The Reverse Side of Auftragstaktik part 2.
Kluck opposed Bülow’s control from the start of the operations, seeing himself in competition with Bülow, and developing his own interpretation of the mission assigned to him. For his part, at first, Bülow did not execute control over the First Army too tightly. Bülow never ordered Kluck to obey him, he never entered into a head-on confrontation with Kluck; Bülow always just asked for support and tried to align the operations of First and Second Army in accordance with the directives set by the OHL. There was considerable friction between the chiefs of staff of the two armies. Kuhl in his post war writing blamed the second army chief of staff for many of the bad decisions that got made. The OHL only discovered where operational objectives were in conflict when it received the separate evening reports of the armies. When the Battle of Mons started, Kluck officially asked for the first time to be released from Bülow’s control. The Battle of Mons of the First Army against the British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) and the parallel Battle of Namur of the Second Army against the French Fifth Army revealed for the first time that Kluck and Bülow were aiming at competing targets. Bülow wanted the First Army acting as a flank guard, while he enveloped the French Fifth Army from the West. This plan would complete the envelopment started by Second and Third Army. Kluck instead intended to attack the BEF with all available power.
Kluck’s plan was not a refusal to obey orders, but it was certainly an over-interpretation of the freedom of decision given to him. Mission-type leadership could only work if the superior commander organized logical command structures and reporting lines, together with clear missions and goals. The subordinate leader could then act clearly and without ambiguity within the given intentions of the superior leader. The result of the diverging operations of First and Second Army led to suboptimal results: although the BEF and the French Fifth Army had been beaten, both formations managed to escape without being caught in envelopment and without being pursued. Moltke should have drawn the correct conclusion from this, and he should have taken steps to make sure that Kluck accomplished the missions assigned to him.
This is not an attempt to picture Kluck as a kind of pariah in the west. When starting an offensive, a determined and resolute commander like Kluck was certainly important to push forward the offensive with the necessary aggression. We should never forget that the First Army between Mons and the Marne produced a marching performance that was beyond anything seen previously in military history. Only the mechanized operations of the Second World War led to faster movements covering longer distances. A commander like Kluck required a strong hand to channel his energy to the correct target. Certainly, Kluck was one of the best German army commanders in 1914. His Chief of Staff, Kuhl, was one of the masterminds among the higher general staff officers. However, Moltke gave Kluck too much leeway and let him and the First Army slip out of control.
The next incident to be examined came on 2 September. The OHL issued a directive imposing a clear directional change for the armies of the right wing. Instead of marching on in a southwesterly direction and wheeling around west of Paris, Moltke now directed the armies south, passing to the east of Paris. Consequently, the OHL assigned to the First Army the task of guarding the right flank of the advancing right wing and following the Second Army in echelon. This directive was a reaction by the OHL to the assembly of French forces in and around Paris. OHL also reinforced the directive issued on 27 August.
This directive of 2 September found Kluck in a difficult situation: he was already about one day’s march ahead of the Second Army and pushing into the flank of the enemy in front of the Second Army. The directive required him to halt his army for two days—one day to allow Bülow to catch up and another day to be overtaken by Bülow. For an aggressive commander like Kluck, a two-day pause was out of the question, particularly because it meant that his rival Bülow would then be in advance of his army. Even more problematic for him, however, was the mission to regroup the First Army to act as a flank guard oriented toward Paris.
Kluck and Kuhl decided to make use of the ambiguity of the directive and to deceive the OHL. Kluck decided that the First Army would only leave the comparatively weak IV Reserve Corps as flank guard to protect against the French Sixth Army assembling east of Paris. As far as the rest of the directive was concerned, Kluck decided to focus upon the mission to squeeze off the Allied forces in front of First and Second Armies. According to his interpretation, only the First Army could accomplish this mission because it was already clearly ahead of the Second Army and in the flank of the enemy forces. This interpretation was not only sophism, but also came close to rank disobedience. Kluck did not discuss his decision with the OHL; he only informed Moltke by transmitting his orders and goals for First Army on 4 September and not until then could Moltke see that he was not following his directive.
This reaction of the First Army led to a dispute between the department heads of the OHL and Moltke. Tappen called Kluck’s response to the directive of the OHL an act of disobedience and urged Moltke to consider a dismissal. Moltke refused, referring to the doctrine of Auftragstaktik. Instead, the OHL would make the operational goals for the continuation of the advance so crystal clear that Kluck would be left no room for maneuver; he would be forced to follow Moltke`s intentions.
To be continued……