would accrue to the defender would not be enough to stop the German juggernaut, let alone repel it. Therefore, keeping the army intact had to be the Belgians’ major plan. King Albert I decided the army would eventually withdraw from its forward locations to the relative security of the forts surrounding the city of Antwerp if the Allies did not arrive in time. From there, the Belgians could stage a sortie to threaten the flank or rear of any German advance through Belgium. The Germans could not ignore an army in Antwerp.
On the German side of the line, from the first day of mobilization, August 2, 1914,17 the entire country automatically became subject to a state of siege. The law did not specify in detail how this state of siege was to be executed, how long it was to endure,—or indeed what it was. This lack of specificity gave considerable leeway to the army corps commanders on how to implement it. The law was used primarily against liberal elements of the Reich’s left wing.
Upon mobilization, the army corps and their divisions and brigades were assembled and dispatched to their assigned frontline position.
Each newly appointed commander and their chiefs of staff were briefed by the chief of the Great General Staff GGS about the intent of the entire operation. After individual meetings the commanders and their chiefs returned to their respective HQ, whether existing or newly created, to draw up initial operations plans while their troops were mobilized and transported to the deployment areas.
Units participating in the Handstreich left their home stations and moved to assembly areas without a clear explanation of their destination or mission. Instead, an officer of the General Staff met them and provided secret orders that detailed their roles. These instructions had those brigades bivouac on the night of the August 3, cross the border, move to an assembly area on the night of the fourth, and continue moving to a further assembly area on the night of the fifth. The officers with the instructions were also charged to be brigade guides for the most important routes because they allegedly had reconnoitered the route.
