August 21, 1914
Two German Army zeppelins were brought down over the western front: ZVIIand ZVIII. This happened very far away from the right wing. However, it seriously affected the total number of dirigibles available. The loss of these two airships, along with the destruction of LZVI on August 6, left the OHL with only four zeppelins on the entire western front. This number would not allow for any “flooding of the zone” looking for the BEF.
The order from Second Army directed HKK 2 to march west and take position in front of the right wing of First Army. This constituted a change in direction, and Fourth Cavalry Division, which had sent distant patrols to the south, had to recall them. These did not rejoin the division until August 22, with some arriving later. Bülow ordered First Army to conform to the movement of the Second Army while screening Antwerp. Specifically, First Army was to seal off the north and northeastern approaches to Maubeuge from the area to the west of the fortress in such a way that it could take action to support Second Army if required. Neither Second Army nor the OHL expected the British forces to come into action in the near future.
The three possible BEF deployment scenarios were: the BEF could be heading for Lille, the BEF could be the French left flank around Maubeuge, the BEF could be moving directly onto the invasion force’s flank literally in the direction of Brussels. Searching desperately for the BEF again, First Army continued to advance in a strongly refused right echelon This echelon was a safety measure just in case the BEF came straight at the invading army from the English Channel. Using the echelon, First Army could concentrate army corps more easily against a threat to their flank or behind them The disadvantage or trade-off was that a refused flank such as this made it more difficult to concentrate army corps to threats from the southeast or the southwest. Both of those two possibilities would require much further marching. Third Reserve Corps, northeast of Brussels, covered the army’s right flank against Antwerp. Fourth Reserve Corps reached Louvain. Second Cavalry Division continued to look for the British in the direction of Alost. It was, however, no longer under the command of First Army; assigned once again to HKK 2, which now was ordered to unite the entire HKK at the front of the right wing of First Army in an effort to reconnoiter toward Ath. First Army stayed deployed in a refused right echelon. If the BEF could be discovered, Kluck would know which way to concentrate. A situation report arrived from the OHL cautioning that the British had probably landed at Boulogne and would be employed from the region of Lille. This included the caveat, There is a tendency here, however, to believe that landings on a large scale have not yet taken place. That caveat was not extremely helpful, the receiving staff probably referred to it with some sort of a modern acronym “CYA.”
The lack of an army group HQ combined with the ambivalently nonaggressive approach of the OHL put the entire right wing into an “agreement” mode. Bülow had to plan for the actions of his own army, as well as those of other forces under his command—which was itself ad hoc, temporary, and so less likely to be automatically acknowledged. That had to be done with no additional staff. Kuhl stated that those agreements and understandings were usually arrived at in an incomplete form after a great loss of time. “Each particular army has its own interests and its own conception of the situation. They can be completely harmonized only by a higher authority.”
While they generally agreed on French dispositions, there was a significant difference of opinion between First Army and the OHL concerning the British location. They shared a common belief that a strong French army was advancing between the Rivers Meuse and Sambre. Relying on an article published in a newspaper dated August 20, First Army thought the British army had already landed in France but had first to consolidate. As a result, First Army expected the appearance of the BEF in its sector within the next few days. Kuhl noted that Second Army would be starting its attack on Namur with its left wing and then wheel to the south. He assumed the British had certainly landed but were not expected to arrive from the direction Ghent–Courtrai–Audenard. This view meant there was no longer any danger to his right flank. Kuhl deduced this by thinking that the British would not risk operational isolation by placing themselves that far away from the French left flank. Instead, he expected the BEF to arrive further to the south in liaison with the French left wing. Kuhl saw this as a green light that would allow First Army’s right flank, Second Army Corps, to proceed to Ninove and then further onto Ath—slowly eliminating the refused flank of First Army and allowing an easier repositioning to the south. This would allow First Army to maintain contact with Second Army, ready to wheel southward.
Bülow initially had a different concept. He wanted to move south with both First and Second Army and only then, with the greatest possible combination of forces to include Third Army, attack the French between the Rivers Meuse and Sambre—the French Fifth Army. First Army did not want to do such an abrupt swing. They argued it would jeopardize any wide-ranging enveloping movement like Schlieffen’s model. First Army wanted their swing to be so broad as would envelop the French left wing whether behind the Rivers Aisne and Somme or behind the Oise or Seine. The OHL left this plan to be agreed on between the armies. Bülow issued this final order was on the twenty-first:
On August 22, Second Army will proceed to the line Binche–Jemeppe for the purpose of advancing over the Sambre on the twenty-third and opening a passage for Third Army over the Meuse. First Army, by covering toward Antwerp and leaving a garrison in Brussels, will participate in this movement so far as to be able in a given case, by investing the north and northwest fronts of Maubeuge, to come into action west of this fortress for the purpose of supporting Second Army.
First Army continued to disagree and sent a liaison officer to argue its position. The Chief of Staff of the Second Army, General von Lauenstein, could not be persuaded. He directed, “Support the attack of Second Army by investing Maubeuge; hence, approach Second Army more closely.” The First Army order for the twenty-second accordingly acknowledged, “ First Army will wheel to the left to support Second Army.” Second Army Corps on the right wing remained far in the rear, going only as far as Ninove. Third Reserve Army Corps advanced more closely toward Antwerp. Fourth Reserve Army Corps was to reach Brussels and press forward, leaving only two battalions as the garrison.
General von Hausen, Commander of the Third German Army, had to release Eleventh Army Corps for the attack on Namur. He would not maximize his strength until he moved forward Twelfth Reserve Army Corps to take its place. That could not take place until the twenty-first at the earliest. However, the agreement between the two armies was not arrived at until the twenty-first. Therefore, the attack by Second and Third Army would not take place until the twenty-third.
The British army cavalry arrived at the area Binche–Canal du Centre screening the advance of the BEF. Meanwhile, French General Joffre ordered Third and Fourth Army to attack into the Ardennes, and Fifth Army to attack and hold the Germans in place.
