PEEBLES PROFILES
EPISODE XIV: Alexander von Kluck
…and the failure of the German Army at the Marne
*** BY SPECIAL REQUEST ***
Alexander Heinrich Rudolf von Kluck was born in Munster, Westphalia on May 20, 1846. He began his military service as a lieutenant during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. He fought at Dermbach and Kissingen under General von Goeben and was awarded the Memorial Cross. Kluck also fought in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 as a company commander. He was twice wounded in the Battle of Colombey-Neuilly. For his bravery, Kluck was awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class. He remained in France until 1873 as part of Germany’s occupation forces.
Upon returning home, Kluck spent several years as a military instructor and administrator at officer schools in Julich, Annaburg, and Neubreisach. He was promoted to colonel in 1896, and he received his first regimental command in Bromberg two years later.
In 1899, Kluck was promoted to major general. Seven years later, he became general of infantry and commander of I Army Corps. His family were ennobled in 1909, and he became Alexander von Kluck.
Four years later, Kluck was appointed Inspector General of the Seventh Army District. In 1914, he became a colonel general. Kluck was also given command of the German First Army when the Great War began that year in August.
He was pleasant and courteous man in private circles. As a professional soldier, Kluck earned a reputation for sub-human brutality, making him hated and feared by his subordinates.
Nevertheless, the Westphalian Generaloberst was responsible for the three northern flank armies tasked with thrusting through Belgium and sweeping through northern France to encircle Paris via Germany’s sole war plan for victory…
THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN
As war spread across Europe, the German General Staff believed that the army could smash through Belgium and defeat France in one month. Even Kaiser Wilhelm II assured his departing troops that they would be home “before the leaves have fallen from the trees”.
With it came a plan on how to fight a war on TWO fronts. It was drafted in 1905 by the former Chief of the General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen… hence the Schlieffen Plan.
His memorandum was written just after the close of the Russo-Japanese War, and it also discussed dealing with France and her new ally Britain via the Entente Cordiale. Schlieffen tried to justify that neutral Belgium was NOT so because of the fortresses of Liege and Namur built after Germany’s unification. The small nation needed protection from its Teutonic neighbor, but the border with France was left wide open.
Schlieffen argued that the French fortresses of Toul and Verdun were too formidable, and the best and quickest way to the West was through Belgium and Luxembourg. There were many highways, railroads, and canals that led from Belgium into northern France.
By contrast, Metz was the German city closest to the French frontier. It was 180 miles from Paris (the two cities were connected by highway) and perhaps the most practical route. Via the Lowlands however, the German armies had to march 250 miles, and the fortress of Liege was “the locked door” to the Belgian plain.
One and a half million men were to be lined up from the Swiss frontier to the North Sea (meaning that Dutch neutrality would also be violated). Once the troops left German soil, they would travel on foot in a huge wheeling motion. The German right wing would outflank French fortifications by attacking neutral Belgium (north of Brussels into Flanders) and reaching French soil in three weeks. In one month, the Germans would reach the Somme and Meuse Rivers.
The idea was to push enemy forces eastward towards the German left flank in Lothringen (Lorraine). A 400-mile circumference semi-circular pincer with a “jaw” 200 miles wide would close and crush the French Army. Once done, Paris would fall in less than forty days after German mobilization, and the war in France would be won.
Then, using 500 trains and fifty wagons each, German troops would swiftly move east and inflict defeat on the Russians threating East Prussia. In the words of the Kaiser, “Paris for lunch, dinner in Saint Petersburg.”
Simply stated, it would be a superhuman effort if such a plan succeeded! Schlieffen, however, left one caveat: if the French retreated beyond Paris, it would be a drawn out war of attrition.
Eight army corps would need to be raised to strengthen the German right wing, creating a congestion problem on the roads and rails with such massed forces traveling on the Belgian plain. The left wing was originally to be 15% of the right in terms of strength and number. It would be later cut to 9% by shifting two army corps across the front to the right, thus creating the image of an army retreating back to German soil and luring the French forces away from the area of decision.
Schlieffen considered attacking neutral Holland to ease the traffic jam and spread out the right wing. He also was certain that Russia would not menace East Prussia until German mobilization was complete. The belief was that it would take the Cossacks a month to mobilize, thus giving Germany time in the West before knocking out Tsarist Russia. It would prove to be a fatal miscalculation once the fighting began.
The Chief of the General Staff tinkered with his plan up until his death in 1913. It was bequeathed to his successor, Helmut von Moltke the Younger. Schlieffen’s dying words were to make sure that the right wing was strong.
Very quickly, Moltke altered (and buried) the Schlieffen Plan by respecting Dutch neutrality and increasing the left wing strength to 42% of the right. The purpose was now a double envelopment rather than a single one.
The new Chief of the General Staff was comforted in his new role when the Kaiser declared that if war came, he (not Moltke) would take overall command in the West. Regardless, the younger Moltke rejected the substance of the Schlieffen Plan, but would later grasp its shadow.
THE WESTERN FRONT OPENS
The German Second Army, commanded by General Karl von Bulow, crossed the frontier into neutral Belgium on August 4, 1914 with an invasion force of 320,000 men set to smash and seize the fortress of Liege, the twelve-mile wide gateway to the Belgian plain. Bulow was Kluck’s superior, and their armies would move in tandem on the extreme right wing that was to march through Belgium and northern France. Upon reaching Paris, the First and Second Armies were to threaten the French capital from both the west and east. Known for his brutality, Kluck ordered his men to murder civilians and burn their villages.
The siege of Liege lasted nearly two weeks, and despite the German victory, it wrecked the finely-tuned schedule of the Schlieffen Plan, allowing time for the deployment of French and British troops. Kluck’s men passed through Liege and crossed the Meuse River four days behind schedule en route to Brussels. By the middle of August, 550 German troop trains had crossed the Rhine River with over a million men in the forward zone marching west.
It took four days to cross the Belgian plain. In that time, the capital city of Brussels fell to Kluck’s First Army. Soon after, the fortress of Namur was under siege by Bulow and the German Second Army.
Having arrived in France one week earlier, the British Expeditionary Force (made up of 100,000 men led by General Sir John French) advanced north towards the coal mining center of Mons, Belgium. The BEF was the extreme left wing of the Allied lines; to its right stood the French Fifth Army led by General Charles Lanrezac. When the siege of Namur and the Battle of Charleroi ended in German victories on August 23rd, Lanrezac’s men began an orderly retreat towards home, narrowly avoiding a pincer movement in the Sambre-Meuse salient by Bulow’s Second Army and the German Third Army under the command of General Max Klemens von Hausen. Unbeknownst to Lanrezac, his withdrawal left the BEF all alone to face Kluck and the German First Army at Mons. Sir John agreed to defend the Mons-Conde Canal for twenty-four hours when he was actually being requested to attack Kluck’s flank. The British were entrenched along the canal and ready for action.
Many of the men in the BEF had fought in the Boer War in Africa. They were skilled marksmen who learned how to turn every house and every wall into a small fortress. These soldiers were equipped with Lee-Enfield rifles (which were superior to the German Mausers), and they succeeded in stopping Kluck’s forces, albeit temporarily. It was a victory of sorts for the British, as they gave the German First Army a nasty shock. The veterans of this battle were called Mons Men, and the Mons Star battle medal came into being.
Sir John received word of Lanrezac’s retreat (an event that led to a gradual disintegration of trust and respect between the two men), and the BEF did likewise on the morning of August 24th. Meanwhile, Kluck’s men would spend the day crossing the Mons-Conde Canal.
With the failure of the planned pincer movement, Hausen decided to change course and moved southeast to help the German Fourth Army (led by the Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm) overcome French resistance in the area around Sedan. This action alarmed Bulow, who was planning a southwest pursuit of Lanrezac’s army. As a result, there was danger of a gap in the lines between the German Second and Third Armies.
Meanwhile, Kluck was in pursuit of the BEF. Further north, he had left an occupation force around the Belgian capital of Brussels. Just to the east was the village of Louvain. It was here on August 25, 1914 that public opinion turned against the goose-stepping armies of gray…
THE FLAMES OF LOUVAIN
From the first day that the German armies marched into Belgium, they looted and destroyed much of the countryside and villages in their path, killing significant numbers of civilians (including women and children). These brutal actions (the Germans claimed) were in response to what they saw as an illegal civilian resistance to the German occupation… organized and promoted by the Belgian government and other community leaders (namely the Catholic Church)… and carried out by irregular combatants or franc-tireurs (free shooters or snipers) like those that had participated in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.
Although civilian resistance was sanctioned by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, it did not exist to any degree in Belgium during the German invasion. However, it WAS used as an excuse to justify the German pursuit of a theory of terror articulated by the 19th century Prussian military philosopher Karl von Clausewitz. He believed the civilian population of an enemy country should not be exempt from war, but it should be made to feel its effects, thus forcing pressure on the enemy government to surrender.
On August 23rd, a notable massacre took place in the village of Dinant near Liege. Soldiers from Hausen’s Third Army were ordered by their corps commander to kill civilians believed to be free shooters. The number of murdered townspeople totaled 674.
Two days later, the small but hardy Belgian Army made a sudden attack on the rear lines of Kluck’s First Army, which forced a disorderly retreat to the village of Louvain. In the chaos that followed, the Germans maintained that it was free shooters, not soldiers, who had fired on their troops… or had fired from village rooftops to signal the Allied armies. The Belgians claimed that the Germans fired on each other in the dark. Whatever occurred did not matter: the Germans began burning Louvain. It was an act not to punish specific Belgian acts, but to provide (before the world) an example of what would happen to those individuals who resisted mighty Germany.
Over a five day period, Louvain was sacked in flames. Included in the conflagration was the renowned university and library founded in 1426. With refugees pouring out of the village, a great outcry grew in the international community. Eyewitness accounts filled the foreign press, including one from an American correspondent named Richard Harding Davis, who arrived in Louvain by troop train on August 27th. His report later appeared in the New York Tribune under the headline GERMANS SACK LOUVAIN; WOMEN AND CLERGY SHOT. Surprisingly, a wireless statement from Berlin was issued by the German Embassy in Washington, D.C., confirming the incidents. One sentence stated that “Louvain was punished by the destruction of the city”. It fueled the Allied press into a frenzy, with British editorials proclaiming “treason to civilization”. The Germans were being viewed as descendants not of the great author Goethe, but of the bloodthirsty Attila the Hun. Such a metaphor stuck for the remainder of the war and beyond, as Germany was now recognized as the land of “the Hun”.
The flames of Louvain convinced the Allied countries that Imperial Germany must be defeated at all costs, without compromise or settlement. To them, a German victory meant the defeat of civilization.
THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU
Alexander von Kluck continued his pursuit of the BEF, convinced that it was near destruction. A second fight occurred on August 26, 1914 in the French town of Le Cateau, thirty-five miles south of Mons and eighteen miles northeast of Saint-Quentin. The retreating British could not break off the fight with Kluck’s First Army despite the fact that the BEF was near the breaking point. Le Cateau was Britain’s largest battle since Waterloo in 1815.
The BEF was composed of two separate corps: the I Corps led by General Sir Douglas Haig; the II Corps by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. The latter was situated in Le Cateau, badly battered and exhausted. Haig’s men were twelve miles away, separated by the Mormal Forest. As Kluck’s army approached Le Cateau, it was up to Smith-Dorrien to ensure the survival of his corps.
Kluck’s plan was a double envelopment of the BEF. Once done, he would continue his southward trek virtually unopposed. Eight German divisions and four British divisions (40,000 men) fought for eleven hours in the streets of Le Cateau.
The British received support from the French cavalry corps led by J.F.A. Sordet. The only victory by the BEF was the successful disengagement from the town. Smith-Dorrien’s corps lost over 8,000 men and nearly forty cannons. The strength of the BEF was cut in half!
For Kluck and the German First Army, they failed to seize a grand opportunity. The seemingly leisure march allowed the BEF to retreat further south. By not keeping up with the British, Kluck was unsure of their escape route, although he felt they were completely defeated and possibly heading westward to the English Channel. As a result, Kluck ordered a day’s march to the southwest towards the Somme River in an effort to isolate the BEF and prevent its escape. It would later prove to be a wild goose chase!
THE GREAT RETREAT
In the first three weeks of World War I on the Western Front, more than half a million soldiers were lost on the battlefield. The Allied armies were in full retreat; the French roadmap to victory (Plan XVII) was in shambles. Its co-author, General Joseph Jacques Cesaire Joffre, was now focused on the task of defending the French capital. Morale remained high in the French Army, however; there were no signs of collapse. Its retreat was in good order, and it allowed Joffre ample time to regroup his men.
Moltke, headquartered in Luxembourg, received word of the German victories on the Franco-Belgian border (better known as the Battle of the Frontiers). Despite such success, there were no large takes of prisoners or captured guns. The farther the Allies retreated, the stronger the unity, control, supply, and reinforcement of their armies. By contrast, the Germans were being weakened by rapid extension as they drove deeper into enemy territory. Nevertheless, the German High Command remained confident, and they sensed total victory was within their reach.
However on August 25, 1914, a series of events on both sides would determine the outcome in the West.
General Joffre appointed as military governor General Joseph Simon Gallieni. His job was to organize the defense of Paris. Gallieni requested three active corps, otherwise he would refuse the governorship.
A new army was being organized as well, and its genesis came from the three corps requested by the new military governor. Joffre created what was to be called the French Sixth Army. It would consist of one Alsatian division, one Algerian division, one Moroccan division, and five reserve divisions. This new fighting force was to be led by General Michel Joseph Maunoury and placed on the extreme left wing north of Amiens (on the German First Army’s flank).
In addition, Joffre was making plans for a counterattack in the near future. The French Sixth Army, the BEF, and the left wing of the French Fifth Army would attack the German right wing (La Fere to Laon and Craonne).
Joffre did express concern over whether the German First Army would reach Amiens before the new Sixth Army was ready to attack. Eventually, he placed this fighting force in a defensive position just north of Paris.
While the Allies were planning to halt the enemy advance, the German High Command received word that the Eighth Army in the East needed reinforcements to stop the Russian onslaught in East Prussia. Under pressure from the Kaiser himself, Moltke released two corps from France and transferred them to the Eastern Front. Four more corps would be sent to double the size of the German Eighth Army. One fifth of the German fighting force in the West was lost to the East, but the Kaiser was certain that France would nevertheless be defeated. In time, it would be revealed that the transfer of troops was unnecessary, as the Germans would inflict a major defeat on Mother Russia in the Battle of Tannenberg before their arrival. The loss of the six corps would prove to be one of the keys in deciding fate in the West.
Another situation was developing on the German right wing that would later prove to be some of the seeds of disaster. Tensions had flared between Alexander von Kluck and his superior in the field Max von Bulow over the use of IX Corps, which was situated between the German First and Second Armies. Kluck wanted IX Corps in his pursuit of the British, while Bulow wanted the same corps to be used in the siege at Maubeuge (to the southeast). Taking his grievances to higher authorities, Kluck then asked Moltke to be given freedom of command from Bulow. His request was granted, and in addition to his “liberation”, Kluck was also given IX Corps. The German Second Army would be left to take Maubeuge.
This fateful decision meant that the German First and Second Armies would no longer work as a team. In fact, Bulow’s Second Army moved southeast to support the German Fourth Army in the center. With Kluck continuing his southwestern trek, it forced Bulow to thin his lines and spread out his own army to close any gaps.
By August 27th, Kluck had reached Peronne on the Somme River with little resistance. He was convinced the BEF was badly beaten and now considered a change of direction to envelop the French left wing with help from Bulow. Such a move would cut off a French retreat to the Aisne River. But there was one factor unbeknownst to the Westphalian Generaloberst: the French Sixth Army!
THE END OF THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN
As the French capital grew closer, Kluck had a decision to make: swing southeast and ignore the French forces in the vicinity of Paris, or continue the southwest advance and ignore a golden opportunity to defeat the French Fifth Army and envelop their flank. In the end, he cooperated with Bulow, his old field superior. The Second Army commander needed Kluck’s help “to gain the full advantage of the victory”.
On August 27th, Helmut von Moltke the Younger issued a directive to the seven German armies on the Western Front. All the forces were to continue moving southwest… but with one caveat: if the enemy puts up strong resistance on the Aisne and Marne Rivers, it may be necessary to abandon the southwestern direction… and wheel due south. The German right wing was already weakened due to the corps sent to East Prussia (thus, the dying words of Schlieffen were ignored).
Kluck was ordered via the directive to advance to the lower Seine River west of the Oise River. But the First Army commander was so certain of victory that he was prepared to take whatever road promised the quickest reward. In addition, Kluck was already contemplating a shift to the southeast and help Bulow destroy the French left wing. So, the plan for victory that was followed since Liege was destined to be thrown into the dustbin!
On the French front, the retreat continued. General Joffre had sent order to Lanrezac’s Fifth Army to counterattack Bulow’s Second Army at Guise. The strike would take pressure off the BEF at Saint-Quentin.
The Fifth Army halted its six-day retreat along the upper course of the Oise River… and on the morning of August 29, 1914, the battle began in a thick mist. Stunned, Bulow sought help from Kluck’s First Army. The result of this battle was not only another German victory, but that the caveat on the August 27th directive was promptly implemented.
The next day, Moltke and his senior staff saw that the news was good on all fronts. However on the left wing, the German Fifth Army had trouble crossing the Meuse River north of Verdun. The French Third Army (led by General Maurice Sarrail) attacked the Crown Prince’s men and forced them to recoil. The German Sixth and Seventh Armies were also stopped in the canalized Trouee de Charmes.
Adding to the woes was the beginning of poor signal communications between German HQ and the right wing armies. Some of the sent messages were not received until the next day, which gave the impression of army commanders disobeying orders. By month’s end, the August 27th directive was abandoned, and the Schlieffen Plan, for all intents and purposes, was officially dead.
CHASING THE ENEMY
Kluck and his First Army continued their trek south in the hopes of reaching the Aisne River before the French Fifth Army. His troops advanced nearly thirty miles in the summer heat, but they failed to reach their objective by nightfall. For starters, Kluck’s left wing was not yet at the Aisne, so it was impossible to bag Lanrezac’s men there. Another problem was that Bulow had ordered a day’s rest for his Second Army. This created a steadily increasing gap between Kluck and Bulow.
German aerial reconnaissance finally spotted the position of the British Expeditionary Forces. It was directly in front of Kluck’s left wing north of Villers-Cotterets. Upon obtaining the information, Kluck ordered the left wing to cross the Aisne by 7 A.M. on the first of September and then head south to attack the BEF. Bulow’s army would be left to deal with the French Fifth Army.
The truth of the matter was that Sir John French and the British Army were planning to head southwest beyond the Seine River west of Paris and out of the war! His relationship with Lanrezac had greatly deteriorated, and he felt that the BEF was in need of repair after the fight at Le Cateau. So, he wired War Minister Lord Horatio Kitchener that his army was disengaging, marching to Saint-Nazaire, and returning to England. Upon hearing the news, Kitchener quickly traveled to Paris and met Sir John, basically ordering him back into the fight.
By this time, the German Fifth Army was still struggling to hold onto the Meuse bridgeheads west of Verdun. The German High Command began to fear the possibility of the French splitting the German lines. Once done, both wings would be exposed to encirclement and total defeat! Eventually, the Crown Prince assured Moltke that the situation had changed again for the better and there was no danger of a French thrust and encirclement.
On the right wing, Kluck began to realize that an attempt to overhaul the British was not feasible. For the first time in the entire campaign, he ordered his First Army to rest on September 2nd. However, a British order showing the position of the BEF just south of Villers-Cotterets fell into German hands and passed on to First Army HQ. Kluck rescinded the day’s rest and ordered another march for his tired troops!
PANIC, PREPARATION, AND PRAISE
There was a change of leadership in the French War Ministry. Adolphe Messimy was replaced by Etienne Alexandre Millerand. The former became a front-line soldier, and the latter was asked by General Joffre to put Paris directly under his command.
As September dawned, Joffre and Millerand encouraged the French government to quit Paris. Maunoury’s Sixth Army was directed to concentrate within the capital. At the same time, Joffre was still preparing for an offensive once the French Fifth Army escaped envelopment.
Nevertheless, Paris was under siege from both within AND the air. Crowds formed and clamored for the French government to declare Paris an open city, but there was no reply. Rumors were circulating that the Germans were encircling the French capital from the southwest. At sunset on September 2nd, a German airplane dropped propaganda leaflets saying the French people could do nothing but surrender.
Millerand sent a message from Joffre to President Raymond Poincare. It said the French Army was in full retreat, and that there were no plans for counter-battle (which wasn’t true). The news caused the French government to pack for Bordeaux, and Gallieni was left to “defend Paris to the end”. He urged Joffre to use the Sixth Army as a maneuver force.
However, Allied aerial reconnaissance detected Kluck’s movement to the south and east of Paris in the direction of Chateau-Thierry on the Marne River. Gallieni received the news on September 3rd and brought it to the attention of Joffre, who was still in a defensive operation mode. Word passed to the other French commanders and the BEF that Kluck’s army was “up in the air”. Joffre then ordered Lanrezac and Maunoury to accelerate their retreats to the Seine and Paris respectively, but with the BEF in line so as not to create any gaps.
A day earlier, German planes brought disturbing news to Moltke and the German High Command. The French were transferring units from the right wing and center to Paris. In order to drive away the enemy away from Paris, Moltke ordered Kluck to “echelon back” behind Bulow’s Second Army to ensure flank cover.
Meanwhile, Kluck concluded that the overnight pursuit of British forces was fruitless. His IX Corps leader, General Ferdinand von Quast, reported that there was still a chance to cut off the French retreat at the Marne east of Chateau-Thierry. Without hesitation and zig-zagging from one enemy to another, Kluck approved the move. But his exhausted men could not reach the Marne by nightfall. Kluck then ordered the capture of Chateau-Thierry and the surrounding bridgeheads the next day, but his men were also ordered NOT to cross the Marne.
OHL finally realized that Kluck was a full day’s march AHEAD of Bulow, so it was a question of whether the former was being insubordinate or did the “echelon” message arrive at First Army HQ in time. French troops from the east continued to move toward Paris, and Moltke sensed for the first time that victory might be slipping from his grasp. The idea of sending an officer by car to Kluck’s HQ was proposed, but decided it would be moot. It was an omission that Moltke would later come to regret.
Bulow’s Second Army spent two days capturing the fortress of La Fere, much to the annoyance of Kluck. He felt that Bulow was better off delaying Lanrezac’s retreat, and Kluck’s request for freedom began to rear its ugly head. With uncertainty looming on the right wing, Moltke now believed that victory was in the center of the line.
Back in Paris, Joffre was still on the defensive. But a stroke of luck changed his mind. A French patrol had fired on a German car near Coucy-le-Chateau, killing all the occupants, including one who was an officer of the Grand Cavalry Division. His blood-stained bag was captured by the French Fifth Army and taken to Joffre’s HQ. Among the bag’s contents was a map marking the locations of ALL the corps of the German First Army AND its billeting areas. But there were still a few rough edges that needed attention.
Joffre decided that competent leadership was needed in some of his armies. Despite being a brilliant peacetime officer, possessing a superb mind, and having a firm grasp of military theory, General Charles Lanrezac was sacked from command of the Fifth Army. Even though he led the retreat in good order, Lanrezac was not an able leader in battle. He was replaced by the hero of Guise, General Louis Franchet d’Esperey.
Another new force would join in the counter-strike: the French Ninth Army led by General Ferdinand Foch (the other co-author of the failed Plan XVII). His men would be placed in between the French Fourth and Fifth Armies. The BEF would join alongside the left wing of the French Fifth Army, and Sir John French was pleased now that d’Esperey was in command. With Maunoury’s Sixth Army in front of Paris and squarely on Kluck’s right flank, the pieces were finally falling into place. All that was needed was the zero hour to launch the attack.
On September 4th, Kluck messaged OHL about seemingly being kept “in the dark” about the situation of the other German armies. Moltke and his staff were in a constant state of worry over the right wing, and their fears were confirmed when it was reported that the left wing of Kluck’s First Army had crossed the Marne at Chateau-Thierry due east of the French capital, apparently to strike the French Fifth Army flank as it approached the Seine River. The buildup of French troops in the vicinity of Paris (five corps) was also weighing heavy on the minds of the German General Staff, and Moltke ordered the First and Second Armies to halt their advances and face Paris in a defensive stance against an imminent enemy thrust. It was to ensure the survival of the right wing without sacrificing victory in the center.
THE MIRACLE AT THE MARNE
After nearly two weeks of planning and preparations, General Joffre ordered the counter-offensive to commence on September 6, 1914… with Maunoury’s Sixth Army dealing the initial blow. On the eve of battle, the news that the terrible fortnight-long retreat was at an end was received with great jubilation on the front line.
That same day, the German IV Reserve Corps, led by General von Gronau, was travelling south along the west bank of the Ourcq River screening the right wing. Some of Kluck’s men reached the town of Claye, only ten miles from Paris! It would be the closest the Germans would ever come to conquering the French capital in the Great War.
From Paris, Maunoury’s lead units were on the move heading east to Monthyon, which was also west of the Ourcq and just north of Meaux. It was only a short time before the two opposing forces crossed paths.
Around 1 P.M. on September 5, 1914, the advance guard of the French 56th Reserve Division (led by General de Lamaze) was spotted by a German artillery officer overlooking Monthyon. With his order to fire, so rang out the opening shots in the Battle of the Marne.
The encounter (which began a full day before the planned attack) took Gronau completely by surprise, and he asked Kluck for help. Over the entire Western Front, hundreds of engagements took place… but the moment of decision was played out at the Marne.
Kluck’s First Army was still due east of Paris and facing south with the Marne River at its back. It was curved in an arc heading northwest through Meaux… well beyond the confluence of the Marne and Ourcq Rivers. One day earlier, Moltke dispatched his intelligence officer, Oberstleutnant Richard Hentsch, to check on the status of the First Army. The other German armies were being checked or pounded by enemy fire. Kluck, however, did not pull back his forces. With Maunoury’s Sixth Army of 150,000 men striking Gronau’s IV Reserve Corps along the Ourcq River and driving for Meaux, the planned counter-offensive was well underway.
Half of Kluck’s army stood south of the Grand Morin River; the other half was being fought to a standstill on both sides of the Marne River. The entire German First Army was dangerously off balance after one day of battle, and its weak wing was positioned too far forward. Four of the embattled corps were deployed at right angles to the weak wing with no strength at the hinge. The rear lines of both flanks were thoroughly entangled. Kluck had no choice but to order his remaining two corps (the III and IX) out of their defensive roles and into the fight to save himself and his army.
Further to the east, General d’Esperey’s Fifth Army attacked the left wing (III and IV Corps) of the German First Army. Kluck quickly withdrew the two corps to join the fight, and by doing so, a hole had been created in the German lines. The distance between Kluck and Bulow had doubled to thirty miles. With all of Kluck’s forces facing westward in total isolation, the right flank of Bulow’s Second Army was out in the open!
The fight between Kluck and Maunoury raged for two days, and it was later known as the Battle of the Ourcq. The French Sixth Army line ran northward from Trilport to Crepy, and it began to bend. In relieving the pressure, Maunoury tried to outflank Kluck’s right with no success… now his army was in desperate need of reinforcements. Enter the military governor of Paris, General Joseph Simon Gallieni… who met the request for more men by using 1,200 taxicabs and buses (the action was called “the miracle of the Marne”)! To further ensure that Paris was safe from invasion, the French XVIII Corps under General Louis Ernest de Maud’huy seized the key bridgehead at Marchais-en-Brie.
To the east, General Franchet d’Esperey and the French Fifth Army drove for Montmirail. Foch’s Ninth Army joined d’Esperey on the right in the northern advance. Together, they encountered Max von Hausen’s German Third Army at Villeneuve. A two-day fight ensued, with the French holding steady and the Germans totally exhausted. Foch then went to the offensive, smashed Hausen’s center, and forced the Third Army to recoil.
Unengaged and well rested, the British Expeditionary Force was requested to march north into the gap between Kluck (still engaged at the Ourcq) and Bulow (who was unable to close the distance, now at nearly forty miles). But Sir John French moved slowly northward through the fog, and a grand opportunity to surround Kluck’s army was missed. Joffre then instructed the French Fifth Army (d’Esperey’s men) to assist the BEF, but by then, it was too late. Little did they know it, the Allies were stumbling to a great victory.
RETREAT AND DEFEAT
On the morning of September 8th, Moltke sent Hentsch on another mission: to meet directly with the army commanders, including Bulow and Kluck. That same day, the latter telegraphed Moltke and claimed that the decisive victory would be won within twenty-four hours. Nevertheless, the Oberstleutnant left OHL on his fateful journey that would decide the course of the entire Western campaign.
After receiving satisfactory reports from the commanders of the Fifth, Fourth, and Third Armies, Hentsch arrived at Second Army HQ at Montmort and found the leader in a depressed state. Bulow stated that his army’s strength was greatly diminished, and that the campaign had taken a heavy toll on his men. In short, Bulow informed Hentsch that he could not deliver a decisive victory.
The Second Army commander had no kind words for his former junior general, Alexander von Kluck. He wasted little time in blaming the head of First Army for his predicament on the Ourcq. However, Bulow admitted that he himself could not plug the hole that existed between Kluck’s army and his own. The pessimism Bulow exerted was having an effect on the messenger from OHL, and for the first time, the word “retreat” was brought into the conversation. Bulow stated that if the British Army crossed the Marne in force, the Second Army would have no other option except retreat.
The next day, Hentsch made it to First Army HQ at Mareuil-sur-Ourcq. He was not received by Kluck himself; his chief of staff (General Hermann von Kuhl) met Hentsch just before noon. Speaking for the First Army commander, Kuhl reported that victory was within reach and said the wings of Maunoury’s Sixth Army were nearing the breaking point.
Despite the optimism at Mareuil, Hentsch felt that the First Army’s position was courting disaster, especially after witnessing the somber mood at Montmort. He repeated Bulow’s intention of retreat if the BEF crossed the Marne, and such a move would leave Kluck’s men completely isolated and unable to escape the Allied advance.
Kuhl was appalled at the prospect of retreat. The First Army had covered 300 miles on foot without a day’s rest. It had won battles at Mons and Le Cateau, and now this same fighting force was on the verge of defeating the only army standing in the way of the French capital. Kuhl felt that if the French Sixth Army retreated, the BEF would have to do likewise. Once done, Kluck’s men could safely meet up with Bulow, refit, and try again for Paris. But with the problems of poor signal communications and a supply system stretched to the breaking point, Hentsch felt it was prudent to fall back for the survival of all the German forces in France.
When the prospect of retreat got back to Kluck, he was surprised… especially since he did not meet Hentsch face to face. Was Kluck avoiding Hentsch because he knew the writing was on the wall before the Oberstleutnant arrived? Or did Kluck view Hentsch’s visit as unnecessary with the glimmer of hope that Maunoury would be defeated? In any case, the response to retreat was almost total disdain.
After Hentsch departed Mareuil, Bulow confirmed that the British had indeed crossed the Marne, and as promised, his Second Army prepared to withdraw. Immediately, general retreat orders were sent from OHL to all the German army commanders. The left wing and center were told to fall back behind the Vesle River north of the Argonne Forest. Bulow and Kluck would follow in good order behind the Aisne River.
The attitude in the Kluck camp was that the First Army would be throwing away a major victory, and there were those that felt the retreat order should be rescinded. But Kluck did not subject himself to insubordination in the heat of the moment, and on the morning of September 10, 1918 (perhaps under protest), Kluck and the German First Army began its retreat to the north. The Battle of the Marne had ended with a stunned and badly battered German Army in defeat, and the most dramatic period of the war was over.
With the Germans digging in behind the Aisne River and the so-called “race to the sea” along the northern flank in the autumn of 1914, the war of mobility soon gave way to four years of bloody fighting in the trenches. In light of the failure to reach Paris, Moltke quickly became a casualty of the war. Although he was partially to blame for his actions, the Chief of the German General Staff became the scapegoat for Kluck, Bulow, and even the Kaiser! He was dismissed and replaced by Erich von Falkenhayn on September 14, 1914.
REWARD, RETIREMENT, AND REMINISCING
For Alexander von Kluck, he kept his post as commander of the First Army. On March 28, 1915, Kluck was inspecting an advanced portion of his troops when he was struck by shrapnel, which caused seven wounds and severely injuring his leg. He was immediately relieved from command. The same day this series of unfortunate events occurred, Kluck received the Order Pour le Merite. Sadly, Kluck never received another command, and he retired from army life in October 1916.
Kluck was convinced that his move towards Paris would have resulted in a decisive victory for Imperial Germany if he had been allowed to proceed. He claimed that he was never entirely in tune with the purpose of the Schlieffen Plan. An aggressive and capable commander, it was Kluck’s misfortune to have the key command in a plan whose basic flaws had been recognized by its author, but never solved.
The lack of coordination between Kluck and Bulow and the ensuing failure to maintain an effective offensive line was a primary contribution to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan. Many German experts hold Kluck and his chief of staff, Hermann von Kuhl, in high esteem. They felt Germany could have won the Battle of the Marne if only Bulow had matched the courageous initiatives of the German First Army, but this viewpoint does not explain the near encirclement of Kluck’s army.
Kluck later wrote of his participation in World War I in the volume entitled Fuhrung und Taten der Erste (1920). That same year, his post war memoirs, The March on Paris and the Battle of the Marne, were published. In his writings, Kluck reiterated his belief that the fight could have been won. He also noted that the right wing was lacking troops to finish the job. He accused Moltke of being too nonchalant about the Paris garrison. However, Kluck himself was unaware of such a sizable force in his trek to the southeast of Paris, and this may have been the result (in Kluck’s opinion) of the disruption of communications by the enemy from the rear. He also blamed Hentsch for not meeting him face to face on the day of decision at the Battle of the Ourcq, but the details surrounding this “non-meeting” have remained a matter of discussion.
The Westphalian Generaloberst would live to see the rise of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. He died in Berlin on October 19, 1934 at the age of eighty-eight.