This week Sabine’s battlefield guide Saturday RIR 235 trying to take Langemark part 4
On 24.10, several enemy infantry attacks were again repelled. Apart from that, there was no change whatsoever in the battle situation. Despite the lively enemy artillery fire on Poelkapelle. the field kitchens reached the village during the few breaks in the fire. Of course, there was no thought of any sort of order to fetch food. Since some of the troops had been living on rubs the previous days, two or three people from each group, sometimes more, hurried to the rear and took up position at the first best field kitchen. The position was therefore very vulnerable. It was fortunate that the enemy did not attack , because they had also suffered heavy losses, namely due to the German artillery fire that had begun to concentrate in the last few days. Our losses were lower on these days, so that at least an attempt could be made to finally ground the units. The dense fog, which in the early hours of the morning lays a veil over friend and foe, favoured this endeavour. the few remaining officers tried with all their might to restore order. They were excellently supported in this by individual young volunteers. On 25 October, Colonel von Wunsch took over the command of the regiment. On 26 October, the regiment suffered another heavy loss: the leader of Battalion II, Major Lehmann, was seriously wounded. He was replaced by Captain von Houwald. heavy enemy artillery fire was followed by several infantry attacks on this day, which were, however, repelled. the enemy was extraordinarily attentive and lively, and pushed on every man who appeared.
regiments 234,235 and 236 were now placed under the command of colonel Von Busse (later reserve infantry brigade 102) as ‘gruppe Poelkapelle’. In the period from 27 to 31 October no change occurred at the front of the regiment. Colonel von Wunsche fell ill. As a deputy commander had not yet been appointed, Major von Rosenthal took over command of the regiment’s battle groups. On the night of 1 November, the long-awaited order to relieve the regiment finally arrived. According to this order, the regiment was to be withdrawn to Westrozebeke the following night. The relief took place without any difficulties. The individual detached groups marched to Poelkapelle, where the battalions assembled. This time the enemy did not disturb the gathering in Poelkapelle with fire attacks. Under the command of the indefatigable Major Bredt, who in the meantime had taken over the regiment again, they then returned from Poelkapelle to Westrozebeke. On 2.11, the first day of rest after twelve days of continuous heavy fighting, a regimental roll call was held, at which a more precise overview of the losses was finally possible.
The officers present at this roll call were / Commander Bredt (wounded), the regimental adjutant Oberleutenant Schneider, Lieutenant Trappe, Lieutenant Wette, Captain von Houwald, Major von Rosenthal, Lieutenant Schanzleh, Lieutenant Teicke and, as rations officer, Lieutenant LiBinger. The strength of the fencing troops was still 60 to 75 men per company. Since the regiment had a combat strength of 900 men per battalion on 21.10, equal to 2700 men, the casualties from 21.10 to 1.11 were, according to preliminary findings, about 1900 men, with III Battalion suffering the most. The total loss of dead, wounded and sick thus amounted to about 70 percent.
these numbers speak a language more powerful than the depiction of the battles. Only those who fought in the front line during those October days and who were lucky enough to survive the events can fully appreciate the magnitude of what happened.
On the afternoon of 2.11, the first replacements arrived from Kassel under First Lieutenant Steinke, who replenished the companies to an average of 100-110 men. While Major Bredt was issuing the order for the most important training to take place in the next few days, the division order came for a general attack on the enemy positions in front of Poelkapelle. The regiment was to deploy at dawn between the left wing of the reserve infantry regiment 236 and the right wing of the 52 reserve division in the Wallemolen area. this meant that the respite was already over and the regiment’s leader looked forward to the planned attack with concern in view of his weakened battalions and the still war-unexperienced replacements.
Source :
Das Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 235 im Weltkriege Otto Hennig