Infantry Doctrine-3
In particular, the bloody assault of the Guard Corps on the strong French position at St Privat created the myth of the brave guard infantry dodging fire and facing death to earn victory for their king. Guard units performed intricate maneuvers in their prescribed battle order, and then they marched up the steep slope where the French Chassepot rifle started taking its toll at 1,200 m. On that slope, 30,000 Germans attacked for three hours sustaining 8,000 casualties, more than Pickett’s charge during the battle of Gettysburg.
At the same time, the consequences of St Privat started a fierce discussion about infantry tactics and the optimum way to attack such strongly defended positions. Fritz Hoenig, a well-known German military author at the time, even called the assault of St Privat a pointless slaughterhouse achieving little more than emptying the ammo pouches of the defending French regiments. Nevertheless, this tactic became the standard of martial behavior. Objectives could be seized and accomplished if the unit had the correct attitude and discipline. This standard was repeated constantly in countless books and reports as the vision of what drove German victory.
But even after the experience of 1870 and 1871, the 1847 manual was neither changed nor replaced. Instead the myth was perpetuated. St Privat-style attacks across more than 1,000 meters of open ground and ascending glacis against a well-defended position were considered brave and were systematically incorporated into training. The company column continued as the regular attack formation of the German infantry during the Franco-Prussian War. Regiments heading into attack first broke up into their battalions, one next to another, and then again into company columns. A company forming an attack column had its first and second platoons three lines deep, each following one another. The third platoon was put in front, usually half of the platoon forming a skirmish line advancing about 100 meters ahead of the battalion.
Traditionally in Prussian regiments, there were three traditional groups. The 1st and 2nd battalions were named “musketeer” battalions and the 3rd battalion was the “fusilier” battalion. The musketeers practiced more bayonet drill; whereas the fusiliers enjoyed a more intense rifle and firing drill. Even in 1918, recruits in the 1st and 2nd battalions were still called Musketier and recruits in the 3rd battalion were called Füsilier. The same structure was also kept among the three platoons of a company. The third traditional group was the “grenadiers,” usually drawing their tradition from the grenadier regiments of the Old Prussian Army under Frederick the Great. Musketeers, fusiliers and grenadiers were considered as line infantry and armed, equipped, and trained alike (except the slightly higher emphasis on rifle training for the fusiliers). Besides this uniform line infantry (Einheitsinfanterie), only the light infantry of the Jäger battalions enjoyed different drill, more live firing, and different weapons. With the Dreyse rifles, the Jäger used the model 1865 Jäger-Büchse with a shorter but octagonal barrel, higher precision and a hair-trigger. Even with the rifle model 1871, the Jäger received a special Jäger-Büchse.
About 50–100 meters behind the skirmish line followed the second half of the platoon as soutiens (French word for reinforcements) to fill losses and to “swarm in” in case the firing line needed reinforcements. There were contentious experiments in dispersed formations in 1872; however, by March 1873, there was a royal decree codifying the company as the normal offensive formation. Lines would be permitted but not in a dispersed formation. Each battalion had two companies advancing next to each other in the formation described above. The third company followed in pure column formation (without a skirmish line) about 150 meters behind the first two companies and also flew the battalion flag. In the case of an unexpected cavalry attack, the companies formed squares with four firing lines one behind another on each of the four sides repelling the cavalry by volley fire. During the Franco-Prussian War, there was a strong tendency to break up the company columns into skirmish lines earlier in order to avoid heavy losses caused by Chassepot fire. The establishment resisted this change as the army reprinted the official regulations in 1876. The army corps commanders continued to influence training and doctrine, and the company commanders continued to drill in column formations. This formation was repeated during the maneuvers in which thin skirmish lines were followed very closely by the attacking columns of the second wave from which a decision was expected. Maneuvers were often conducted on open terrain to allow for easy movement.
Shortly after the Franco-Prussian War, an improved infantry rifle, the model 1871 designed by Paul Mauser, was introduced. This rifle replaced the outdated and difficult-to-handle Dreyse rifle with its fragile firing needle. The Mauser had an improved bolt-operated lock and fired stable brass cartridges instead of the quite fragile Dreyse paper cartridges. In short order, the model 1871/84 improved repeating rifle replaced the1871 rifle; it used the same lock as the model 1871 guns but had an eight-round tube magazine under the barrel. Although the model 1871/84 still fired black powder cartridges, it was a repeating rifle allowing a murderous rate of infantry fire at distances up to 1,600 meters. Starting with the rifle model 1871/84, they had to subscribe to the standard infantry rifle—again leading to long discussions trying to justify the need of a special Jäger rifle. Still the French were faster in taking the lead in the arms race by introducing their model 1886 Lebel rifle that fired 8 mm smokeless powder (cordite powder) cartridges. Those “small” caliber rounds had not only a much higher range and higher muzzle velocity, but they were also much lighter compared to the old black powder rounds; thus, they enabled the infantryman to carry more rounds in his ammo pouches.
The Prussians tried to compete against the Lebel rifle with the model 1888 “commission” rifle that was hastily designed by the Royal Prussian Rifle Commission (Königlich Preußische Gewehr-Prüfungskommission) that also fired smokeless 8 mm rounds. The initial technical design of the rifle revealed severe teething problems and required numerous redesigns before it was really operational by the mid 1890s. The technical requirements of the new 8 mm caliber were widely unknown and were often discovered only after numerous accidents with bursting barrels. There was also an issue of cracking ammunition shells that led to explosive gases blasting into the shooter’s face. The French seemed to face basically the same problems with their Lebel rifle since they also had to go through numerous redesigns until the final Lebel rifle M. 1886/93 was used until the end of the Great War.
Bavaria was equipped with Werder rifles and all other contingents with Dreyse rifles. The model 71 single-loading rifle was introduced in the 1870s and replaced by the improved model 1871/84 during the second half of the 1880s. When the last 71/84 rifle was produced in 1888, the introduction of the model 1888 had already been decided. In 1898, the Gewehr 98—again designed by Mauser—followed and was redesigned for the 8 mm “S” cartridge in 1903. Although the model 98 rifle was the standard gun of the German army in 1914, many reserve and Landwehr formations were fielded with model 88 rifles, carbines, or model 91 rifles (a short and carbine-like version of the model 88 used by the foot artillery). It took until 1916 for almost all German formations to be equipped with model 98 guns.