Mobilization-2
The Total Requirement
The dispute about the size of the army between the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff is well documented. Schlieffen always argued vehemently for a larger army. A series of War Ministers rejected his call, stating that the army was already large enough. In 1899, War Minister Heinrich von Goßler first crossed swords with Schlieffen, the Chief of the General Staff. His argument centered on quality over quantity. Schlieffen’s argument was the army had to be bigger than the French army or at least big enough to take on the French and the Russian armies simultaneously. The arguments intensified when Karl von Einem became the War Minister. Von Einem indicated to the Reichstag and to the budget committee that the army was large enough and that the argument should end. He had entirely the opposite view from Schlieffen though. Surprising to note, von Einem had no insight into the operational war plan at all until Schlieffen was replaced in 1906.
Some have claimed that Germany lost the war because the Reichstag would not provide the funding to increase the size of the army. This does not hold up to critical examination as both liberals and conservatives in the Reichstag continued to vote for the “estimates” or army budget in the years leading up to 1914. In reality, the size of the army revolved around the size of the officer corps. The War Minister insisted that the officer corps remain aristocratic and responsive to the Kaiser; the Chief of the General Staff looked at the required number of units to fight France. The younger Moltke, when he followed Schlieffen as Chief of the General Staff, continued to insist on an increase in the size of the army, but as late as 1909, he and von Einem were still at odds. Moltke believed that an increase of 6,500 to 7,000 soldiers net, spread out over five years, was the maximum that he could achieve. In 1911, Moltke, spurred on by Ludendorff, wrote another memo based on an updated assessment, saying that an increase of 300,000 men was needed to defeat France and for the “right to survive,” but both the Kaiser and the War Minister were against such an increase.
Difficulties in the system continued to show and finally, in March 1912, von Einem agreed that in time of war the infantry was short 81 staff officers and 557 captains; the artillery lacked 60 staff officers and 134 captains. There was an overall shortage of 1,200 lieutenants. Yet when von Heeringen replaced von Einem as War Minister, the new War Minister argued that an increase would mean acceptance of less suitable elements in the officer corps, which could lead to a dangerous democratization of the army. He placed the increases into a percentage and was very cautious, fearing that an increase of only 17 percent in the size of the Prussian army would dilute the officer corps and NCOs. Moltke argued that suitable officers could be found and von Heeringen answered with a testy, “how?”
A compromise led to an overall increase of 136,000 men between 1912 and 1914. Ludendorff, who had argued so vehemently in favor of increasing the army, was posted to a regiment. This was a far larger increase than the War Minister had sought. The new War Minister, Erich von Falkenhayn, lamented to the Chancellor that any further increase would have a negative effect on the officer corps and would lead to a deterioration of the army. Moltke countered that the increase was required at all costs. When the Chief of Staff repeatedly laid out the requirement, and the War Minister admitted he had a shortfall of officers, a potential disaster loomed. The Germans were faced with a two-front war. In general, the Germans had two plans: Aufmarsch I targeted France with 55 to 65 divisions and only 10 to 15 divisions deployed against Russia, and Aufmarsch II targeted Russia, with some 40 divisions going east and 30 deployed to the west. In 1914, Plan I was used. In fact plan two had already been tabled by the start of the war.
The forces involved in 1914 were massive. There were 880,000 active soldiers; 794,000 of them from the regular Army, 79,000 from the Navy, 7,000 colonial forces and, with the addition of both contingents of the Landwehr, the total reached 2.1 million men in almost 88 divisions with 55 cavalry brigades. Additionally, there was a pool of almost 1,000,000 Ersatz reserves. Seventy of those infantry divisions were earmarked for the West. They initially marched out to the front under the command of one of the armies. Upon mobilization, that number grew to three million. By January 1915, the German army comprised 4,357,000 men of whom 2,618,000 were in the field. Those astounding numbers were achieved despite the enormous losses of 1914. Not only did the army numbers increase, but also their departure created a significant hole in the economy. During the first six months of the war, four million men were removed from the civil economy and processed into the military. In late 1914, the problem was not a shortage of manpower, but rather a lack of trained officers and modern equipment.
Depending on where they were deployed, the strength of each army varied. First Army had 320,000 men; Second Army–260,000; Third Army–180,000; Fourth Army–180,000; Fifth Army–200,000; Sixth Army–220,000; Seventh Army–127,000; and Eighth Army–150,000. The total of the eight field armies: 1,637,000.
Additionally, there were other groups as follows:
- Ersatz formations in Lorraine (six Divisions, one Brigade) 120,000 men;
- Army of the North (IX Reserve Corps and 1 Landwehr Division used as a covering force for Schleswig-Holstein against British landings and assault operations), 60,000 men;
- Border Fortress Commands (roughly equivalent to six divisions), 120,000 men;
- 1-4 Landwehr Divisions 16,000 each; one Landwehr Division assigned to Army of the North, transported to Eastern Prussia at the end of August; 2 Landwehr Division assigned to Fifth Army around Metz; 3 and 4 Landwehr Divisions constituted the Landwehr Korps Woyrsch (as a covering force for Silesia.)
Adding the eight armies and the other groups together yields 2,097,000 Field Army requirements in total.
There is some skepticism with these figures. In particular, the strength of the First Army at 320,000 is a prime example. While this is clearly quoted in several sources it can be traced back to an original estimate by Edmonds in the British Official History. Finding support for this number in a German language document seems elusive. It is less important to understand the exactness of the figure than to wonder if this is another example of a British history “truth” handed down uncritically for a century. I believe these numbers to be a significant exaggeration.