August 7, 1914
There was no allowance for signal troops of any kind to be assigned to establish and maintain communication between Emmich and his higher HQs. As the commander of Second Army became anxious about the lack of information, he sent forward a liaison officer. This resulted in a report on August 7 that Fourteenth, Twenty-Seventh, and Thirty-Fourth brigades were still outside of the fortifications and there was no idea where General von Emmich was. The liaison sent another report around noon on the seventh that Liège had still not been taken. Despite repeated efforts, FFA 9 was not tasked for any missions again. Its commander was separated from his unit due to his dual role on Emmich’s staff. And yet another report at 1800 hours relayed that intelligence officers in Koblenz were questioning whether the HQ of General von Emmich still existed. Wild rumors abounded. One assessment was that the command had been annihilated. Another rumor was that Emmich had committed suicide. General von der Marwitz, the commander of HKK 2, thought he had to take command of the Army of the Meuse because of the absence of Emmich. Based on rumors and lack of information, both the OHL and the Second Army HQ believed the attack had failed.
Few riders came back from the remote patrols. Of the four patrols led by officers in Seventeenth Dragoner Regiment, just one returned. The Germans used no deep aviation reconnaissance. These brigades were products of peacetime training of six separate army corps.
Another telling tale is that German senior officer losses were extremely high. The loss of so many senior leaders in such a short period certainly indicates both traditionalist training, as officers were supposed to be in the lead of any attack, and levels of confusion demanding senior officer involvement despite the risks.
The Handstreichas conceived had obviously failed, but Belgian actions caused it to become a partial success. Leman was not only commander of Third Infantry Division, but also governor of Fortress Liège. As mentioned, one of the few successes in the Handstreichwas that of the Seventh Jäger Battalion attack on the Belgian Third Infantry Division HQ, where the general was located. As Leman evacuated to Fort Loncin, command and control of the Belgian forces fell into complete confusion. Reports were contradictory, and the general did not understand the situation. He was of the opinion that four full German army corps—instead of multiple separate brigades—were attacking. With reports of penetrations throughout the perimeter of Liège, he believed he was facing a catastrophe and that the Belgian Third Infantry Division could be caught in a mousetrap. He heard excited reports of strong German cavalry to his west and as many as five thousand more German cavalry around Warreme. Because the Belgian troops had been withdrawn from the Visé area, Leman had no idea exactly how much German cavalry had crossed the Meuse River. Estimates were wildly different, but two cavalry divisions were known to be north of Liège and should have wanted to cross. Thus, the Belgians worried the German cavalry would not only trap the Belgian divisions, but also turn the flank of the field army. Leman ordered the withdrawal of his field forces to the west side of Liège. Finally, he decided to withdraw both Third Infantry Division and Fifteenth Brigade to join the field army, leaving only the fortress troops. Leman informed the Belgian SHQ that the division would be withdrawn because it was completely exhausted.
The Belgian decision to withdraw rather than counterattack is interesting. Originally, the Belgians had no prewar plans to defend the intervals between the forts. Leman succeeded in convincing the king to do so, over the head of the Belgian chief of staff, just days before the war broke out. It is not clear how many casualties the Third Infantry Division suffered as a result. The withdrawal in any case turned into a disorganized route march. When it arrived at Hannut on August 7, the previously strong division needed to be reorganized: the five brigades that had started the battle were consolidated into three. The SHQ also understood the forts still held out but that Leman had stayed in Liège and abandoned his division. The Belgian Field Army finally came to rest at a naturally strong position halfway between Liège and Antwerp along the River Gette.
The Germans pushed into the city of Liège against little organized resistance. Fire from the forts was sporadic and not coordinated because each fort was by now isolated. Movement between the forts became easier for the attackers, and even many German staff cars seem to have found their way through. Ludendorff made his well-known capture of the Citadel. The mobile Belgian forces withdrew. Some units joined the retreat while others capitulated. As Fourteenth and Eleventh Infantry Brigades entered the city, it continued to rain. At 1300 hours, an officer of the General Staff brought the directive: “Lüttich is in our hands. The troops that stand near Julémont have to advance immediately!” The advance to Liège from the direction of Jupille continued unhampered with flags flying in heavy rain.
By the end of the day on August 7, the Germans had in Liège two infantry brigades and an infantry regiment and had effectively secured the city center. The first authentic news to relieve the suspense in Second Army came toward the close of the day when Bülow’s HQ intercepted a private telegram from Emmich to his wife. The information it contained was quite scant, reading only, “Hurrah, at Liège.” Two hours later, formal word arrived from the Second Army’s liaison officer: “General von Emmich entered Liège on August 7 at 0745 hours. The Governor in flight. The Bishop a prisoner. Liège evacuated by Belgian troops. Citadel of Liège occupied by our troops. As yet not known which forts have been taken.”
This report completely overturned and reversed the initial impression that the attack had failed. Now it was generally accepted by Second Army and the German OHL that the struggle was over. The communiqué from Berlin proclaimed the capture of the fortress. The German press hailed the victory. Throughout Germany, the public received the news with smug satisfaction. Liège has been captured! Reality was more mundane. In a tactical context, it was not such a great victory. It was almost as though the Germans owned the center of a doughnut. Despite all the celebration and back slaps, there was still a great deal of work to be done. With the tunnels blocked, there was no quick solution—no solution at all—except to clear the tunnels. The unbelievably good news for the Germans, however, was that neither of the railway bridges had been destroyed!
This left the Germans in a paradoxsituation. They controlled the city of Liège but not the surrounding forts, which could still interdict the lines of communication through the city. There was no direct contact or communication between Emmich in the city center and Bülow outside.