August 4, 1914
The Army of the Meuse crossed the border into Belgium on a forty-kilometer front: six brigades of infantry and all of HKK 2—approximately twenty-five thousand soldiers and eight thousand horsemen supported by 124 guns and four 21-centimeter mortars. At Emmich’s direction, a proclamation was read in every Belgian town. Parenthetically, the fact that in peacetime no proclamation was prepared but had to be prepared by the staff of General von Emmich is an indicator that the chief of the General Staff thought—or hoped—that the invasion would end with Belgium accepting the original ultimatum.
Most of the Belgian reserve units initially deployed at Liège were sent specifically to help secure the rail bridges. Although some sources question this decision, it made perfect sense. If the Germans recognized the rail bridges as the most important objective within Liège, certainly the Belgians would likely do the same. As a rule, studies about Liège focus on the forts instead of the lines of communication. Without the railroad bridge, there would be a risky delay in advancing the logistics of the invasion force. The purpose of forcing the gap was after all, to set the conditions for the advance. But neutralizing the forts was essential in order to clear and secure the communication lines. It became a question of priorities, and the bridge at Visé was key. Unlike the rail bridges that would take more time to become primarily important, the need for this bridge was immediate. If the Germans did not have this bridge, they could not put their troops on the other bank of the Meuse River swiftly. If the troops could not cross the river, they could not get into position for the essential execution of the Handstreich. Here the German Thirty-fourth Infantry Brigade and two entire cavalry divisions were ready to cross, but alas the Belgians had already destroyed the bridge.
There was a ford further north, near the Dutch border at Lixhe. However, it seemed not so easy to cross the ford as it had looked on paper Bridge Transports Thirteen and Fourteen did not arrive until the afternoon of August 5. Until the arrival of bridge transports only a few cavalry pontoon bridge wagons, some fishing boats, and timber stacks were available for bridge construction but none sufficient on the wide, fast-flowing river. This was an unwelcome realization. According to the Moltke Plan, attacking infantry and parts of the cavalry divisions were supposed to be west of the Meuse on August 5. If these troops did not reach their starting positions in the course of that day, then the attack—intended as simultaneous and to be mounted from all sides of Liège—would be thrown off schedule and objectives. After the crossing, the troops still needed to march twenty to thirty kilometers to reach the attack’s assigned starting points. The guides who supposedly knew the region had not shown up. Finally, the mission of the cavalry divisions according to the plan Handstreich expanded for the next day. After their arrival north of Liège, they were to take part in the attack as far as circumstances allowed. Now, all of that was impossible without an intact bridge.
The hastily mobilized FFA 9, Luftschiff “ZVI,” and the field airship battalion Second Feld-Luftschiffer Abteilung (FLA) were put at Emmich’s disposal. The FFA 9 had to reconnoiter alone around Liège until August 10 because FLA 2 had not been able to complete its mobilization in time. FFA 9 (which was normally assigned as part of Fourth Army Corps from First Army) had to protect the German attack against surprise by the Belgian field army. These very first pilot reports provided the command of the assault force an insight on the enemy situation. While there seem to be reasonably accurate reports about new construction of defenses between the forts, reporting on the status of the bridges continued to be faulty. The Belgian field army—then assembling, did not seem to be intervening at this stage. On the eastern and southern fronts of Liège, the fortresses were prepared and fortified between the forts. In other words, the Army of the Meuse was preparing to execute an attack although the staff knew for five days that the Belgian Third Infantry Division had mobilized to defend the area between the forts. They knew this on July 31. There were thousands more defenders than the Germans plan anticipated. The original tactical concept of the operation was to advance between the forts through areas supposedly undefended, then attack at night, surprising undeployed forces. Instead, the Germans faced superior forces in reasonably well-prepared positions. This was an attack that objectively had no or very little chance of success.
The cavalry’s primary mission lay beyond Liège, in locating the Belgian Army. However, in the initial stage, HKK 2 was assigned to the Army of the Marne. The commander, Marwitz, had also been tasked to lead the crucial northern element in the attack on Liège. The intent was for the German cavalry to precede the main advance and accomplish three things: ensure the Belgian Army did not escape to the northwest and flee into Antwerp, clear the way for the advance, and perform reconnaissance.
The Belgian defenders of Visé withdrew to the center of Liège, leaving the Belgian commander no reliable reconnaissance source for what was happening in the north. Instead, erroneous reports of several German cavalry regiments with artillery on the west bank of the Meuse were forwarded to the Belgian General HQ in Leuven. Thus, on the evening of August 4, neither side knew what the next day would bring.