Aleksander’s Book Corner
The Battle of the Frontiers – A series of German victories due to the French soldiers red trousers and easily repelled bayonet attacks?
In spite of the image of dash and élan the French proved themselves quite capable of fighting defensively and using the terrain to conceal themselves. When French infantry and cavalry were engaging in a firefight or waiting in an ambush laying down in the prone position or from behind cover, the red trousers was not a factor at all. In addition to the m/1912 kepi cover, the French infantrymen would leave the skirts of the greatcoat unbuttoned to reduce the visibility of the red trousers. The phrase “The enemy couldn’t be seen” is noted several times in German regimental histories during the opening battles with the French.
Lieutenant- Colonel Ernst Lettenmayer, commander of the 2nd Bavarian Jäger Battalion at Lagarde on August 11 1914 noted: “The French must be credited with mastering the use of the terrain. Even with the best telescope it was difficult to recognize their positions. The French preferred to use houses for defense and well positioned trenches and camouflaged walls. Machine Guns were positioned in the church tower but we did not see them, we had not expected such a devious trick. Unfortunately, these machine guns caused many casualties, especially in the 4th company, including the company commander.”
This is an account by K. B. 1. Schwere Reiter-Regiment as they crossed the French border into Alsace-Lorraine and faced French cavalry on August 6th 1914.
“…I struck gallop and suddenly found myself facing two enemy cuirassier squadrons, one on horseback, the other dismounted with their carbines ready. They shouted something to me. I turned about rapidly and suddenly hell broke loose from all sides. It was a strange feeling, offering such a big target, all the way back. The bullets whistled past my ears and eyes with a hair’s breadth. Every hedge, every cornfield came to life, I saw flashes of red trousers and tumbling riders everywhere. The French had lured us into a trap.
To the left off the road I saw Lieutenant Colonel Count von Spreti riding and in the strongest fire riderless horses and troopers stumbling across the fields with their lances. We covered about 1000 meters while being fired upon from all sides, before we finally rallied behind a hop orchard south of the town.”
The 88 I.R. wrote of their experiences while engaging the French at Bertrix, August 22 1914.
“The riflemen entrench themselves. The distant rumbling on the right becomes stronger and stronger, and gunfire can now also be heard from the left. Everyone waits for the French attack, but no enemy appears.”
As time went on and it became evident that the French were not going to launch any attacks, the German officers decide that they would have to take the initiative. As the infantry moved forward they were greeted by furious fire.
“Incessantly the French shrapnel and shells are shrieking, drowning out everything else. There is no sign of the enemy. To the right of the 5th Company, the 8th has collided with the enemy in the woods. From individual wounded coming back, we hear that the 5th Company has lost almost all officers.”
In an attempt to recapture some guns the French soldiers managed to work their way undetected quite closely towards the German riflemen, who were saved by the alertness of their machine-gunners.
“The German machine-gunners, however, see their bayonets protruding above the still young trees. If the machine-gun platoon had not come to this place by chance, the enemy division would have been in the rear of the German riflemen… As the machine-gun platoon continues to advance, the machine-gunners see the horrific effect of their fire.”
Time and again the German forces are taking the initiative and making costly offensive maneuvers against French soldiers in defensive positions.
“Bugles are signaling for the Germans to attack! A wild assault commences as our forces are being torn apart by French infantry and artillery fire but continue to advance! Then in many places follows a hard, fierce struggle for the French guns, in which the Germans remained victors everywhere.”
Lieutenant Lorenz of Braunschweigische Husaren-Regiment Nr. 17 account of the fighting against French forces near Sambre, August 22 1914:
“The edge of the forest lies under heavy enemy fire and the machine gun operators are already operating severely reduced in size among the dead and wounded…The road there is steeply sloped. On the slopes to its right and left it is still teeming with scattered enemy infantrymen. Every now and then a wave of gunfire whizzes through the terrain from some direction”
I.R. 92 fought nearby on August 22 1914:
“The vanguard under Sergeant Pramme had crossed the fork of the village road behind the church by about 60m and was heading for the southeast exit of the village when they suddenly saw figures emerging from the darkness in front of them. Captain von Suckow called out, ‘Halt, who goes there?’ – ‘Qui vive?’ it answered back from the dark, and at the same moment volley fire pelted the vanguard.
It became the signal to fire on the marching troops for the French soldiers who were hiding in the houses and numerous villagers who took part in it… the vanguard suffered heavy casualties from the gunfire and had to retreat to the vicinity of the church… It was an indescribably agonizing feeling to be defenselessly exposed to enemy fire.”
On August 21 1914 soldiers of Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr.1 approached the Sambre. Again, they faced difficulties in locating the French soldiers facing them. Which led to a great deal of uncertainty whether or not they should advance, as they could not determine their opponents strength.
“General Ludendorff had joined the divisional staff east of Belaine, and they observed the events eagerly through their binoculars. The enemy couldn’t be seen. Our cavalry had reported being fired upon when approaching the Sambre. For the time being it was difficult to estimate the strength of the enemy forces.”
Ludendorff settled the matter and ordered an attack, the day before they were ordered to do so. To seize what he saw as an opportunity to defeat a, possibly, weaker enemy before they received further reinforcements.
“Under furious enemy artillery fire the Augustaners charged down the steep slopes…The crossings were seized after facing the fiercest resistance from enemy companies. Upon entering Auvelais the regiment was engaged in house to house fighting.”
The German officers had to deviate from the plans to seize opportunities throughout the bitter fighting that day:
“at Fosse 2 and on the road the enemy forces firmly held their positions. If they received reinforcements and launched an attack the situation could rapidly become very uncomfortable for us. The officers therefore ordered an immediate attack to take over the factory and coal dumps of Fosse 2. This was not what the Brigade Commander had intended, but the decision proved to be of vital importance.”
“at Fosse 2 and on the road the enemy forces firmly held their positions. If they received reinforcements and launched an attack the situation could rapidly become very uncomfortable for us. The officers therefore ordered an immediate attack to take over the factory and coal dumps of Fosse 2. This was not what the Brigade Commander had intended, but the decision proved to be of vital importance.”
At last:
“The French forces were falling back and disappeared into the darkness that now descended upon the area. However, the casualties of both regiments were heavy and, when the fighting ended at about 10 o’clock at night, the Franzers and Augustaners sank to the ground in exhaustion.”
Conclusion
The German forces did not prevail easily against an antiquated army charging blindly against machine-gun fire. The French forces put up fierce resistance and proved far more cautious and willing to fight defensively than has been portrayed in most of post-war literature.
In fact, French officers proved to be overly cautious and lacking in confidence of the operations. What is evident is that German officers had inherited the fine legacy in the Prussian military tradition of seizing opportunities through intuition and coup d’oeil. French officers in August 1914 were characterized by far more uncertainty in their decision-making, and thus their soldiers remained in much more static positions that could be outflanked by a more daring opponent.
The German forces were led by officers who were far more willing to take risks and use initiative. Furthermore, their troops displayed far more offensive spirit, bravery, and a willingness to endure costly attacks out in the open more so than their adversaries famed for the “offensive spirit”. The German victories should be attributed to these factors, not simplified tales of easy victories due to red trousers or foolhardy French élan.
Sources:
– Das K. B. 1. Schwere Reiter-Regiment Prinz Karl von Bayern im Weltkriege 1914 – 1918.
– Article in “Sonderausgabe der Aschaffenburger Zeitung”, by Lieutenant- Colonel Ernst Lettenmayer, commander of the 2nd Bavarian Jäger Battalion.
– Das Königl. Preuß. 2. Nassauische Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 88. Tat im Weltkrieg 1914/18, Band 7, 1936.
– Die Braunschweiger Husaren im Weltkriege 1914-1918. Hier Band 1. 1914 – 1915.
– Geschichte des Braunschweigschen Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 92 im Weltkriege 1914 – 1918.
– Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914 – 1918.
Photo: French soldiers at the marketplace at Ypres – December 1914. Colour by Malczewski Colorization.