Infantry Doctrine-5
The Boer War revealed the next dilemma when it became obvious that the firepower of modern rifles led to a superiority of fire over movement. Translated into German military thinking, it seemed questionable whether attacks were the superior tactical approach. An anonymous contributor in the Military Weekly (Militär-Wochenblatt) in 1901 triggered the next round of discussions about a suitable infantry tactic. The Boers had limited formal military training, but they were equipped with superior Mauser rifles and they made use of the terrain. As a result, the Boers scored numerous successes over the formally approaching British infantry. In March 1902, Lt Col v. Lindenau, a department lead in the Great General Staff, presented lessons from the infantry attacks of the Boer War at the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin. Lindenau demanded that the infantry tactics included in the 1889 manual be improved. He maintained that the skirmish lines of attacking and defending infantry alike had to be made even thinner. This change meant more men following in subsequent lines under cover and swarming in if reinforcements were required.
Lindenau suggested that the British army had attacked in “thick,” dense formations without proper preparation by fire. He pointed out that these British attack formations would have been in perfect compliance with the German manuals and were practiced during most German maneuvers. Without openly raising a critique of the Kaisermanöver, it was crystal clear what Lindenau was referring to when mentioning that German infantry still could be seen advancing in dense lines regardless of any exposure to possible enemy fire. The photograph from the newspaper Wochenschau inSeptember 1913 (discussed in the Introduction) that depicts German infantry lines advancing during the autumn maneuvers of 1913 shows that not all units were using the 1889 manual.
Now called “the 1902-style infantry attack,” the reformers and traditionalists discussed this Boer-style infantry attack and a further split between the factions ensued; Scherff and Boguslawski maintained their traditionalist side. But again the reformers prevailed. The Boer War and later the Russo-Japanese War showed the superiority of firepower over human attacks. Before completing the attack upon any well-defended position, there had to be an extended fight for fire superiority. The ever-thinner skirmish lines of advancing infantry had to be permanently supported and reinforced by soutiens swarming in and slowly moving closer to the defense lines while maintaining a well-targeted rifle fire. Additionally, it was discovered that a final bayonet charge was required to dig out the defenders who were hesitant to leave their trenches and expose themselves to fire.
The Japanese Army that defeated the Russians in 1905 was tactically trained according to the standards of the German 1889 infantry manual. The Japanese praised this manual as the right mixture between suitable and modern tactical standards combined with a high level of freedom for the military leaders, but Moltke the Elder felt that the room for tactical interpretation was too wide and needed to be filled by further explanatory guidelines.
The Bavarian general, Ludwig Ritter v. Gebsattel, maintained that only some 20 percent of German officers would be intellectually above average, 50 percent would be around average, and 30 percent below average. He also believed that allowing 80 percent of the army officers the freedom of decision provided by the 1889 manual was to too wide and needed to be narrowed further. So work on a new infantry manual began. This time General v. Bülow, the Commanding General of III Army Corps and a widely respected drillmaster, designed the core part about the tactical application of the manual in combat—the part Schlichting had designed in 1889.
General v. Bülow headed up the rewrite of the infantry regulation but fearful of the dangers of spreading forces too thin, he still favored a frontal assault in skirmish attack formation. This rendition did not resonate with many of the division and corps commanders. These leaders’ tactical freedom in the application of these principles is often overlooked in books about the Imperial German Army. It was well known that all Prussian officers knew that each army corps had its own set of rules. This freedom was obvious during the maneuvers of 1903 and 1904. The Kaiser and his Guard Corps were even involved when they attacked en masse with battalion and company columns without artillery support. The old Chief of Staff, Count Waldersee praised the spirit of the attack to the Kaiser. In the fall of 1905, the Kaiser observed the II Army Corps maneuvers in Pomerania. His comment to the War Minister was that different corps were not uniformly applying the reforms of 1889, “When I’m in East Prussia I find one tactic, when in Metz another —and when I go to Hanover, I find something else entirely—which is itself different from Silesia.”
The Kaiser’s discomfort alone compelled the Minister of War to direct a commission be formed in January 1906 to develop a new infantry regulation. Hans von Plessen, who espoused attacking without thought of personal danger, led the traditionalists. This tactic was considered true Prussian discipline. Maj. Gen. Karl v. Fasbender of Bavaria led the reformers. He incorporated lessons from the modern wars and sang the praises of delegated tactics. Von Bülow espoused the middle ground position in this argument and he agreed with dispersed formations but not with delegated tactics—Auftragstaktik.
Their work resulted in a new infantry manual on 29 May 1906. In a nutshell, the 1906 manual was an iteration of the 1889 manual rather than something entirely new. It built on lessons from the Boer war; the Japanese experience in Manchuria and it rooted Auftragstaktik in the entire German military system. It emphasized the necessity for fire superiority and the need for cover more clearly than the previous manual had. Now even the attacker had to seek cover and to dig in during phases of exchanging rifle fire. Every man should carry a spade and sandbags were considered useful protective tools. The individual soldier had to be trained and drilled in detail to make sure he would be able to live up to the requirements of Auftragstaktik. He needed to be able to carry out his task even if not closely supervised by an officer or NCO.