On the morning of the 18th October, a 90-man strong cyclist detachment of the 46 res division, accompanied by a 3-man strong cavalry patrol, had advanced in the direction of Westrozebeke, far to the enemy’s rear. The British ambushed the cyclists, shot down most of them and captured a few. the regimental numbers of the prisoners and the documents and papers found gave general French the first reliable information about the new German army corps, which had marched in its entirety as 4 army on to the Flanders front. this realization threw all the English general’s plans out of kilter. French was deprived of the possibility of free decision-making. the march of the 4th army, which remained completely secret until 18 October, dictated his action.
on 18 October, the entire army corps of the 4th army came into contact with the enemy’s vanguard. only on the right wing of the III res corps did the battle begin that day. October 19th had brought the enemy main forces closer together. For 20 October, general French had ordered the main attack, which was to initiate the decision on the western front. The realization that he was facing a strong new German army led him to insist on defense. The strategic situation had completely changed. the encircling battle intended by both armies turned into a frontal attack led by us. the enemy had found time to prepare for the greatest possible defense in the canal position, had drawn on all available troops and had closed the ranks as tightly as possible.
the impetuous attack on the right wing of the 4 army forced the king of the Belgians to draw the Belgian divisions closer together to the left. originally, the 5 Belgian division stood in the Diksmuide – Drie Grachten section and held the front, which was naturally bent back at this point due to lake Blanckaert. In front of ‘Drie Grachten’, this division had set up a formation near Luigem ( a small hamlet) which kept in touch with the Houthulst forest and the cavalry corps standing there. to the right of the 5 and thus on the right wing of the Belgian army stood the 6 division, holding the Merkem – Bikschote – Boezinge section and supported by the cavalry corps and the 87 reserve division.( French).
on 21 October the English general Haig attacked ruthlessly from Langemark, but found himself threatened by the unstoppable advance of the XXIII res. corps on the left flank. The French and Belgian cavalry rushed back across the canal, and the French territorial divisions were also driven back out of Bikschote to the canal position. Haig bent his left wing as a defensive hare back to the bridgehead of Steenstraete.
Note on Drie Grachten : From 10 October 1914 onwards, the Belgian engineers set up a defensive position here to prevent the Germans from taking the strategically important bridge on the “Three Canals”. To make sure that the bridge would not fall into German hands, they blow it up on 15 October together with the nearby “Cayennemolen” and the “Knokkebrug”. On 21 October 1914, the hamlet “Luigem” east of the hamlet “Drie Grachten” is taken by the Germans and developed into an important position.
sources : https://inventaris.onroerenderfgoed.be
Geschichte des Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 212 im Weltkriege 1914 – 1918 by Makoben, Ernst
Images : Bikschote, list of a few casualties RIR212, Maertje vaart Merkem, 2 maps area Merkem – Bikschote