Railroads During Mobilization-4
During the wars of 1866 and 1870-71, railroads played a major role, carrying both men and supplies forward. Based upon this experience, Article 41 of the Imperial Constitution reserved rights to the army, when new railroad construction was planned, even by single states. A central railroad administration (Reichseisenbahnamt) made sure that railroad planning was carried out according to central goals. For example, during the late 1840s, the General Staff influenced the construction of the Minden-Cologne railroad (Cöln-Mindener Eisenbahn) to ensure fast mobilization in case of war with France.
After the Franco-Prussian War, it was comparatively easy for the General Staff to budget money for the further strategic build-up of the railroad network. With a changing strategic focus between the East and West and the rising threat of a two-front war, railroads became a force multiplier for the fast and easy transportation of huge military formations between both war theaters. Especially during the Schlieffen era, a rapid switching of forces across Germany was essential to fight the Russian enemy after achieving a victory in the West. To Clausewitz, the defensive is superior to the offensive and gives multiple advantages to the defender. One of them is the defense along so-called “interior lines,” (innere Linien) which means that a defender is able to shift and concentrate his forces faster and more efficiently than the attacker could do given his “exterior lines.” To Schlieffen, interior lines aided strategic planning in a two-front scenario. To finally succeed, the defender has to push for decision by fast and sudden counterattacks—the “flashing sword of revenge” (das blitzende Schwert der Vergeltung) as Clausewitz called it. Well-planned railroads provided essential support to such an operational doctrine.
Due to the booming German economy in the 1880s, a massive railroad build-up was needed to support the economy. In parallel, many mergers and acquisitions occurred, bringing together small and privately operated railroad companies with a few large state-owned companies. This centralization made it easier for the General Staff to plan new lines in close co-operation with the railroad companies and to introduce new processes and standards for military railroad operations. The railroad department of the General Staff, military railroad formations, and the civilian railroad administration liaised closely to ensure centralized planning. Before the war, the German railroad infrastructure comprised 57,000 km of full-gauge track (Vollbahn) and 11,000 km of narrow gauge and light rail track (Schmalspurbahn).
Eisenbahndirektionen made sure that these uniform processes and standards were followed throughout the Empire. In addition to the Eisenbahndirektionen, 26 military line commanders (Linienkommandanturen) were installed to make sure that railroad plans made by the General Staff were correctly implemented. A field grade officer with a railroad background—ideally a General Staff officer, who previously had served in the railroad department—commanded the Linienkommandantur. The second in charge was a senior civilian executive from the regional railroad authorities—ideally from the regional Eisenbahndirektion. The line commanders played a pivotal role in coordinating the mobilization preparations between the General Staff and the railroad authorities. A cornerstone of the plan was to annually review the military timetable (Militärfahrplan) that was to be used upon mobilization.
The Militärfahrplan was based on the standard military train with 110 axles and 600 tons capacity, made up of passenger cars and freight cars. The freight cars were used for the ordinary men or horses with up to 40 men or eight horses in one car. A certain number of freight cars were turned into flat bed cars by taking away the sidewalls and roofs for the transport of wagons. Standard military trains were usually pulled by a G3/BR 53 steam engine or one comparable. The trains traveled at a comparatively slow average speed of 30 kilometers per hour on major lines or 25 kilometers per hours on narrow gauge lines. This slow speed was chosen to create enough slack in case of technical problems or other delays. In the autumn of 1913, the railroad department started calculating a new Militärfahrplan, based upon an average speed of 40 kilometers an hour to speed up mobilization, but this was not ready for use during the mobilization in 1914.
On dual-tracked lines trains could be dispatched every 20 minutes, while on single-tracked lines, in order to allow for return journeys, the frequency was halved to one train every 40 minutes. Beginning in 1912, the Militärfahrplan also scheduled local trains for civilian traffic and to supply essential goods to civilians in urban areas during the mobilization and the initial deployment of the army (Militärlokalzüge). The Militärfahrplan distinguished between mobilization transports (Mobilmachungstransporte) and war transports (Kriegstransporte). The purpose of the mobilization transports was to bring all military formations and the fortresses up to war strength. The purpose of the war transports was the deployment of the operationally ready formations into their assembly areas as per the operations plan. To that end, hundreds of trains were dispatched down designated transportation lines into clearly defined assembly areas along the eastern and western borders. Mobilization transports, on the other hand, undertook many different roles with various loads and to different locations, sometimes crossing the transportation lines of the war transports.
Some of these transports formed the massive coal and tanker trains travelling from the Ruhr area and Upper Silesia to the ports of Kiel or Wilhelmshaven to supply coal and fuel oil to the Navy. Others were huge transports of reservists from populated areas of the empire, who were sent to Eastern Prussia; other trains were used to evacuate the civilian population from the border areas together with their cattle. They were also involved in the evacuation of precious horses from horse-breeding farms and military horse-breeding depots (e.g. Trakehnen) in Eastern Prussia, where they were in danger of being captured by Russian cavalry.
The mobilization transports started moving when imminent danger of war was announced on 31 July. Upon mobilization, a number of high priority early mobilization trains had to be scheduled to ship the 48, 50, 53, 64, and 3 Bavarian, 7 Bavarian, and 11 Bavarian Infantry Brigades into their assembly areas in the Reichslande. These brigades had the task of guarding the border against early French strikes. The 16th Infantry Division also had to be sent to the Luxembourg border, so as to be in position to occupy it and its train lines. A second wave of early mobilization transports shipped six reinforced infantry brigades (11, 14, 27, 34, 38, and 43 Brigades) to their assembly area west of Aachen for the planned coup-de-main against the fortress of Liège. This assault force was under the command of General Otto v. Emmich. All these formations were still at peacetime strength when shipped to their assembly areas. Mobilization had to be carried out during their border guard or during the assault on Liège.