During the opening weeks of the war soldiers on all sides noted how empty the battlefields were. The Germans came up with a term to describe this; ‘die Leere des Gefechtsfeldes’. Meaning ‘the emptiness of the battlefield’. In August 1914 soldiers would in between short, rapid rushes immediately lay down on the ground, taking cover as best as they could to avoid being a visible target. The effectiveness of modern rifles, machine-guns and artillery was understood after observations made during the Sino-Japanese War, the Boer War and the Balkans Wars.
An English soldiers description of his pre-war training with the French army in the book ‘The French Army from Within (1914)’:
“As an infantryman, his business is to entrench himself when ordered to do so; to advance by short rushes, squad alternating with squad, during the work of getting nearer to the enemy; to charge if bidden, or to retreat as he advanced, in the way that would produce least damage to the force of which he is a member if that force was exposed to actual fire.”
An Officer’s Manual for the British army details the intended way for infantry to advance:
“Owing to the effect of the enemy’s fire onward movement can rarely be continuous, and when effective ranges are reached there must usually be a fire-fight, more or less prolonged according to circumstances, in order to beat down the fire of the defenders. The length of rushes must depend upon the ground, the enemy’s fire, and the physical condition of the troops.”
German infantry training manual, 1908:
“Lines of skirmishers on the move in the open will suffer severely from the fire of unshaken infantry at medium and even long ranges. Their losses will increase with the density of the skirmishing lines. Long and uninterrupted advances of dense skirmish lines are therefore impossible under effective hostile fire at short and medium ranges. A further advance can consequently only be effected by working forward gradually, supported by fire from alternate flanks.”
In the book ‘In the Fire of the Furnace’, a French Lieutenant describes the first attack by a French unit near Mangiennes:
“Once having left the wood, we reached the little hill-top. In spite of having been told that the modern battlefield is empty, I had never imagined anything so desert-like as this. Not a man to be seen in these fields which sloped gently downwards: it was abandoned territory. Down below us, yonder, there rose a puff of smoke, then another nearer; a third; all in a line. They might have been bonfires lit by an invisible hand.”
Marcel Dupoint, a French captain of the Chasseurs à cheval witnessing his first battle in August 1914:
“Getting past the ridge I understood what I had seen was only the background of the battle. Violent rifle fire was heard in every direction. In the meadows a large number of infantry sections were crouching behind every available bit of cover.’
Walter Bloem, a Captain of the 12th Grenadier Regiment, describes the advance towrards the British during the Battle of Mons August 23 1914:
“And so we went on, gradually working forwards by rushes of a hundred, later fifty and then about thirty yards towards the invisible enemy…
Where was the rest of the battalion? Nothing to be seen of them. Yes, there… a hundred yards to our left a section of Grenadiers was working forwards like us by short rushes. I looked again all round. The enemy was still invisible. “
Lieutenant Lorenz of Braunschweigische Husaren-Regiment Nr. 17 account of the fighting against French forces near Sambre, August 22 1914:
“The edge of the forest lies under heavy enemy fire and the machine gun operators are already operating severely reduced in size among the dead and wounded…The road there is steeply sloped. On the slopes to its right and left it is still teeming with scattered enemy infantrymen. Every now and then a wave of gunfire whizzes through the terrain from some direction”
The cavalry understood that the era of mounted combat for the most part was over. As stated in the preface of the regimental diary of Ulanen-Regiment König Wilhelm I. (2. Württembergisches) Nr. 20.: “The infantry bears the brunt of the battle, therefore it deserves the greatest glory, as stated in the field service regulations.”
However, the cavalry proved useful on a number of occasions by their rapid mobility and proficiency with their carbines. In August 1914 troopers of Bavarian Schwere Reiter Regiment 1 (1st Heavy Cavalry Regiment) were tasked with halting French troops approaching from Merville.
“Once in its new position, 4th Squadron received orders to link up with a company of Bavarian Reserve Jaeger Battalion on its right and Schwere Reiter Regiment on its left and to hold the new position at all costs.
The enemy, however, did not allow us sufficient time to provide cover from fire for the troopers. The move was directed at about 10 am and, only a short time after we reached the new position, enemy infantry detachments began bearing down on us from the direction of Merville, moving in tactical bounds and brilliantly supported by their field artillery.
Shortly afterwards, rifle and machine gun fire was opened from the northwest. This had a very damaging enfilade effect on our troopers deployed to counter the threat from Merville. Despite everything, the courageous troopers of 4th Squadron exercised excellent fire discipline and made sure that every round found a worthwhile target.”