THE AUFTRAGSTAKTIK PROBLEM
The years after 1871 were characterized by an intense discussion about two conflicting trends. The conventional tacticians or Normaltaktiker (spearheaded by General-Major v. Scherff and Colonel v. Boguslawski) were supporters of tight control, who wanted to specify battle actions down to the last detail. These conventional tacticians argued that detailed orders would counteract the dispersal effect brought about by the devastating impact of enemy fire and the supposed unrestrained independence at lower command levels. On the other side were the mission-type command supporters of Auftragstaktik, (spearheaded by Lieutenant General v. Schlichting), who urged the independence of small units. Schlichting stated that mission-type command was the necessary consequence of modern combat. The resulting ever-thinner firing lines made it difficult for company grade officers to tightly control their platoons and companies. The mission-command supporters did not want to issue detailed orders limiting the freedom of action of the lower leadership levels. Rather mission-type command supporters assigned each unit a clearly defined task—the mission. Although Auftragstaktik was incorporated into German military doctrine in the 1888 infantry manual, it still met resistance. Prior to the war in 1914, Auftragstaktik formed a permanent part of officer and General Staff training.
On lower command levels, Auftragstaktik proved to be an excellent tool that increased the combat the effectiveness of German formations during the war. Auftragstaktik helped by increasing flexibility and reactivity. Flexibility was of particular importance in combat situations in which higher command levels were frequently only partially informed about tactical developments and the enemy situation. Acting immediately to accomplish a mission usually proved to be more effective than waiting for further orders or information. On higher command levels, Auftragstaktik was also a perfect tool to increase combat effectiveness. In 1914, higher level command and control connections were poor and slow. The headquarters connecting the seven armies in the west had only a single Morse-type telegraph transmitter. Its range was limited to just 300 km under ideal weather conditions, and it required relay stations. As a result, transmission delays of up to 24 hours happened frequently. In addition, the radio signals coming from the Eiffel Tower usually drowned out the German messages, so that they were interrupted and required retransmission. Wire connections had only gone as far as the Luxembourg border by as late as 3 September. The two most important armies on the right wing had unreliable radio communications with each other; communication was only possible by making use of messengers and liaison officers. Their subordinate corps had no communication with the army headquarters. After the battle of Mons, First Army established communications with the subordinate corps by wire. Second Army established wire communication only after the battle of St Quentin. Cavalry divisions were equipped with two light and two heavy radio stations each, which were of very limited range. The radio stations were also quite unpopular among the cavalry commanders.
Schlieffen described the Supreme Commander as a kind of a modern Alexander (referring to the ancient Greek King, Alexander the Great) sitting in a comfortable chair in his headquarters, bent over a map following the operations of his armies and sending encouraging messages by telephone to his army commanders. The younger Moltke saw himself as the intellectual mastermind behind the beginning of operations, in that he had overhauled the Schlieffen doctrine during his term as a Chief of General Staff and adapted it to current operative and technical developments. Moltke was certainly personally brave, as he had shown as a young Fähnrich during the battle of Weissenburg on 4 August 1870, but he did not want to play the role of the heroic military leader. He wanted to convince by his sparkling intelligence rather than by determined military behavior. Groener, who was a confirmed Schlieffen follower, was heavily biased about Moltke as the responsible leader, who had, in his opinion, gambled away the sure recipe of victory by watering down the Schlieffen plan. Groener called Moltke a reluctant commander in his book written in 1931 and accused Moltke of softness, weakness, and the lack of guts to guide his army commanders and to keep them on the track of victory.
In peacetime, Moltke had the reputation of being a highly intellectual analyst with a very courteous, and friendly attitude towards his fellow commanders and other officers. In the 1920s and 1930s, there were additional criticisms raised about Moltke, saying he was under the influence of his wife Eliza Gräfin v. Moltke-Huitfeld and of the anthroposophist Rudolf Steiner. He was denounced for spiritualism and occultism. The head of the Military Cabinet, Graf v. Hülsen-Haeseler, had called him a religious dreamer. “Luckily” Moltke died from a stroke in June 1916 and because he could no longer defend himself, he became the ideal scapegoat for the 1914 disaster. Due to the way he was appointed as Schlieffen’s successor in 1905, Moltke always felt that he was a kind of a compromise between all involved stakeholders, a less-than-ideal solution. This was a view shared by many among the top ranks of the army
An in-depth analysis of the 1914 Battle of the Marne is beyond the scope of this book, so no more will be said about the younger Moltke’s military career. It is, however, important to understand that Moltke tried to avoid direct personal confrontation. He was not a tough and resolute military leader who rolled over any kind of resistance and countervailing opinions like a steamroller—a leader who would sell his soldiers’ lives by the millions to achieve final victory. If Moltke wanted to be successful in 1914, he needed one of two things: either a permanently available direct communication channel with his army commanders to discuss changes in the operational situation and to pass on his ideas and directives, or Army Groups (Heeresgruppen) and army group commanders positioned between him and his army commanders to translate the directives of the OHL into orders and clear, explicit guidance. Army groups could have been geographically closer to the army commands. These group HQs should have been located halfway between OHL in Koblenz or Luxembourg and the army commands. The shortened distance would have helped bridge the communications gaps exposed by poor radio or telegraph communications. The distances between headquarters were certainly a problem that had never occurred during peacetime maneuvers. During maneuvers the civilian telephone net had always been available for military communication. Furthermore, vigorous army group commanders could have provided robust leadership, influencing the actions of the army commanders in ways that Moltke was reluctant to pursue. Unfortunately, neither of these two options was available in 1914.