Halen 15 – Probing
1100 Hours. The German Jäger had not crossed the Gete Bridge at first because they feared the barricade and the brewery were still occupied. They soon determined that the Belgians had withdrawn from the village. Six companies were positioned in a wide arc round Halen. The important Gete crossing had fallen into German hands very quickly. “At about 1100 hours we are informed that our infantry had to evacuate Halen. A company of Cyclists [actually two platoons] reinforced us. Behind a dense hedge at the right side of the road we lie out of enemy view. We await the events, while at our right from the direction of Loksbergen cannon fire roars and rifle fire rings out.”
1130 Hours. The 1st Battery (Batt)/Artillerie à Cheval (A Ch) started shelling Halen, causing German losses. They fired only a few shells, aimed mainly at the bridge, while the Halen market square was packed with German troops. A Dragoner Regt Nr 17 patrol emerged from the town, advancing toward the railroad crossing—it was thrown back in disorder.
I [Lt. Hofmann, FAR Nr 3] rode into Halen with the first Jäger. The Jäger assemble a bunch of “Franktireurs” [francs-tireurs] at the village square. Now enemy shells crash into the houses [from the Mettenberg Hill gun positions]. They rip off half roofs; bricks and tiles fly around. I leave my horse behind and try to come to the other side of the village. From there I see at a distance of 2,000 meters the enemy artillery battery at the [Mettenberg] hill. They stand there unhidden. I return to the village and report this to [Regimental Commander] Maj. Wagner. By now, the village already looks ravaged. Houses are in flames; bodies block the road; from time to time, a shell crashes.
The Jäger Bn Nr 9 skirmishers advanced toward the railroad, in the direction of Velpen. The Cyclists retreated very quickly, as they wanted to be integrated in the IJzerwinning Farm defensive position. After trying to direct the Cyclists towards the sunken road (the Betserbaan), Van Overstraeten succeeded in positioning them about 400 meters in front of the IJzerwinning Farm. “I order them to stop and to turn back. . . . I trot towards the crossing of two sunken tracks [Kanonnierstraat and Betserbaan].”
Gen.Lt Otto von Garnier, Commander of the German 4th Kav Division, and his staff entered Halen along with the Jäger. He wanted to have a clear view of the situation. He became convinced that it would be wise to keep one squadron available in the village and execute additional reconnaissance as the enemy left its positions. He sent a dispatch rider to Herk-de-Stad to report the situation to Marwitz, the HKK 2 Commander. Marwitz shelved his thoughts of an advance via Diest. He would now only go for the Gete line at Halen. The 3rd Kav Bde would have to cross the Gete south of Halen. In the meantime, 17th Kav Bde would have to advance through the village in order to attack from behind the enemy forces that were opposite 3rd Kav Brigade. Marwitz was now also informed that Halen had been taken relatively easily and the Jäger were already partly at the western exit. He ordered not one squadron, but the entire 17th Kav Brigade, to advance on Halen and to be at the Divisional Commander Gen.Lt von Garnier’s disposal as soon as possible. These decisions were made four kilometers from the battlefield, where Marwitz could see only a map. The 17th Kav Brigade Commander, Gen.Maj Graf von Schimmelmann, thought the situation much too unclear to send an entire brigade into the unknown. However, he was overruled. The order stood and was executed with a disastrous outcome.
So, the brigade followed 3rd squadron/Dr Nr 17, which was the reconnaissance eskadron under Rittm. Freiherr von Malzahn. Dense clouds of dust rose. Enemy artillery intensified the shelling. Garnier saw the entire 17th Kav Brigade —instead of the single reconnaissance squadron he really wanted. All the streets were jammed and blocked. There was no possibility for artillery or machine-gun units to advance through the village streets. “In the Halen village streets stood three columns of horses and carts packed for more than two hours. . . . Fortunately, the Belgian Artillery never noticed, as they mainly shelled the area around the bridge. Otherwise, panic would certainly have broken out.”