Halen 11 – German Jaeger’s Attack 3
0925 Hours. An SHQ envoy handed de Witte an envelope:
The Mixed Brigade of the 1st Belgian Army Division
will will, assembled near Sint-Margriete-Houtem, received the order to march on Kortenaken. This brigade is at your disposal in order to enable you to prevent the enemy from crossing the Gete and Demer Rivers. . . . Contact the brigade’s commanding officer at Loksbergen. . . . In case the enemy succeeds to come across the left bank, you must push him back to the right bank with the support of the 4th Mixed Brigade.
0930 Hours. Elements of the German FAR Nr 3 came riding down the main road, moving fast. The lieutenant in charge looked for a suitable location to position his guns. He bumped into Hptm. Herbig of Jäger Bn Nr 9, who promptly pointed out positions—all on the right side of the main road near Waterkant. Jäger Bn Nr 9, which had arrived on the scene, and were moving into their attack positions, protected these guns. “At the gallop, two guns arrived. Now shot after shot struck the Halen houses at a distance of about 1,000 meters. . . . In about 10 minutes, the Belgian machine guns at the south of the village had disappeared.” Although these machine guns had dogcarts, it is not certain whether the dogs were present or if the carts had been human-powered, like those of the 4th Mixed Brigade dogcarts that would appear later.
We are informed that the spearhead of our cavalry had been fired upon from Halen. Hptm. Winkler [FAR Nr 3] orders me [Lt. Wehl] to position my section north of the Halen-Herk-de-Stad Road. He looked for a position for the 2nd Section south of the road. The only possible positions are at about 1,000 meters from the edge of the village. The battery now fires upon riflemen at the edge of the village, setting some houses on fire. The enemy retreats quickly.
0945 Hours. There was no advanced evacuation of the residents of Halen. The population must have thought that this would pass relatively uneventfully. The German POW had advised the Belgians to disappear as soon as possible because six German cavalry regiments were closing in. When the artillery fire started, the citizens became seriously frightened. Maurice Cleeremans noted, “Inhabitants—informed of the upcoming predicted events—grabbed the most essential things and fled in the direction of Diest. Many managed to get onto the normally scheduled train that provided service from Tienen to Diest and ultimately to Brussels.”
Artillery rounds started piercing holes in the sides of the buildings, shattering roofs, and splintering glass throughout the town. Some of the residents took shelter in their basements, but the majority started a massive flight. Some headed for the train station, inspired to take the 11:00 to Diest. Cleeremans claimed that the stationmaster had realized he could no longer allow trains into Halen from Diest or Tienen, and he notified the respective stations by telephone. Van Overstraeten, passing by at the moment the Cyclists were falling back to the railroad crossing, stated as well, “When I crossed the railroad I noticed a hundred villagers gathered at the platform of the railroad station—men and women—patiently waiting for a train, . . . a train that would take them away . . . and that would never come.”
