PEEBLES PROFILES
EPISODE XX: Gottlieb von Jagow
Gottlieb von Jagow was born in Berlin on June 22, 1863. He was a German diplomat who served as the state secretary of the German Foreign Office from January 1913 to November 1916.
Jagow was educated at the University of Bonn. He entered the diplomatic service in 1895, first assigned to the German embassy in Rome. He then moved to the Prussian mission at Munich.
After he passed his examination in diplomacy in 1897, Jagow was assigned to the Prussian mission at Hamburg. He quickly switched again to Rome, where he advanced to the position of second secretary (legation counselor). After a short interlude with the German mission at The Hague, Jagow returned as the first secretary to the embassy in Rome in March 1901 (where he stayed for five years).
In 1906, Jagow was transferred to the foreign office in Berlin. He first made his mark as private secretary to Bernhard von Bülow (former Imperial Chancellor). In December 1907, he was appointed Envoy Extraordinary to Luxembourg, and in May 1909, Jagow became the German ambassador to Rome. During the Italo-Turkish War, Jagow conducted important negotiations with the Italian government and (it is said) prevented a war between the Austrio-Hungarian Empire and Italy.
In January 1913, Jagow was appointed secretary of state for Imperial Germany. He played an active part in negotiations preceding the outbreak of World War I, and was, in particular, concerned with relations between Germany and Austria. In fact, Jagow was the first member of the Imperial German government to become acquainted with the terms of the Austrian ultimatum of October 18, 1913 to Serbia, the earliest indicator of the impending crisis of July 1914. But Sir Martin Gilbert wrote, “War seemed unlikely in the spring and summer of 1914”. The illusion of war debate began with aims of colonial annexation and supremacy in Africa, negotiated neutrality for other states to effectively invade France, and asserted attempts to compete with royal naval seapower.
During the 1914 July Crisis, Jagow was confident that an Austro-Serbian war would be localized, and that Russia was not yet prepared for a continental war. This belief was incorrect: the Chancellor was even more sceptical, and it indirectly led to the outbreak of World War I.
By July 29th, Jagow was “very depressed” that Austria’s note policy of duality had hastened war. When the conflict ended five years later, he attributed deeper reasons for the outbreak of war to “this damned system of alliances.” Jagow had even tried before the declaration of hostilities to persuade Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to allow a debate in the Reichstag on war aims. However, a veto and a ban on all criticism of the government was promptly imposed. Long conferences with the Chancellor and the Kaiser did nothing to change his mood.
Jagow was also wrong to believd that Britain would respect Germany’s access to Rotterdam (part of the list of grievances that caused the war). Consequently, he was perceived as “a weak link in a weak government” before being replaced. Despite this fallacy, Jagow had always been aware of the Entente Cordiale (the-Anglo French alliance of 1904).
Furthermore, he, like the Kaiser, made no secret of the racial Slavic nationalism threatened from Russia. Jagow believed as soon as the Russian railways were complete, invasion would soon follow.
There were also moments where the Germany foreign secretary appeared to playing both sides. Jagow indulged in taunting ally Austria as “nervous”… while at the same time ignoring Serbia’s pleadings for peace. He also attempted to lull Britain into a false sense of security… while “cutting the lines” of diplomatic communication after it was too late! In fact the fortnight’s delayed response for Austria’s commencement of hostilities gave Jagow the opportunity to blame Russia for starting the war.
On July 24th, the British thought Jagow was “quite ready to fall in with suggestion as to the four powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg”. But he was already ill and exhausted from his exertions, acknowledging that Serbia was the victim of bullying.
Basically, Jagow was a member of a foreign ministry team that denied a British offer of a five-power conference, for they had already agreed on Moltke’s plan two days before Austria’s declaration of war against Serbia on July 28, 1914. The next day, Prince Lichnowsky’s telegram cable was ignored for hours, which Jagow argued was responsible for Bethmann-Hollweg’s “misstep.” The offensive plan, revised by Jagow and the Chancellor, was soon delivered to King Albert I of Belgium as an ultimatum in a sealed envelope with a note demanding “an unequivocal answer” to Germany’s demand for her troops to be allowed to march through the country on the way to France. The diminutive bureaucrat was eternally optimistic by character that German superiority would triumph.
By November 1914, the Ottoman Empire had declared war on the Allies, so Jagow ordered Leo Frobenius to persuade the government of Abyssinia to yield to the Central Powers. Stirring revolt also dominated German foreign policy in the East; at the heart of it was Jagow’s dialogue for the “liberation of Poland”. It was also instrumental with the under-secretary Arthur Zimmerman (one of Bethmann’s governmental supporters), who ran Agent Parvus in Constantinople. The aim was “the complete destruction of Tsarism and the dismemberment of Russia into smaller states.”
Nonetheless, Gottlieb von Jagow was naturally cautious, doubtful of Turkey’s commitment to alliance. At the same time on April 18, 1915, he secured for Turkey her sovereign rights over the Dardanelles.
Jagow was also determined to continue the fight in Galicia, But when he received President Wilson’s offer of an international peace congress, American mediation was flatly refused. Jagow called it “schwarmerei”; but as war dragged on, he became domineered by Zimmermann’s pretensions for the Chancellory. Military successes in Russia encouraged Jagow to keep Austria-Hungary in the fight without them giving in to the Tsarists.
Jagow subscribed to the school of thought that Russia had to be pushed back deep into her hinterland. He was also in support of an independent Polish kingdom, thus preventing the sullied blood to dilute German racial superiority. He also sought “Pan-Germanization” and a customs area from Austria-Hungary, safeguarding German exports. More sinister was a program for ethnic cleansing of Poles and Jews conditional on an Austro-German military alliance. Jagow himself favored a policy of annexation and Germanization. He sent a memorandum on September 11, 1915 to Falkenhayn, who rejected any possibility of an alliance with Austria’s “slipshod” army.
By the end of October, Jagow had developed the idea that Courland and Lithuania should be annexed in return for Austrian Poland, “chaining” the Dual Monarchy’s destiny to Germany’s. An able and skilful diplomat, Jagow persuaded the German General Staff to drop objections to the political proposal to impose Mitteleuropa on Vienna. The foremost threat in Jagow’s mind was Slavic nationalism.
Wilson’s aide, Colonel House, reassured Jagow that U.S. policy in 1916 was not designed to blame the politicians… only the military. According to Friedrich Katz, Jagow, an opponent to unrestricted submarine warfare, was the principal supporter of a failed plan designed to provoke a war between the United States and Mexico. At the time, the Mexican Revolution had created rising tensions between the two countries. As a result, Jagow expected that the U.S. would not enter the Great War if it was militarily involved with Mexico. The end result was failure, as the United States would declare war on Germany in early April 1917.
Jagow was also responsible for the Longwiy-Breiy Plan to occupy the plateau that overlooked the city of Verdun (made possible by Baron Romberg’s visit to Berlin). But it was merely a pretext for a new extension of German strategy deeper into France.
Jagow remained steadfastly anti-Russian, to the extent that he sacked staff to get a putative alliance with Ushida, the Japanese ambassador. His meddling with Ushida in St. Petersburg got himself ‘discarded’ for attempting a separate peace with Russia on Germany’s behalf; Jagow even confessed on May 17, 1916 that the “whole swindle ceases to matter”.
Any diplomatic rapprochement was soon broken when Russia launched the Brusilov Offensive in early June 1916. Jagow’s policy had woefully failed: he was scheming to introduce a Grand Duchy of Poland… as Germany conspired to divide the country in half.
Jagow eventually retired in November 1916. A quiet, unassuming and scholarly man, he was one of the worst speakers in the Reichstag. James W. Gerard (the United States ambassador to Germany at the time) stated in his book “My Four Years in Germany” that Jagow was forced out of office by an agitation against him on account of his lack of force in defending government policy in the Reichstag.
In 1917, Jagow served as head of a military hospital in Libau. He later wrote
a defense of German policy entitled Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (“Causes and the outbreak of the World War”), which was published in 1919.
Gottlieb von Jagow died in Potsdam on January 11, 1935 at the age of sixty-one.
PRIMARY SOURCES
(1) Gottlieb von Jagow, letter to Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London (18th July, 1914)
We must see to localizing the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Whether this is possible will depend in the first place on Russia and in the second place on the moderating influence of the other members of the Entente. The more boldness Austria displays, the more strongly we support her, the more likely is Russia to keep quiet. There is certain to be some blustering in St. Petersburg, but at bottom Russia is not now ready to strike. France and England will not want war now. In a few years according to all expert opinion Russia will be ready to strike. Then she will crush us with the numbers of her soldiers, then she will have built her Baltic fleet and strategic railways. Our group meanwhile will be growing steadily weaker. Russia knows this well and therefore absolutely wants peace for several years more. If localization is not attainable and if Russia attacks Austria, then we cannot sacrifice Austria. We should then find ourselves in a not exactly proud isolation. I have no wish for a preventive war, but if the fight offers itself, we dare not flinch. I still hope and believe that the conflict can be localized. England’s attitude in this matter will be of great importance.
(2) Sir Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years (1925).
I really felt angry with von Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow. They had given us to understand that they had not seen the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was sent; they had been critical of it when they saw it. Von Jagow had said that, as a diplomatic document, it left something to be desired, and contained some demands that Serbia could not comply with. By their own admission they had allowed their weaker Ally to handle a situation on which the peace of Europe might depend, without asking beforehand what she was going to say and without apparently lifting a finger to moderate her, when she had delivered an ultimatum of the terms of which they did not entirely approve. Now they vetoed the only certain means of peaceful settlement without, as far as I knew, even referring it to Austria at all. The complacency with which they had let Austria launch the ultimatum on Serbia was deplorable, and to me unaccountable; the blocking of a Conference was still worse.
(3) Gottlieb von Jagow, statement issued after the sinking of the Lusitania (18th May, 1915)
Lastly, the Imperial Government must specially point out that on her last trip the Lusitania, as on earlier occasions, had Canadian troops and munitions on board, including no less than 5,400 cases of ammunition destined for the destruction of brave German soldiers who are fulfilling with self-sacrifice and devotion their duty in the service of the Fatherland. The German Government believes that it acts in just self-defense when it seeks to protect the lives of its soldiers by destroying ammunition destined for the enemy with the means of war at its command.
