Here as in all the German colonies, the defenders were out-numbered and out-equipped by their invaders. But of all the African colonies, German South West Africa (modern Namibia) had the most regular German soldiers in arms and all were mounted (approximately Schutztruppe 90 officers and 1,800 other ranks with police and reservists to more than double that number), the most modern rifles (all were equipped with the Gew98) and the most machine guns and artillery available to them. As such, one would expect that it was the colony best able to defend itself. This however proved not to be the case for a number of reasons.
One reason for that was the dire state of relations between Germans and Africans in the colony. The mistrust on both sides caused by the Herero and Nama Rebellions and the following genocide a decade earlier had not healed. Unlike in other colonies, the Schutztruppe could not rely on locally recruited soldiers to fight on their side. The few small units of African soldiers recruited in wartime mutinied without seeing action and were disbanded. This antipathy between the colonisers and the colonised also meant that the African population were more likely to break out in rebellion or assist the invaders as scouts and informants rather than show loyalty to the Germans.
Probably the biggest reason however was the terrain. South West Africa is mostly desert and scrubland. There is not much place to hide and not much edible vegetation or wildlife. Moving columns of soldiers could be spotted miles away from the cloud of dust especially by enemy aircraft of which several were employed in the campaign. There is also a shortage of water in Namibia, rivers run dry and waterholes are few and far between. This meant that an army could not forage off the land and be mobile for long periods. Conversely in East Africa and Cameroon, the Germans did forage off the land and the allies often lost track of German movements in large forested areas.
The forest canopy also meant that the SMS Königsberg could seek refuge in the Rufiji Delta in East Africa and her guns and crew eventually joined the Schutztruppe on land. In South West Africa, there was no forest canopy and also no navigable rivers for a warship to sail up. The gunboat SMS Eber then left South West Africa on the outbreak of war and sought refuge in Brazil.
Strategically as well, there was little purpose for the fighting. After the fall of Kamina radio station in Togo in August 1914, South West Africa lost contact with Germany. Her main radio station at Windhoek was therefore no longer of strategic value alone so unlike in Togo and New Guinea it was not a point of defence. German communities had built up farms and towns, especially in Windhoek and Swakopmund. With the assumption that Germany would quickly win the war in Europe and everything would then be returned to normal in the following peace treaty, there was no desire to fight over and possibly destroy their assets.
A further thought is that the Schutztruppe in Cameroon and East Africa both escaped allied capture by entering other colonies. In the case of Cameroon by entering Spanish territory and being peacefully interned there, in the case of East Africa by invading Portuguese territory which by that time in 1917 was already at war with Germany.
South West Africa was different. It was bordered by British Empire and Dominion territories except to the north with Portuguese Angola. In 1914, as the British Royal Navy blockaded German ports along the coast, the Schutztruppe came up with the idea of attacking Naulila in then neutral Portuguese territory to possibly get supplies landed that way. The attack was militarily a success but diplomatically a failure in that the Schutztruppe had lost any hope of a friendly safe haven if they needed it later.
Aside from that, the war began relatively well for German South West Africa. Their commander, Joachim von Heydebreck’s plan was to base his main force in the south and use the mobility and firepower of the mounted Schutztruppe to oppose enemy invasions where and when they occurred.
In September 1914, a British and South African force did invade from the south and were soon surrounded and forced to surrender at the Battle of Sandfontein. The Schutztruppe had successfully used their mobility to bring machine guns and artillery to bear on their enemy from all sides.
A Boer rebellion had also broken out in South Africa itself, so plans to invade the German colony would have to be shelved for the moment.
The following year, after having dealt with their homeland revolt, the South Africans were back in strength with a change of leadership. The new commander was a former Boer General (and later South African Prime Minister) Jan Smuts. He was an experienced and formidable commander.
The Schutztruppe also meanwhile had a change of leadership. Heydebreck had been killed in an accident with a rifle grenade and was replaced by Victor Franke, himself also an experienced commander dubbed the ‘Hero of Omaruru’ for his action in 1904. As Heydebreck had done, Franke kept most of his force in the south of the colony waiting to respond to the South African attack when it came.
While it was possible for Heydebreck to surround a single invasion force at Sandfontein, in 1915 the South Africans invaded with larger forces in a three pronged attack, on land from the south and south east and from sea capturing the port of Lüderitz. Franke couldn’t split his forces and manage to surround and out gun all three of the enemy’s columns. If he faced one or two, the other would cut off his retreat.
And so he avoided such a fate temporarily and retreated north towards Windhoek destroying the railway as he went. While both armies were often mounted on horseback, the South Africans also had a large number of motorised vehicles (so were less reliant on the railway) and as mentioned earlier also had air reconnaissance on their side. The Germans did fly a pair of aircraft for a time too but they were of less use defensively reconnoitring than those of the South Africans were offensively.
On 12 May, the capital Windhoek predictably fell without resistance (as did all German colonial capitals with the exception of Tsingtao). The main German force had not been outflanked however until another South African force under Louis Botha advanced from Swakopmund to Franke’s west. To his south was Smuts, to the north and east only desert and more potential enemies. The Schutztruppe knew they couldn’t forage or find water there.
The Schutztruppe did fight some defensive actions towards the end (notably at Otavifontein on 1 July and Ghaub on 4 July) though they were always forced the retreat, being out flanked and running short of water.
Botha then sent a force each to encircle Franke’s east and north. Although the total number of South African soldiers now in the colony vastly out numbered the Schutztruppe (and Franke knew that) the number actually surrounding the Schutztruppe at that moment was actually similar to or smaller than their own (though Franke didn’t know that). All Franke saw was that he was surrounded, out of retreating space and could only fight a pointless heroic last stand or surrender.
On 9 July 1915 near Khorab, the surrender was signed by Botha, Franke and the German Governor Theodor Seitz. The South Africans under Smuts and Botha had simply out manoeuvred Franke and the Schutztruppe forcing their surrender with minimal casualties. In total during the campaign, the South Africans had lost around 250 dead and the Germans just over 100. By comparison, the German East African campaign had tens of thousands of military casualties on either side.
Since then Franke has come in for some criticism about his conduct of the campaign, his indecisiveness and failure to put up a rigorous defence of the colony. The suggestion has been made that Heydebreck would have done a better job if he had not died. Some felt the Schutztruppe should have defended Germany’s honour with a last stand battle, they certainly had the military ability to do so if not the will.
Personally, I think criticism of Franke is unworthy and I can’t honestly see how any better outcome could have been achieved even with greater loss of life. It was true that other colonies had fought on after being surrounded but the end result was the same for all of them. I’d be curious to hear other people’s opinions on what could have been done better?