Infantry Doctrine-1

Sometime during mid-August in 1914, a young French cavalry lieutenant, René Chambe, met the exhausted remains of the routed French 18 Infantry Regiment. During the battle in Lorraine, within minutes the regiment had lost almost half of its men and all but two of its officers. They were still shocked from the terrible experience that had taken their friends and could not believe what had happened, “And even without seeing the enemy! I tell you, we haven’t even seen a single German!”

The heavy losses had a deep impact upon those who survived. Like their imperial German counterparts, they went to war having a specific idea in mind about how that war should look. Their idea of an open battle with skirmish lines advancing with flags flying and bugles sounding came from the battles of 1870 and 1871. Now disaster had struck like a bolt out of the blue. Why was there such a gap between the prevailing doctrinal idea of war and the truth of actual war in 1914?

The development of imperial German infantry doctrine goes back to the days of Napoleon. The doctrine of that time used basically three formations for foot troops: column, line, and square. The Napoleonic Army of France was equipped with a smooth bore musket that was dreadfully inaccurate even at 150 yards. A soldier could be trained to shoot the inaccurate musket or endeavor to stab their opponent with a bayonet.

 Column formation was primarily used for the offense. The formation was intended to strike fear into the hearts of the opponent. Deep narrow columns of soldiers tightly packed together would move quickly and with ease of direction. The concept was to close upon the enemy’s position and stab him with a bayonet. This shock action and mobility were intended to strike fear into the defense and cause the defense morale to fail. The defense would run away—routed. In addition to shock action, column formation offered ease of maneuverability. It did not however provide firepower. Massive battalion columns on a narrow front really limited any firepower coming from the column.

The line formation was used for firepower. To get the most soldiers involved, the soldiers had to stand in line three deep so that each musket could be pointed at the enemy. This line formation was another form of shocking the enemy. The maximum number of weapons would be stretched out linearly with the intent to fire on the enemy and destroy him with firepower. The primary purpose of firing at the enemy was intended to shatter the defender’s morale and cause him to run away—routed and maybe inflict a few casualties along the way. As the musket was dreadfully inaccurate, it was most effective when fired as a large volley thereby increasing the odds of something hitting the target. Soldiers stood shoulder-to-shoulder several ranks deep, pointed their weapons at the enemy, and fired a volley.

The musket was a single shot weapon that required reloading after every round. Consequently, the soldier had to remain standing while reloading and was protected only by the cloud of smoke and the inaccuracies of the opponent’s weapon. This formation was effective, squeezing the most out of the existing weaponry and technology. Lines would often be brought close to an enemy line, and the soldiers could trade volleys using similar technology. Lines were awkward to maintain. They were very slow to move and turning consisted of a wheel-like motion. Leaders behind the line regularly maintained control. In general, since soldiers could not be sure to hit what they were aiming at, very colorful uniforms became the norm. It was a certain way to identify troop units. It also became a matter of heritage and pride for the soldiers wearing the uniform. Our minds quickly go to visions of French soldiers in August 1914 wearing red pants as part of their heritage, despite the obvious tactical problems.

The square formation was defensive in nature; in it, the foot soldiers formed a four-sided rectangle with the bayonets sticking out. Such a formation was supposed to be a major deterrent to cavalry; however, it had the disadvantage of presenting a tightly packed target to artillery and troops in line formation who could hit two sides of the square with one fired round. Squares could move, but they were extremely slow. They were not intended to be a shock to enemy infantry, but rather a rock in a sea of attacking cavalry that would lessen the cavalry’s morale if the infantry were unshaken. The German armies of the time, like all the other armies in the world, were equipped with primitive smoothbore, flintlock rifles. After the wars of Napoleon, the percussion lock rifle was officially introduced in Prussia in 1839 and made firing rifles safer and more reliable. This safety and reliability was particularly true in wet and rainy weather, but the percussion lock rifle did not affect range and precision so did not really change infantry tactics. Infantry fire was commanded in volleys in which drill had to increase the speed of reloading those long and unhandy muzzleloaders. Victory was often accomplished through bayonet attacks upon an enemy who was shaken by previous volleys of fire.