Friedrich Karl (“Fritz”) von Loßberg
was born in Bad Homburg in Hesse-Nassau on April 30, 1868. One of the leading proponents of the system of defense-in-depth, he was later to become “the fireman of the Western Front”, always sent by OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung) to the area of crisis.
Loßberg was undoubtedly the foremost German expert on defensive warfare. He was made a floating chief of staff during crises… band given the right to issue orders in a superior’s name. In Military Operations France and Belgium 1917, Part I… Cyril Falls, the British official historian, referred to him as “a very remarkable soldier.”
Throughout the eight months which Colonel von Loßberg spent in Mézières (in early 1915), he was straining at the leash to return to more active work at the front. The first opportunity (which came by accident), he seized with both hands! Loßberg’s chief, Colonel Tappen, was still away when the French offensive (in the Champagne) was launched on September 25, 1915… and Loßberg deputized for him when General Erich von Falkenhayn explained the situation to Kaiser Wilhelm II the following morning. A message had come through earlier from the German Third Army Chief of Staff (Lieutenant-General von Hoehn) that the left corps might have to be withdrawn two miles back behind the Dormoise, and Colonel von Loßberg (during his account of the situation on the Champagne battlefront) expressed strong disapproval of such an action. Within three hours of that interview, he was on his way to replace General von Hoehn as Chief of Staff, a great honor for a junior colonel of only two months’ seniority (all the other army chiefs of staff held a rank no lower than major-general).
EARLY LIFE AND WAR
Loßberg was commissioned in the Guards Regiment in 1888, the third generation of his immediate family to serve in it. He qualified as a general staff officer… and in 1911, Loßberg became an instructor at the Kriegsakademie (War Academy). He was appointed chief of staff of the XIII Württemberg Army Corps two years later.
In the first year of the Great War, Loßberg fought on both the Western and Eastern Fronts. Promoted to lieutenant-colonel in January 1915, he was transferred to OHL at Mézières in France and became the deputy chief of operations. Loßberg already knew the supreme commander, Erich von Falkenhayn, as well as the chief of operations and other staff members… while the Kaiser remembered him as “the fencing lieutenant in Berlin”.
The Germans defended the Western Front in the Prussian tradition: the defenders were massed in the front line and instructed to “hold what you are ordered to hold”. Some of the OHL staff foresaw that with more guns and ammunition, the Allied preliminary bombardments would quickly convert the crowded German front line into a slaughterhouse.
In May 1915, their thinking was stimulated by instructions captured from the French Fifth Army, stipulating three lines of defense. The first line was manned by sentry groups, with listening posts in front. It was to be strongly built but lightly garrisoned. If the attackers achieved a breakthrough, they would face a second main line of resistance, which included dugouts to accommodate all of the defenders of the first two lines. A third row, incorporating artillery and shell-proof shelters for the reserves, stood behind the primary lines.
OHL Staff Colonels Max Bauer and Bussche and Captains Geyer and Harbou liked the idea of defense-in-depth… and discussed making it flexible by permitting the garrison of the front line to retreat to join the main line of resistance if the front was breached. But Loßberg argued against elasticity, because he had been impressed in battle by the demoralizing effect of fleeing men.
SECOND CHAMPAGNE
In September 1915 the French attacked in the Champagne east of Reims, advancing along a twenty-mile front behind a cloud of poison gas and smoke. The German Third Army was driven out of the front line; their chief of staff proposed to fall back two miles and shelter behind a river. He was replaced by Colonel von Loßberg, who upon arriving at HQ was telephoned by a corps commander asking whether the Third Army was still planning to retreat. Loßberg ordered him to stand where they were.
A few minutes later, Loßberg met his commander, General Karl von Einem, who endorsed the cancellation. Einem also agreed that Loßberg go immediately to the front with full powers. The French were sure to attack again once they had moved their artillery forward. When Loßberg arrived at the heights on the north side of the valley where the German Third Army stood, he was immediately struck by the strength of the position they had been forced to occupy. They were now defending a reserve trench on a reverse slope 220 yards beneath the crest. The line was hidden from enemy observers, and the defenders could shoot down attacking French troops as they emerged over the crest. The only flaw, however, was that German artillery observers (usually placed in the front line) were equally blind. Loßberg ordered the observers to set up positions along the crest where he was standing, which gave them a perfect view of the slope opposite where French attackers would appear, thus the Germans would no longer be in the noisy, smoky confusion of the front line during the attack.
The reserves were placed just behind the northern hill, and Loßberg ordered shelters to be built for them. Pickets were dotted along the crest of the hill facing the French. These depositions fit perfectly to his belief that the “strength of the defense lies in concealment from enemy observation”. Loßberg then motored to the headquarters of each corps and ordered the men to position their lines similarly. The new defense stymied further French attacks.
THE SOMME
When the Allies launched the “big push” at the Somme in July 1916, Falkenhayn summoned Loßberg and asked him to take over as Chief of Staff of the German Second Army, situated at the southernmost point of the front where the French had achieved penetration. Loßberg agreed… but on the condition that the German attacks at the Battle of Verdun be stopped. Falkenhayn shook hands… but never kept his promise!
At Second Army HQ, the commander (Fritz von Below) gave Loßberg permission to go to the front with full power to issue commands. When Loßberg saw how the original front line trenches had been utterly demolished by the enemy barrage, he ordered the defenders to stand where they were and adopt a mobile defense-in-depth. The front line was to be held lightly, with the defenders moving forward into shell holes as soon as a bombardment began. The artillery observers were moved behind the main line of resistance to the heights where the reserves for the battalion holding the sector were also sheltered. Enemy penetrations would be driven back by counterattacks. If possible, an immediate counterattack would be launched by the two reserve battalions of the regiment holding the sector, led by the front-line battalion commander who best knew the conditions. Close behind the front, Loßberg stationed counterattack divisions. In his system, corps, which had contained a set trio of divisions, became responsible for the length of the front held by the trio: the divisions making up the corps were changed if necessary, but the corps remained responsible for its terrain.
If there was an enemy threat, Loßberg tried to be in the front line at daybreak to gauge morale. Most days, both Below and Loßberg visited a section of the front, except during attacks when they had to be at the telephone exchange. They were careful to relieve divisions that had given their all.
After Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff took over OHL on August 29, 1916, Loßberg was delighted to watch the spiritual revival of the German Army… especially after the attacks on Verdun were finally stopped. Unlike their predecessors Moltke and Falkenhayn, H-L solicited and freely discussed ideas. Loßberg was asked for a report describing his defensive tactics. In September 1916, construction began on a new backup line well behind the current front, the Siegfriedstellung (the enemy called it the Hindenburg Line). It was built with all recent refinements, including shallow dugouts with concrete roofs that could be left quickly when attacks began. When Loßberg toured the almost completed line, he saw that the artillery observation posts were built into the front line trenches, which were on a forward slope exposed to enemy ground observers! Supported by Below and Army Group Commander Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, Loßberg successfully argued for building a new front line (wherever possible) on a reverse slope, with positions for a light line of first resistance on the crest. The artillery observers were now placed in the second line, overlooking the enemy.
OHL issued a paper the “Conduct of the Defensive Battle” on December 1, 1916. Mostly written by junior staff officers, it incorporated many of Loßberg’s ideas for mobile defense-in-depth. It also recommended elasticity, permitting the defenders of the front line to retreat if forced. Loßberg still strongly opposed elasticity in his report that OHL published on January 30, 1917.
BATTLE OF ARRAS
The BEF attacked the German Sixth Army near Arras on April 9, 1917, advancing behind a creeping barrage for almost three miles. The British successfully captured the heights of Vimy Ridge, which gave their observers a commanding view over the Douai Plain.
Two days later, Loßberg was made Chief of Staff of the German Sixth Army. He found the defenders in chaos… but in the Crown Prince Rupprecht’s words, he was “almost superhumanly imperturbable”. He swiftly organized new defensive lines, then telephoned Ludendorff that this time… the defense would be elastic, because the front line was so readily observed. If forced, the front-line defenders would withdraw… and the battle would be fought at the second line, which was mostly on a reverse slope, easily observed by artillery observers. By this time, counterattacking infantry were using stormtrooper tactics. When reserve divisions advanced from the artillery protection line to counterattack, they came under the command of the division they were supporting. Repeated British attacks gained no significant ground.
THIRD YPRES
After the brilliant British capture of the Messines Ridge on June 8, 1917, Ludendorff asked Loßberg to move to Flanders in Belgium and become Chief of Staff of the German Fourth Army (led by General Friedrich Sixt von Armin). Loßberg knew the topography of the Ypres Salient from the first battle for the town in the autumn of 1914 . For the first time, he could organize a mobile defense-in-depth before an attack began.
Loßberg strove to make the defenders invisible to attackers on the ground… and even to their aerial observers. As soon as the bombardment began, the front-line men left their trenches to shelter in shell holes scattered randomly about in front of the line that the British artillery was smashing. These defenders were provided with boards so they could shelter above the ground water that filled the bottoms of the holes. They were also given corrugated iron and canvas for crude roofs. They were to fight to the end from these holes with their light machine guns.
The second line of resistance was about three miles behind the front (near the effective limit of the enemy’s field guns). It had concrete nests for heavy machine guns and shelters for riflemen, mortar crews, and light machine gunners. If the attackers achieved a breakthrough, most of the defenders moved into shell holes so they could strike from unexpected directions. They were ordered to hold their positions… even if their line was penetrated! Before successful attackers reached the artillery protection line, they would face counterattacks from the reserve division.
The two-week, six-million-shell bombardment ended on July 31, 1917; the British anticipated that their infantry would advance five miles on the first day. By midday, the surviving attackers were penetrating the second line of resistance… but they soon smashed into counterattacking Germans, who pushed back the Brits even as the rain began to pour down. The day after the attack, Loßberg was promoted to major-general.
On August 16th, the British attacked again… but with orders to advance no more than 2,000 yards before digging in to repel any German counterattacks. Such bite and hold tactics forced the Germans to change also. Ludendorff, who increasing directed the defense, placed more men in the foremost line… and waited until the following day to mount a carefully-organized counterattack. The British artillery overwhelmed the foremost defenders and their immediate supports.
On October 7th, the Germans returned to a lightly-held front, which would retire to the main resistance line where they would be joined by counterattacking troops. At the same time, a dense artillery barrage would be laid in front of the main resistance line. The emphasis was still on a mobile defense; companies were assigned zones (rather than lines) to defend. After Ludendorff took responsibility, Loßberg does not describe the further changes in his book, which was based on a diary.
Their final configuration was that each front division should establish a main line of resistance 450 yards behind the front. It consisted of strong points which would hold out even if the line was breached. Heavy machine guns, working in pairs, were just behind this position, along with a few field guns as anti-tank weapons. The battle zone extended to a depth of five miles behind the front; it was dotted with points of resistance that if necessary would be held until relieved by counterattack. Since the maximum range of field artillery was five miles, attackers nearing the end of the battle zone could only be supported by their heavier guns. A reserve division was in position close behind this battle zone. If a counterattack was launched, it was led by the commander of the division at the front. This defensive doctrine was carried over after the end of the war.
After enormous sacrifice via “bite and hold” tactics, the British took Passchendaele Ridge on November 30, 1917. Now they faced another strong line of German field works… with another behind it close to completion!
1918: YEAR OF DECISION
Loßberg wrote little in his memoirs about 1918, the year in which the Germans launched their astonishing breakthrough offensives on the Western Front. It began with Operation Michael on March 21st; the British lines near Cambrai were smashed. It created a vast salient that increased the length of the German defensive front… but it also failed to take any strategic objectives.
Loßberg urged OHL to withdraw from the useless and costly, but his request fell on deaf ears. The next offensive was the decisive Battle of the Lys in April 1918, codenamed Operation Georgette and launched by the German Fourth Army in Flanders around Armentieres. There was another brilliant breakthrough, which was later stalled by reserves manning a stout mobile defense-in-depth. On Loßberg’s advice, the attack was halted, and the soldiers failed to take Hazelbrouck, the major railway junction that was their prime objective. In four major battles over a four-year period, Ypres remained in Allied hands.
OHL then shifted the attack to the Champagne in late May 1918 to draw away French troops who had been sent to help the British in Flanders. The German advance in the Third Battle of the Aisne was the most remarkable yet, moving twenty miles from the starting line by the end of the first day. On May 30th, German troops reached the right bank of the Marne River near Chateau-Thierry, a mere thirty-five miles from Paris. The news caused the French government to pack for Bordeaux like they did in 1914!
In June 1918, OHL decided that they must enlarge the salient, so they would be able to bring forward enough supplies to drive on to Paris. On part of the sector, the French front line was lightly held and easily overrun… but the Germans unexpectedly encountered the main line of resistance. It was beyond the range of the German field guns, thus the offensive later known as Noyon-Montdidier was halted.
OHL decided to strike again in Flanders and finish off the British. On July 18, 1918, Ludendorff came to discuss the next operation with his commanders, including the Crown Prince Rupprecht and Loßberg. The latter found the Quartermaster General “aggressive and confident”.
But Ludendorff’s mood was quickly shattered by a telephone call reporting that Franco-American forces had smashed through the right flank of the salient pointing toward Paris on the opening day of the Battle of Soissons. With all of Germany’s manpower reserves exhausted, It soon dawned on OHL that the war was lost. There were no more German attacks, and OHL was slowly forced to withdraw, hoping to establish a shorter defensive line that could be held. First, all of the German wounded had to be evacuated… then, the essential supplies like food and ammunition… and finally, the fighting troops being assaulted all along the front. They reorganized for withdrawal on August 8th, and Loßberg became Chief of Staff of Army Group von Böhn (made up of the German Second, 18th, and Ninth Armies).
Early in November 1918, Loßberg was reassigned to OHL. The armistice that was signed at Compiegne specified that all German troops still remaining in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Alsace-Lorraine after two weeks would become prisoners of war. These men were evacuated in time, a final display of the organizational skills of the German Army.
POST WAR
In the small post-war German Army (the Reichswehr), Loßberg was first in charge of defending the new eastern border with Poland. Later, he became general chief of staff and commanded the Sixth Division.
Fritz von Loßberg eventually retired in 1927 as a general of infantry. He died in Lübeck on May 14, 1942 at the age of seventy-four.
His son Bernhard was also a general staff officer, known for the Lossberg study for the invasion of Russia.
DECORATIONS AND AWARDS
Loßberg was made an honorary citizen of Bad Homburg, his hometown…
– Iron Cross of 1914, First and Second Class
– Pour le Mérite (September 21, 1916) with Oak Leaves (April 24, 1917)
– Order of the Red Eagle, Fourth Clasd
– Order of the Crown, Third Class (Prussia)
– Knight’s Cross of the Royal House Order of Hohenzollern with Swords
– Service Award (Prussia)
– Honor Cross, Second Class of the Princely House Order of Hohenzollern with Swords
– Knight’s Cross of the Military Order of Max Joseph (Bavaria)
– Military Merit Order, Third Class with Swords and Crown (Bavaria)
– Commander’s Cross, Second Class of the Military Order of St. Henry (Saxony)
– Knight’s Cross, Second Class of the Albert Order with Swords (Saxony)
– Commander of the Military Merit Order (Württemberg)
– Knight’s Cross of the Order of the Crown (Württemberg)
– Commander Second Class of the Order of the Zähringer Lion (Baden)
– Bravery Medal (Hesse)
– Military Merit Cross, Second Class (Mecklenburg-Schwerin)
– Knight’s Cross, First Class of the Order of Henry the Lion
– Knight’s Cross, First Class of the House and Merit Order of Peter Frederick Louis (Oldenburg)
– Commander of the Order of the White Falcon
– Hanseatic Cross of Bremen
– Commander, First Class of the Ducal Saxe-Ernestine House Order with Swords
– Cross for Merit in War (Saxe-Meiningen)