Infantry Doctrine-2
Only a very few elite Prussian units, such as light infantry battalions (the Jäger), were equipped with the more precise rifled muzzleloaders. Staffed with NCOs and men having a hunting (Jäger) or forester background, Jäger formations did not operate in the rigidly drilled formations of the line infantry formations. This rigid infantry drill with its lines, columns, and square formations was very suitable during the age of black powder rifles. A few volleys of fire covered the entire battlefield with a screen of white smoke so even the massive columns of infantry did not provide clearly visible targets to the enemy. Officers on horseback could still easily oversee and lead their platoons, companies, and battalions. In Prussia the breakthrough came in 1841 when, under the cover of extreme secrecy, the Dreyse needle-lock rifle was introduced. This rifle was breech-loaded and did not require the operator to stand while reloading. Introduction of these new breech-loaded rifles was kept so secret that during the battles of 1848 and 1849, only the first Jäger and guard formations were equipped with Dreyse rifles.
Prussian regulations did not reflect the opportunities this new rifle provided. The Exerzir-Reglement für die Infanteriefrom 1847 was based on the percussion lock muzzleloader model 1839. Therefore, during the wars of 1864 and 1866, the Dreyse breechloaders provided an unpleasant surprise for the enemy. The written doctrine did not cover the existing technology even though the writing postdated the technology by six years. Particularly, the battle of Königgrätz turned out to be a bloody massacre. The Austrians, while standing, firing, and reloading their muzzleloaders, were exposed to the Prussian Dreyse rifle fire that came from infantrymen who were kneeling or lying on the ground. The Austrians were still convinced during that war that column formation and the charge with the cold steel of a bayonet would be the deciding factor. The Austrian commander devoted a lot of time to exercises in closed formations. The general thought remained that the best way to deal with the Dreyse rifle, should it be encountered, was to provide a moving target. The Austrians believed that frontal attacks would succeed because the Prussians believed such an attack was impossible and would not know how to react.
While there was some evidence of success on the Austrian side such as at Custozza against the Italians, the losses to the attacking columns were appalling. Even so, no one analyzed the effect of the massive casualties on the loser’s morale. Further, the professional European armies disregarded lessons that could have been learned from the American Civil War because armies of the Western Hemisphere were considered amateurish and staffed with volunteers. Professional European armies were thought to provide a completely separate example.
Moltke the Elder, the Chief of the Prussian Great General Staff, evaluated the 1864 and 1866 wars and issued an “Advice to Higher Military Commanders” (Verordnung für die höheren Truppenführer vom 24. Juni 1869) concluding that the destructive power of rapid infantry fire from modern breechloaders could no longer be successfully dodged by traditionally conducted frontal bayonet attacks.
Instead, infantry should attack by moving forward in thinner skirmish lines of soldiers firing and taking cover independently. Since the French had also introduced a newly designed needle-fire rifle with increased precision and about twice the range in 1868 (the Chassepot Rifle), a change in infantry tactics seemed to be inevitable to prepare for the next war.
Traditionally, the German military had always distinguished between geleitetem Feuer and Schützenfeuer. Geleitetes Feuer or directed fire was where officers controlled distance, target, and direction. Schützenfeuer, on the other hand, was used mostly by Jäger units that had better-trained, independent marksmen, who were beyond the direct control of their officers. Schützenfeuer made the more traditional officers feel uncomfortable due to the perceived loss of control. Unfortunately the war against France came too quickly after this 1869 guidance, and the required doctrinal change in tactics did not happen. These shortfalls led to several very bloody lessons for the Germans. The German armies won that war starting with a series of swift victories over the imperial French Army. Those victories were accomplished through significant numerical superiority and were often bought at the cost of very high losses.