Halen 5- Estimate of the situation, How to approach this?

Halen 5- Estimate of the situation, How to approach this?

Lt. Gen. von der Marwitz commander of HKK 2, had a very clear objective. Somehow, he needed to pry the left flank of the Belgian Field Army away from Antwerp. What stood in his way was the terrain itself and the position of the Belgian Cavalry Division. The latter were spread out for quite a distance along the river Gete. But why the rush? The infantry would not even begin to move forward until the 18th. At that time, Marwitz probably knew the plan that the infantry would be moving a couple of days before so maybe on the 15th. Only the infantry would have the strength to “disperse the Belgian Army.” The fear was that the Belgians would withdraw into Antwerp before the infantry came into contact. So really what Marwitz needed was to freeze the Belgian Field Army in position and deny  freedom of action. Marwitz decided that the best way was to get his cavalry divisions across the river Gete and do something that would deny the Belgian Field Army freedom of action.

It is not at all clear what he would have done had he succeeded in this. If somehow Marwitz could magically teleport his two divisions into a location of his choice behind the infantry of the Belgian Field Army could not that infantry turnaround and crush him? Perhaps his reasoning had something to do with Auftragstaktik where they felt a need to do something. He did not seem to consider it a threat that the Belgians might hasten their withdrawal should a cavalry force be ensconced on their flank.  If Marwitz succeeded in pushing back the Belgian Cavalry Division then what? What is the next move as there is no infantry to exploit the success? So why the hurry?

Marwitz had three significant problems that his force structure was not equipped for. The HKK logistics issue as there was no infantry Corps for the cavalry division logistics to tie into. The forts around Liège still cut any access to the railhead for needed supplies. Many of the horses were starving. The other issue was the lack of engineering forces to be able to bridge any of these myriad of rivers. Due to the steepness of the banks, many of the rivers could not be forded by cavalry. Therefore, all river crossings had to be done on bridges that were intact. Failing that, no wheeled traffic could cross like artillery and machine guns. The third issue was the complete lack of any kind of aviation asset for the HKK. Deep reconnaissance was just not possible.

Despite these technical issues, the mission was handed down to the two cavalry divisions with the fourth cavalry division in front. The division commander, Gen. von Garnier, could estimate part of his decisions based on the terrain of the battlefield. There was the town of Halen that stood directly across the Gete river. The terrain was dominated by two hills: Mettenberg and Bokkenberg. In the distance on the right-hand side was the hill called the Bokkenberg.  It was a natural artillery position that needed to be flanked and any artillery driven away. The Diest road to Zelk was flat, but 800 meters before Zelk, the terrain climbs steeply to sixty or seventy meters. That is the Bokkenberg. In the center was the slightly shorter hill : Mettenberg. The terrain was clear but rose slowly up to 55 m. Directly in the middle of the open field as you approached Mettenberg there was a farm known as the IJzerwinning Farm. Standing in Halen on the left you would see the Gete river and after a slight incline the hamlet of Velpen.  Below Velpen to the south were large wooded areas known as The Loksbergen Wood and the Provincial Wood.

So General Garnier develops an easy scheme of maneuver- a double envelopment knocking the artillery off of the hills and trapping the Belgian Cavalry Division in the middle. Jaeger’s will take the town and the all-important bridge. 17th Cavalry Brigade will go to the right and knock the artillery off of the Bokkenberg. The third Cavalry Brigade will go to the left, crossed the river on their internal organic pontoons, and knock the artillery off of the Mettenberg, seizing the farm and joining up with the 17th Cavalry Brigade.