Maximilian “Max” Wilhelm Gustav Moritz von Prittwitz und Gaffron was born in Bernstadt (now Bierutów, Poland) in Prussian Silesia on November 27, 1848. The young Prittwitz came from aristocracy; his father Gustav von Prittwitz was a Prussian general, and his mother was the former Elizabeth von Klaß. He was also a first cousin to Paul von Hindenburg’s wife, Gertrude von Sperling.
EARLY YEARS AND MILITARY RISE
After attending school in Oels, Prittwitz joined the Third Guard Grenadier Regiment and fought in the 1866 Austro-Prussian War. He was then commissioned as a junior officer in the 38th Fusileers and served in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.
On May 19, 1874, Prittwitz married Olga von Dewitz (born August 30, 1848; died January 9, 1938), the daughter of Kurt von Dewitz (a landowner) and his wife Euphemia (née von der Groeben). The couple had one son, Erdmann von Prittwitz und Gaffron.
After attending the Prussian Military Academy, Prittwitz was appointed to the Sixth Jaeger Battalion. He subsequently held a number of positions in the General Staff, interspersed with company and battalion commander appointments in various infantry regiments. In 1913, Prittwitz was made a full general (Generaloberst) and took command of XVI Corps in Metz.
KOSAKEN KOMMEN!
One day after Imperial Germany declared war on Tsarist Russia, Prittwitz was appointed commander of the German Eighth Army of 135,000 (consisting of one cavalry and eleven infantry divisions). Lacking heavy artillery, medical services, and telephones… the Eighth Army was to stand firm, play for time, and defend East Prussia from an impending Cossack attack.
Although reputed to be an excellent commander during the pre-war years, several of Prittwitz’ contemporaries believed he owed his command of the German Eighth Army more to his courtly connections than to his military skills. Both the Chief of the German General Staff Helmut von Moltke (the Younger) and War Minister Erich von Falkenhayn supposedly considered Prittwitz intellectually and militarily unfit for command and simply wanted him out of Berlin.
But in truth, Prittwitz and his chief of staff Count Georg von Waldersee were both unsound men in unsound times! The two Russian armies (eight cavalry and thirty infantry divisions) outnumbered the German Eighth Army by a ratio of four to one. But the Russians had to face forest, lakes, marshes, and hills… while the Germans held the advantage in mobility via the East Prussian railway network. In addition, the Eighth Army had recently acquired a competent soldier from Alsace: Lieutenant Colonel Max Hoffmann (who had the wisdom and knowledge about the Russians).
On August 14, 1914, as Prittwitz, Waldersee, and Hoffmann were preparing to move army HQ out of Marienburg, the first Russians appeared opposite the northern flank of the Eighth Army. They were the leading elements of the Russian First Army (from Vilna) led by Pavel Rennenkampf (a Baltic German).
Prittwitz ordered I Corps (led by General Hermann von Francois) to reform west of the Angerapp River. But instead, Francois launched an attack at the frontier town of Stalluponen on August 17th. Army HQ was stunned, and Prittwitz was now worried that his plan was falling apart.
Three days later, three German army corps attacked the Russian steamroller at Gumbinnen (west of Stalluponen). Unfortunately, seven thousand Teutons passed into Russian hands, and it was a technical defeat for the German Eighth Army.
Prittwitz planned to resume the fight, but the Russian Second Army (from Warsaw) led by Alexei Samsonov was advancing on the German rear! With the German Eighth Army reeling from Gumbinnen, Prittwitz and Waldersee feared the worst. Even though Hoffmann and his companion General Paul Grunert felt Rennenkampf could be knocked out in two or three days, Prittwitz argued that the fight needed to be shifted to the south before taking on the Russian First Army.
A fateful call was made by Prittwitz to GHQ in Koblenz. He informed Moltke that his forces would have to beat a one-hundred-mile retreat back to the Vistula River. That meant the abandonment of East Prussia, which the German General Staff (many of whom were East Prussians) found completely unacceptable. Additionally, I Corps commander Hermann von François complained to the General Staff that his superior was in a state of total panic… and the General Staff concurred in this assessment.
But Hoffmann and Grunert had been able to convince Prittwitz to reverse his initial decision of retreating to the Vistula on August 21st. However, Prittwitz failed to mention that the retreat was cancelled in favor of a new counteroffensive… and the change of orders came too late for Moltke. He now felt that Prittwitz was a spineless commander and a defeatist who (along with Waldersee) needed to be promptly removed.
DOWNFALL AND DEATH
On August 23, 1914, Prittwitz was replaced as commander of the German Eighth Army by Paul von Hindenburg and the hero of Liege, Erich Ludendorff. The tandem was immediately able to execute the plan that had been put in motion by Hoffmann, Grunert, and Prittwitz. As a result, the team of H-L succeeded in driving both Russian armies from German soil during the battles of Tannenberg and First Masurian Lakes.
Max von Prittwitz was desperate to explain his actions (or perhaps inaction) which had resulted in his dismissal, but unfortunately, he never got the chance. Prittwitz retired to Berlin, where he lived for three years before dying of a heart attack on March 29, 1917 at the age of sixty-eight. He was buried in the Invalids’ Cemetery (Invalidenfriedhof) in Berlin.
Sadly, his son Erdmann would lose his life in battle just over a year later on May 23, 1918.