PEEBLES PROFILES
EPISODE XIX
Hermann von François
Born January 31, 1856 in Luxembourg to a noble family of Huguenot extraction, Hermann von François was exposed to a military life from an early age. His father Bruno von François was a Prussian general and commander of the 27th Preußische Infanterie-Brigade. Sadly, he was killed in action leading his men during the Battle of Spicheren on August 6, 1870, less than a month before the Battle of Sedan.
By 1875, François, who had enrolled as an officer cadet, was based in Potsdam as Leutnant of the 1st Garde-Regiment zu Fuß. From 1884 to 1887, he attended the military academy at Berlin. By 1889, François had been promoted to Hauptmann (captain), and he had joined the General Staff.
In the early 1890s, François was posted to the XV Corps as a general staff officer based in Strasbourg. After a brief stint as company commander in 151st Infanterie-Regiment of the 31st Division, François devoted all his energies to the General Staff. In 1894, he was promoted to major and transferred to the 8th Division in Mannheim. By 1899, François was the chief of staff for the IV Corps, commanded by General der Infanterie Paul von Hindenburg, based in Magdeburg.
In 1901, François’s mother, Marie, took the family to German South-West Africa to follow her youngest son, Hugo, who was a Hauptmann (Captain) in the colonial army. The family was based in the region during the Herero Wars, in which Hugo fought. François’ other brother, Curt, was a well known scientist and researcher.
Hermann von François was promoted to Generalmajor and placed in command of the Hessischen-Brigade in Darmstadt in 1908. He was then promoted to Generalleutnant in 1911 and given command of the 13th Division for a brief period before his promotion to General der Infanterie and his posting to command of I Corps under the 8th Army based in Königsberg.
When World War I began, François was stationed in the province of East Prussia, where he was commander of the I Corps of the German Eighth Army. His task was to defend the easternmost regions of East Prussia against a Russian attack directed at the key city of Königsberg. The Eighth Army would be expected to hold out against significantly larger Russian forces (650,000 soldiers, thirty infantry divisions, eight cavalry divisions) until it could be reinforced by troops coming from the West after the expected quick defeat of France, This strategy was in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan, which would guide German forces in the opening phase of a two-front war in which Germany faced BOTH France and Russia.
THE EASTERN FRONT OPENS
Germany had no true plan in the East, except to stand firm and play for time. The German Eighth Army consisted of 135,000 men, eleven infantry divisions, and a single cavalry division. It lacked heavy artillery, medical services, and telephones.
The German forces in the East were under the command of General Maximilian von Prittwitz und Gaffron. Both he and his chief of staff (General Count von Waldersee, the nephew to Schlieffen’s predecessor) were unsound men in times of crisis. However, they were aided by a lieutenant colonel who had transferred from Alsace with the wisdom and knowledge of the enemy Cossacks. His name was Maximilian von Hoffmann.
François’ I Corps faced the right wing of a two-pronged invasion of East Prussia: the Russian First Army. It was under the command of a Baltic German named Pavel Rennenkampf.
It was well known (especially by Hoffmann) that Rennenkampf and the Russian Second Army commander, Alexei Samsonov, had been in a bitter feud since the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Now, these two men were ordered by their superior and army group commander, Yakov Zhilinsky, to work together and defeat the Teutonic forces in East Prussia.
The Russians would have to deal with many natural obstacles in East Prussia: forests, hills, and the high number of marshes and lakes. Such barriers would slow their pace and diffuse their masses.
However, Zhilinsky had an alternate plan. Rennenkampf’s First Army would advance from Vilna north of the Masurian Lakes through the forty-mile wide Insterburg Gap and threaten the fortress of Königsberg, the seat of Prussian power for over two centuries. Meanwhile, Samsonov would move north from Warsaw in Russian Poland, travel west of the Johannisburg Forest, advance on the rear of the German Eighth Army, and encircle it. Once done, there would be an open road to Berlin!
But one factor swung the advantage back to the Germans: mobility. The railway network in East Prussia allowed rapid shifts and redeployment of troops from one area to the other. This would be key in the days ahead.
Prittwitz and Hoffmann estimated that the 8th Army would engage Rennenkampf’s forces between August 15th and the 20th. However, on August 14th, as army headquarters prepared to move out of Marienburg to a location more central to the planned battle, the first Russians appeared opposite the northern flank!
Prittwitz (nervously eyeing the advance of the Russian left wing far to the south) ordered François to reform behind the Angerapp River. Reluctant to surrender any of his beloved Prussia (and naturally pugnacious), François felt breaking off the engagement would be deadly. So he ignored Prittwitz’s order, responding with the famous reply, “General von François will withdraw when he has defeated the Russians!” He counterattacked the Russian First Army, which brought on the Battle of Stalluponen. Army HQ was stunned upon receiving the report.
However, despite suffering severe losses, the Huguenot won a surprising victory, inflicting 5,000 casualties and taking 3,000 prisoners. But Prittwitz worried that his plan was now falling apart!
After winning the battle, François obeyed Prittwitz’s order and withdrew fifteen miles to the west. Three days later, another fight broke out that became known as the Battle of Gumbinnen. Three army corps led by François, General August von Mackensen, and General Otto von Below attacked Rennenkampf’s men, who were protected by solid earthworks east of the Rominte River. The Germans lost 7,000 troops, and the word “panic” began to appear in communiques to HQ.
Despite the losses, François’ aggressiveness resulted in the cautious Rennenkampf halting his westward advance. Tactically, Gumbinnen was viewed as a surprising German defeat!
Prittwitz planned to resume the fight, but Samsonov’s men had crossed the southern border of East Prussia and were advancing on the German rear! Both he and Waldersee feared the worst, and the 8th Army was ordered to retire west of the Vistula River to avoid being cut off from home. In effect, the whole of East Prussia was being yielded to the enemy!
The retreat order also reached the Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (headquartered in Luxembourg). In haste, he sent two corps from the West to reinforce the 8th Army in East Prussia.
But Hoffmann and his companion General Grunert were in Nordenburg (thirty miles southwest of Gumbinnen), and they had noted that Rennenkampf (his army completely halted) could be knocked out in less than three days. Prittwitz, however, argued that the fight needed to be shifted to the south before taking on the Baltic German yet again. The three men finally agreed that a sidestep by the German Eight Army right flank would face the left wing of Samsonov’s army… thus the order to retreat was cancelled.
Later, Prittwitz met with Moltke in Berlin without the presence of Hoffmann and Grunert. In the meeting, Prittwitz did NOT inform Moltke that the order to retire behind the Vistula had been dropped in favor of a new counter-offensive. This failure to communicate led to the former’s demise, and Moltke decided that Prittwitz was a spineless commander who had disintegrated and needed to be replaced.
TANNENBERG
The tandem of Prittwitz and Waldersee was replaced by Paul von Hindenburg (called out of retirement at age 66) and Erich Ludendorff (the hero of Liege). On August 23rd, Hindenburg immediately cancelled the retreat order in favor of a renewed attack, later to be known as the Battle of Tannenberg. The upcoming fight brought legendary fame to Hindenburg, but the initial plan was the genius of Prittwitz’s deputy chief of operations, Max Hoffmann.
The single cavalry division would delay Rennenkampf’s First Army. Meanwhile, the remaining troops would move south to the area around Osterode to face Samsonov’s Second Army. Hoffmann was gambling on the notion that Rennenkampf would not help Samsonov due to their feud. Three German corps (First, Seventeenth, and the First Reserve) were to be shifted along with General Scholtz’s XX Corps.
François’ I Corps was transferred by rail to the southwest to confront the Russian Second Army (advancing from Russian Poland). His men travelled southwest from Königsberg through Braunsberg, Mulhausen, and Elbing to Marienburg. Then François and his corps headed southeast by rail through Deutsch Eylau to Seeben.
Nine German divisions faced southeast in a large arc measuring sixty miles… with strong flanks and a thinned center. The idea was to bait Samsonov’s army and crush it.
The Second Army commander was unaware of the situation facing him and his men: twelve divisions and three corps heading northwest towards the Vistula River. The remaining VI Corps was to move north towards the area between Seeburg and Rastenburg.
Samsonov assumed the German Eighth Army was retreating in the north, but he was oblivious of the fact that he was falling into a trap… despite reports from the Russian cavalry of a sudden buildup against his left flank. Samsonov asked Zhilinsky (who was 160 miles to the rear) if he should advance westward… and was told no. With Rennenkampf idle in the north and Samsonov heading into a meat grinder in the south, Zhilinsky made no effort to control the situation!
To add to the horror, the Russians were advancing half-rationed and half-fed. Many of them were without boots, using rags instead. The artillery horses were starved, and the Russian harvest was not yet ripe!
The fight began on August 24th with Samsonov’s troops clashing with Scholtz’s XX Corps from Allenstein in the center of the arc. Known as the Battle of Orlau-Frankenau, the Germans gave ground and fell back westward, but their lines did not break.
Ludendorff then issued an order to General François to attack the Russian left wing at Usdau on August 25th. But the Huguenot rejected the direct order, arguing that his heavy artillery, munitions trains, most of the light guns, and some of his men were not yet present. Angered, Ludendorff (with Hoffmann in tow) met with François and repeated the order. Reluctantly, François agreed to commence the attack despite lacking shells.
But during the return from that meeting, Hoffmann received two explosive intelligence intercepts that had been transmitted by Rennenkampf and Samsonov “in the clear” (i.e. unciphered).
The first was from Rennenkampf. His message revealed the distance between his and Samsonov’s armies… and it further detailed his marching plans, which were NOT towards Samsonov’s forces.
The second intercept was from Samsonov himself. Still believing the main German force was falling back, the Second Army commander provided detailed plans for his intended route of pursuit!
Although Ludendorff was sceptical of the intercepts, Hindenburg altered the German Eighth Army’s plans… and François could wait until he was full prepared to attack.
On August 27th, François attacked the lead elements of Samsonov’s army and began to make steady advances to the rear. It was the start of the decisive role of the entire battle. However Ludendorff, fearing a Russian counterattack by Rennenkampf, now ordered François to break off the advance. Unnerved, the I Corps commander took Soldau on the frontier, cut off communications with Samsonov’s center, and confined the Russian left in the process. Then he proceeded east to prevent Samsonov’s men from retreating back into Russian Poland.
On the Russian right, Below and Mackensen’s artillery forced the flank to fall back in confusion. With François pushing eastward, the Russian Second Army was in danger of encirclement.
François took Neidenburg on the night of August 31st. The next day, he captured Willenberg… and the bulk of Samsonov’s army was in a closed ring!
It was cheered as “the greatest German victory of all time.” Tannenberg (originally named Ostroda) was propagandized as revenge for the 1410 defeat of the Teutonic Order by the Poles. Even though it was François’ shining moment, Tannenberg made Hindenburg a national hero.
For the Russians, it was a disaster! The losses were 125,000 men (95,000 of them were captured) and five HUNDRED guns. Sixty trains were required to transport the captured materiel back to Germany!
Samsonov, unable to face the Tsar, committed suicide in the forest with his pistol. Zhilinsky would later be dismissed for incompetence.
PASSING HONORABLY INTO ECLIPSE
With Hindenburg and Ludendorff leading the 9th Army in Russian Poland, Hermann von François remained with his corps in East Prussia and led it with much success against Rennenkampf in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes in September 1914. When General Richard von Schubert (the new commander of the 8th Army) ordered him to retreat, he dispatched a telegram to the OHL describing his success and stating “the commander is badly counseled.” The telegram impressed the Kaiser so much that he immediately relieved Schubert. On October 3rd, Wilhelm II gave von François the command of the 8th Army. He did not hold it for long.
When Hindenburg and Ludendorff prepared their counterattack from Thorn in the direction of Łódź, François was reluctant to send the requested I Corps. Instead, the badly trained and ill-equipped XXV Reserve Corps was deployed… which was too much for his superiors. In early November 1914, François was removed from command and replaced by General Otto von Below.
After some time “on the shelf”, François received command of the XXXXI Reserve Corps on Christmas Eve 1914. After a brief spell in the West, he returned to the East in April 1915. One month later, François took part in the spring offensive (Gorlice-Tarnow) that conquered Russian Poland. He continued to distinguish himself and won the Pour le Mérite (Germany’s highest military decoration) on May 14, 1915 for his performance in the breakthrough at Gorlice.
In July 1915, François was transferred back to the Western Front to take command of the Westphalian VII Corps in France. With the Battle of Verdun raging, he became commander of Meuse Group West in July 1916. One year later, the oak leaves were attached to his “Blue Max” for outstanding performance during the Battle of Verdun.
However, François never received any further promotions or serious commands under Ludendorff. So he gave up his command in July 1918 and was placed on the standby list until October when he retired.
After the war, François returned home and wrote several books on military history, including the best-seller (in Germany) Marneschlacht und Tannenberg in 1920. He died on May 15, 1933 at the age of seventy-seven.
AWARDS AND ORDERS
– Order of the Crown, First Class (Prussia) – Service Award (Prussia)
– Honor Commanders Cross (Ehrenkomturkreuz) of the Princely House Order of Hohenzollern
– Commander Second Class of the House Order of Albert the Bear
– Commander First Class of the Order of the Zähringer Lion
– Military Merit Order, Second Class (Bavaria)
– Commander First Class of the Order of Philip the Magnanimous (Hesse)
– Honor Cross First Class of the House Order of Lippe
– Honorary Cross Second Class of the Reuss Honor Cross
– Commander 2nd class of the Ducal Saxe-Ernestine House Order
– Cross of Honor of Schwarzburg, Second Class
– Order of Merit, First Class (Chile)
– Commander of the Order of the Redeemer (Greece)
– Commander of the Order of Saints Maurice and Lazarus (House of Savoy)
– Order of the Black Eagle
– Iron Cross, First and Second Class (1914)
– Pour le Merite (May 14, 1915)
– Oak Leaves (July 27, 1917)
– Grand Cross of the Order of the Red Eagle with Oak Leaves and Swords (October 14, 1918)