Halen 17 – First Charge-2
Whatever their intention, the cavalry failed to change formation. This may be blamed on both the terrain and the failure of the reconnaissance patrol to give terrain information to the lead squadron.
Rittm. Hans von Bodecker, who survived the battle and became a Belgian POW, commanded this lead squadron —2nd Squadron/Dr Nr 17. Based on his survival and capture, we have a great deal of information about his charge. Hewanted to ride along the Halen-Zelk Road and then turn left when the terrain allowed. He knew nothing about the results of Bernstorff-Karrin’s reconnaissance party. He was not aware of the great many wire fences or that the entrance to Zelk itself was barricaded. Either side of the street was bordered with wire and ditches. “We had to stay in the four-row column, not able to spread out. Still no road to the left. We have to stay on the road. Then I notice the barricade [at Zelk], and all hell breaks loose. Horses and troopers crash down.” Of the ninety horsemen in the squadron, only fifteen returned.
The road itself was surfaced with cobblestones; trees lined either side. According to the unpublished account of Lt. Robert de Heusch, a Belgian officer stationed at the main road barricade, the squadron emerged from a wood 600 meters from the barricade. We have seen pictures of the barricade. Although it was not substantial, it was obviously enough to block the cavalry advance. From the pictures, it is clear that the cavalry had breached the barricade, as there were dead horses on either side. It is not clear exactly where the squadron was when fired upon, but we know they had been marching at a moderate pace, four horses abreast. It seems as though the squadron lead was allowed to advance beyond the north-south road leading to Vogelzang Farm.
De Heusch, who was at the barricade near the De Boerendans Inn, stated:
Our troops open fire, calmly. It is sheer slaughter. The Germans fall as flies; those that escape the bullets crash into the barricade. Ten horses without riders manage to come just in front of the barricade. The complete Squadron is destroyed, forty KIA [killed in action], some thirty WIA [wounded in action], and twenty-five POW. The wounded are immediately taken care of by our medical officer. We captured ten horses, they are in good shape. The Squadron Commander, Rittm. von Bodecker, is made prisoner and hands over his military items. He blames us for the having declared war on Germany. He also states that the Germans will be in Brussels by 15 August and in Paris ten days later.
The Dragoner Regt Nr 17 history states, “Rittm. von Bodecker wants to take the main road towards Zelk and then turn left when the terrain allows him to do so. The road is seamed with wire fences and hedge. We had to stay marching on in a four-file column. We could not deploy. There was no possibility to turn left; we had to stay on the road. Bodecker stated that there was no road leading to the left. However, we know there was, but it was within the kill-zone of the Squadron. It therefore became available too late for him to maneuver. From this, we have to conclude that he intended to attack the Belgian Artillery (2nd and 3rd Batt/A Ch) on Bokkenberg Hill, after the squadron passed Zelk. Obviously, the lack of reconnaissance played a major role in this debacle; however, the Germans were using terribly outdated maps.
As stated earlier, 3rd Squadron turned completely around and retreated toward Halen. There they dismounted and took no further part in any charges. Poseck gave this decision an interesting twist. He tried to convince readers that this Squadron wanted to charge but could not because of the carnage on the road. Cavalry Regimental Commander Ob. Baron von der Heyden-Rynsch made the decision at that point (according to Poseck) to pull his regiment out and dismount it. The timing of this makes it seem extremely half-true.