Halen 34-Belgian Reinforcements Arrive=3
Hptm. von Schierstädt, Commander of the G MG-Abt Nr 2, attributed this success to “the valuable peacetime training, the maximum exploiting of the terrain, and the discipline to only to show oneself when aiming for a good shot.” He did not even mention the green-gray uniforms that rendered them practically invisible. The Belgian Army had trained for none of this. The G MG-Abt Nr 2 had only one KIA at Halen; Jäger Bn Nr 9 and Nr 7 each counted eleven dead. But they had been engaged in combat since the morning.
Several Belgian platoons were now sent out piecemeal in an attempt to encircle Velpen. They failed. The 1st Bn/4th Line Inf Regt sent a 3rd Comp platoon from the far south of their position. They crawled on towards the bridge. The Germans started firing and the platoon leader, Second Lt. (2Lt.) Marée, fresh from the Belgian Military Academy, was killed. The patrol’s wriggling in the lower pastures had not remained unnoticed by the Germans. When Marée died, his platoon quickly retreated. Another platoon under 2Lt. Decour from 1st Comp/1st Bn/4th Line Inf Regt attempted to infiltrate along the flanks. Until 1630 hours, Decour crawled forward with his men. When they suddenly jumped up to run and reach the Velpen Road, fire from the Garde MG’s started at a high cadence. The patrol crawled quickly towards the bridge. There they found the remnants of the Marée platoon that had been shattered only minutes previously. Decour managed to cross the Velperstraat and the small bridge, leaving behind some soldiers. He advanced some 200 meters. In doing this, he and his few men represented the closest any Belgian 4th Mixed Bde soldiers would come to Halen during the fight. However, enemy fire compelled him to retreat towards the Velperstraat. He found shelter in one of the small houses halfway between the Velp Bridge and the Velper-Rotemstraat crossroad. The men he had left behind at the Velp Bridge disappeared as well. From his shelter, Decour saw 3rd Bn/24th Line Inf Regt elements approaching.
During the turmoil and confusion, 2nd Comp/2nd Bn/24th Line Inf Regt had shown up at the position of the vanguard 1st Bn/4th Line Inf Regt. Lt. Stoops commanded this company. At first, he halted his company along a track leading from the Loksbergen Road southward. He then went forward in the same ditch that Rademakers had followed. The major ordered Stoops to push forward into the Velp dale. The young officer went off to reconnoiter, but returned after a few paces, telling the major, “As I crawl currently, do not assume that I do this out of fear.” Then he went on, his head up, crossing the open space separating him from the protective hedges. He was shot immediately. This is an example of how wrong ideas on warfare led to senseless heroism. Even the battalion commander had his own ideas on the conduct of war, based on older doctrine. His adjutant wrote, “I hear someone calling for me. The major had now come to me brandishing his saber, shouting ‘1st Battalion advance!'” All of the men between the road and the hedge rose up. They barely managed to advance a few steps before the machine guns swept along the entire advancing line and the Belgians started crawling. The whole advance of the 1st Bn/4th Line Inf Regt staggered—and came to a halt. After the farm that served as the battalion’s command post went up in flames, the retreat order was given; the retreat happened under enemy fire.
The 3rd Bn/24th Line Inf Regt fought at Velpen as well. There, this Battalion served as flank guard and arrived later than the other units. It had been ordered to attack Halen via Velpen. This was all that Battalion Commander Maj. Staquet knew. As the vanguard had not crossed the Velp at Vroente, the flank guard and the main body were about two kilometers apart, separated by the Velp River. The 3rd Bn/24th Line Inf Regt had come south of Blekkom, nearer to the small river. In the back of the buildings where the Halen Museum is now, the plan of assault was prepared. A Belgian patrol advanced on the Rotemwinning Farm, a small fortress with a closed-in yard. The 3rd Bn/24th Line Inf Regt assault would be launched from this farm, called “Geyssens Farm” by the soldiers.
The 1st Comp headed directly towards the bridge. It must have been at the same time as Decour had moved near the bridge and saw them. Similar to Decour’s assault, this one was stopped. The 1st Comp did not make it further than halfway to the Velp Creek and the Velperstraat. Only 2nd Comp managed to get a bit further than the Velperstraat-Rotemstraat Road. Sergeant Rodolf Pille recorded the actions of 2nd Comp/3rd Bn/24th Line Inf Regt:
We crawled for about fifty meters and then positioned in one line, in a ditch, . . . just positioned there as the German machine guns started their work. Like a huge sewing machine, murderous fire came down. Our major saw that we could not return the fire because of the bad position we were in. The Germans were barely 100 meters from us. He now ordered the assault. The bugle sounded and the troops crossed the main road [Velperstraat], climbing the elevation of about two meters. After staying there for fifteen minutes under a hail of bullets, we could identify some groups of Germans here and there. Suddenly, after fifteen minutes, the Germans repositioned their machine guns in a better position. We had to go back.
The 1st Comp stayed near the small houses at the crossroad. Rademakers fell, unnoticed by his officers. Decour was nearly surrounded after his failed infiltration along the Velp Creek. With only three men left of his platoon (the rest had disappeared or were wounded), Decour also fled into a small house in the Velperstraat. In the small house, he found the wounded Capt. Frankx of 3rd Comp/3rd Bn/24th Line Inf Regt. Following the ditches, Decour was able to escape along the Velperstraat, rejoining his unit in the evening. By that evening, the complete 3rd Bn/24th Line Inf Regt had been withdrawn. In Kortenaken, Pille witnessed, “in the Staff HQ of our army unit, a fine dinner was served for the Staff.”
Resistance south of Velp Creek was stronger than this sad story seemed to account. While the 3rd Bn/24th Line Inf Regt was preparing, the dismounted Leibhusaren were ordered to attack the Hontsum-Velpen line. German Jäger Bn Nr 9, one of its machine-gun sections, and one company of Jäger Bn Nr 7 moved along Velp Creek. Jäger Bn Nr 7 wrote, “The company pushed on in a southeastern direction towards Bloemendaal from the Velp Creek, taking some Belgians prisoner. As the Belgians left the southern part of Bloemendaal, the Jäger entered. As the Belgian fire increased, there were casualties in the company, amongst them all three remaining officers and a Fähnrich.” Velpen could not be taken. Originally unoccupied, it became German; and as both armies retreated, it became unoccupied again.
The commitment of the rest of the 4th Mixed Bde units was much less cohesive than of those at Velpen. This is the actual situation around the IJzerwinning Farm: The Germans had already positioned FAR Nr 3 near the Halen railroad station and deployed FAR Nr 35 near Velpen. German Jäger controlled the plateau from the Betserbaan and probably fairly close to the farm. The German 2nd Squadron/LH Nr 2 operated dismounted along the IJzerbeek Creek. They wrote, “We advanced, leaping on. Shooting was seriously hindered by the many wounded Dragoner and Ulanen that lay on the fields.” This proves that they did advance on the terrain in front of the IJzerwinning Farm. Another passage mentions that they “had come as close as 200 meters of the Belgians, suffering wounded.” The Leibhusaren mention Belgian machine guns, as well. German troops would have advanced as far as Liebroek, along the Ketelbeek Creek; but we have not been able to determine to which units they belonged.