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Timeline

The following timeline is not a comprehensive listing of all the events during the opening campaign of 1914, nor during the Battle at the Marne. Instead it lists those events that contributed to command deficiencies and the misapplication of Auftragstaktik.

2 August—First day of mobilization. Army Commanders received their deployment orders and were called to the Chief of the Great General Staff in Berlin to discuss their missions and initial operational objectives together with the strategic and operational intention of the OHL. First Army (v. Kluck) was put under the control of the Second Army (v. Bülow). Seventh Army (v. Heeringen) was put under the control of the Sixth Army (Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht).

2 August—The mission for the First Army given in the deployment order was as follows:

The German deployment against France is based upon the following intention: The bulk of the German armies shall move through Belgium and Luxembourg into France. If the information about French deployment is correct, the advance has to be carried out by swinging the entire right wing around the pivot point Metz-Thionville. The movement of the army shall be led and determined by the right wing. The movements of the inner armies shall be directed to always keep in touch with the pivot point Metz-Thionville. The commencement of the advance of the bulk of the army shall be ordered by OHL as soon as the right wing armies (First and Second) have completed their deployment around Liège.[1]

3 August—Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) formed in Berlin.

4 August—Start of the coup de main on Liége. Although the Germans took the city of Liège on 7 August, the coup de main on the fortification belt (Liége had 12 forts) failed at the first attempt.[2]

6 August—General Krafft von Dellmensingen, Chief of General Staff Sixth Army, explained his interpretation of the deployment order and the briefing given by Moltke in an aide mémoire reflecting the operational plan of the Sixth Army for the opening moves of the Battle in the Reichslande. Moltke endorsed the aide mémoire. The general outline of this aide mémoire was as follows:[3]

• An offensive by the bulk of the French army was expected in Lorraine.
• Sixth and Seventh Armies—called group in the Reichslande (Gruppe in den Reichslanden) by Dellmensingen—delay the French offensive and shield the left flank of the German forces in the west until the goal of French operations finally becomes clear.
• Surprise breakthrough of French forces at the link between the Sixth and Seventh Armies must be prevented at all costs.
• Counterattack as soon as all troops of the Sixth and Seventh Armies are deployed and operationally ready.

7 August—Landing of the BEF starts in complete secrecy. The Germans receive first vague information about the BEF on 20 August.

8 August—Ft. Barchon was the first fort at Liége to surrender after being pounded by 21 cm heavy howitzers (mortars).

7-8 August—Beginning of the Battle of Mulhouse: in Southern Alsace, the French VII Corps took Mulhouse in a surprising attack on 8 August. Seventh Army asked OHL to endorse a counterattack with two army corps. After endorsement by OHL, Seventh Army informed Sixth Army that XIV and XV Army Corps would counter-attack Mulhouse. Sixth Army command was displeased about this bypassing of its control function. In the Sixth Army staff, the operation was called the Mulhouse “sidestep”.[4]

9-10 August—Counterattack of Seventh Army on Mulhouse using XIV and XV Army Corps. Although Mulhouse was successfully taken back, and the first victory over French forces could be announced, the price was high: XV Army Corps was more than 100 km south of its original deployment area around Straßburg, jeopardizing the connection between the Sixth and Seventh Armies. XIV and XV Army Corps had fought their first battle day and had completely used up their stocks of artillery ammunition. The battle of Mulhouse jeopardized the entire operations plan of the Sixth and Seventh Armies for the coming battle in Lorraine.

10 August—OHL tried to bring operations back in line with the following directive: “His Majesty has ordered: Sixth and Seventh Armies, together with HKK 3 are to operate from now on under the command of the Sixth Army.” This directive reinforces the directive given in the deployment order in which the Seventh Army was put under the control of the Sixth Army.

11 August—Sixth Army sent the Ib officer, Major v. Xylander, to Seventh Army headquarters in Straßburg to again convey Dellmensingen’s aide mémoire and to outline future cooperation. Dellmensingen expected Seventh Army to join the operations in Lorraine by 15 or 16 August at the latest. Seventh Army requested a couple of days more to rearrange its formations after the Battle of Mulhouse.

11 August—Ft. Evegnée (Liége) was taken after being pounded by heavy artillery.

12 August—The remaining forts of Liège were pounded with super heavy artillery (30.5 and 42 cm) to force them to surrender. First the forts north of Liège had to be taken to allow First and Second Army to deploy their troops forward through the Liége bottleneck before the advance on the right wing began. The forces assigned to carry out the attack on Liège, which had been fielded in peacetime strength (static) had to complete their mobilization and the absorption of reserve personnel during the fights around Liège.[5]

14 August—Start of the offensive of the French First and Second Army in Lorraine towards Saarburg and Saarbrücken.

14 August—After a surprise French attack west of Straßburg, Seventh Army cooperated only reluctantly with Sixth Army. Sixth Army informed OHL about the difficulties of obtaining compliance from Seventh Army.

16 August—The last two forts of Liège, Hollogne, and Flemalle surrendered. Due to heavy losses, the French offensive in Lorraine slowed down. Dissent between Sixth Army and OHL began to have repercussions. OHL wanted Sixth Army to continue with delay operations and to lure French forces deeper into Lorraine. Sixth Army was disinclined to continue the fighting withdrawal towards the river Saar. Dellmensingen and the Bavarian Crown Prince wanted to attack the advancing French forces in Lorraine with the help of the Seventh Army.

16-17 August—OHL moved from Berlin to Koblenz and took quarters in the palace of the former Electors of Trier (Kurfürsten von Trier) after the final capture of Liège and before the launch of the advance on the right wing. The OHL left Berlin by train at 7:55 a.m. on 16 August and arrived in Koblenz on 17 August in the early morning.

17 August—First and Second Armies completed deployment in Belgium along the following line: Hasselt–St Trond–positions west of Liège–Huy–Durbuy and were ready to advance. OHL informed the other armies in the west that the advance of the right wing would begin on 18 August and OHL then subordinated First Army to Second Army.

17 August— Commander Sixth Army (now called Supreme Commander in the Reichslande–Oberbefehlshaber in den Reichslanden) ordered Seventh Army to join a combined offensive against the French forces in Lorraine on 19 August. This order was conveyed again by messenger; Major v. Xylander acting as a kind of liaison officer from Sixth Army to Seventh Army.

17 August—OHL sent Lieutenant Colonel v. Dommes, the head of the political department, to the headquarters of the Sixth Army in St Avold. He was there to convey and explain the intent of the OHL for the operations in the Reichslande. Moltke intended that the Sixth and Seventh Army continue delaying actions and conduct a fighting withdrawal behind the river Saar. This action would expose the French to a flanking offensive and threaten to trap them in a pocket in Lorraine. Dommes discussed these issues directly with the Bavarian Crown Prince, but since he had neither a written directive by Moltke nor a map showing this operational plan, the Bavarian Crown Prince sent him back with the message, “The OHL might either give me the necessary freedom or direct me step-by-step.” Dommes’ recollection of the meeting was different; he believed that Sixth Army would do its best to continue delaying actions.

18 August—Start of the advance of First and Second Armies on the right wing.

19 August—Start of the Battle in Lorraine.

19 August—Belgian forces started to withdraw towards Antwerp. First Army headquarters moved from Grevenbroich in Germany to Louvain in Belgium. Second Army headquarters moved from Monschau in Germany to Jodoigne (about 20 kilometers southeast of Louvain) in Belgium. Second and Third Armies prepared for an attack on the fortress of Namur.

20 August—Information arrived at OHL based on articles in The Times that the BEF had already landed in French ports (true) and were deploying around Lille (false). Start of the combined offensive of Sixth and Seventh Army in Lorraine. After losing the Battle of Gumbinnen, Generaloberst v. Prittwitz ordered withdrawal of the Eight Army behind the river Vistula and was ready to sacrifice East Prussia to the Russians. Moltke ordered HKK 1 to move to the right of Second Army changing his original plan significantly.

20-25 August—Siege and conquest of Namur. After the bad experience at Liège, Namur was systematically pounded by heavy and super-heavy artillery from the beginning.

21 August—Information received by OHL that the BEF was about to land in Northern France but that significant landing of troops had not happened yet. In fact this was incorrect. The British I and II Corps were in their concentration areas, east of Bohain and Landrecies respectively, by 20 August. Despite any uncertainty, First Army expected to meet British forces within the next several days. Second Army changed operational goals for the First Army from a western direction to a southbound direction.

21 August—French forces in Lorraine started a withdrawal behind their fortification line.

22 August—Prittwitz was dismissed from command of the Eighth Army in Eastern Prussia. Instead Generaloberst v. Hindenburg was appointed to act as new commander together with General-Major Ludendorff as Chief of General Staff.

22 August—Between 11:00 a.m and 12:00 noon, cavalry patrols encountered British cavalry around Mons. In the afternoon, the IX Army Corps also reported British troops in Mons and along the Canal du Centre between Nimy and Ville sur Haine. “All of a sudden the British appeared in front of us.”[6] Bülow was more concerned about the French Fifth Army south of the river Sambre than of the BEF and wanted to employ the First Army as his flank guard around Maubeuge. Kluck cared more about attacking the BEF and questioned whether he was still under the control of Second Army. After all, the initial directives and the deployment orders had put First Army under the control of Bülow only for the operations around Liège. In a telephone call with Lieutenant Colonel Tappen, Kluck received the confirmation that he was still under the control of Bülow. This telephone call had been technically very difficult.

22 August—Sixth Army reported victory and “overwhelming success” to the OHL—obviously to conceal the fact that the premature attack did not achieve the expected success. OHL assigned Sixth Army the objective to pursue the beaten enemy with the intention of breaking through the French fortress belt between Toul and Épinal. The situational analysis of the OHL differed from that of the Sixth Army. Based upon the success reports of the Sixth Army the OHL seemed to believe that the French forces in Lorraine were routed, disorganized, and trying to escape. The situation analysis of the OHL was based upon a telephone call between Lieutenant Colonel Tappen and Krafft von Dellmensingen.[7] This situation analysis underpinned Moltke’s decision to direct pursuit and further attacks in Lorraine, instead of shifting forces to the North to reinforce the advancing right wing.

22-24 August—Battle of Namur: Second and Third Armies attacked the French Fifth Army in the triangle between Maubeuge, Namur, and Dinant across the rivers Sambre and Meuse. The French Fifth Army managed to escape the encirclement on 24 August.

23-24 August—Battle of Mons: First Army defeats BEF and the BEF withdraws from the Canal du Centre in a southwesterly direction.

23-24 August—Battles at Neufchâteau and Longwy. French Third and Fourth Armies launched a huge offensive in the Ardennes and were beaten by German Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies. After the Battles of Mons, Namur, Neufchâteau, and Longwy (the Frontier Battles—die Grenzschlachten), the withdrawal of the Allied left wing started giving way to the advancing German right wing and created the impression with the OHL that the campaign in the west was more or less won.

25 August—A fierce counteroffensive by the French Second Army in Lorraine brought the half-hearted pursuit by the Sixth Army to a standstill. At 9:00 p.m., the Ia of the Operations Department of the OHL, Major v. Redern, arrived at Headquarters Sixth Army in Dieuze bringing a message from Moltke, containing the breakthrough of the French fortress lines between Toul and Épinal as the new operational goal for the Sixth Army. The Sixth Army immediately was directed to start pounding the French positions with heavy artillery. Like Lieutenant Colonel v. Dommes on 17 August, Major v. Redern did not have any written directive from Moltke; he just explained the intention of the OHL.

25 August—Second Army made Guard Reserve Corps and Third Army made XI Army Corps available to the OHL. OHL believed that a breakthrough victory was already achieved on the right wing, but the situation was still unclear in Lorraine. Therefore, the OHL that same day ordered the transport of both corps to East Prussia.

26 August—Attacks of Eighth Army started the Battle of Tannenberg in Eastern Prussia.

26 August—Battle of Le Cateau. German First Army defeats British II Corps. As at Mons, British forces managed to escape.

26 August—After intervention of the Bavarian Crown Prince, the Sixth Army was released from the mission to immediately attack the French position at Nancy.

27 August—OHL issued a directive to all armies in the West about continuation of the operations to achieve final victory following the successful Frontier Battles (General directive to First through Seventh Armies for the continuation of the operations—Allgemeine Anweisung an die 1. bis 7. Armee für den Fortgang der Operationen):

• The advance was to be continued at high speed to pursue the defeated enemy and to prevent them from setting up further resistance. The next leg of the advance was now to aim for Paris.
• First Army and HKK 2—still under the control of the Second Army—was to move sharply south towards the river Seine from its current position around Péronne.
• First Army was also to protect the right flank of the advancing German armies against attacks of newly formed allied troops.
• Second Army with HKK 1 was to turn southbound towards Laon and was to take La Fère and Maubeuge.[8]
• The Fourth and Fifth Armies with HKK 3 were to be directed towards a line Epernay—Châlons sur Marne—Vitry le Francois.
• The combined forces of the Sixth and Seventh Armies with HKK 3 again was given the task to break through the French fortress belt between Toul and Épinal if the French continued to withdraw. The Seventh Army was promised independence from Sixth Army as soon as Sixth Army had managed to cross the river Moselle.

28 August—Due to communication problems with radio and telegraph, the directive from 27 August did not arrive at most army HQs until the early morning of 28 August.

28 August—French Fort Manonviller about 35 kilometers southeast of Nancy surrendered after being pounded with heavy artillery for 54 hours.

28-30 August—Battle of St Quentin (the French called it Battle of Guise). Counter-attack of the French Fifth Army against the German Second Army. Although this battle ended with a tactical defeat of the French Fifth Army and Lanrezac again only just managed to escape from encirclement. This battle, nevertheless, slowed the German advance and bought time for the French to build up a new Sixth Army on the right flank of the German First Army. This new French army consisted almost entirely of reserve and territorial formations.

30 August—Major Bauer, the specialist on super-heavy artillery in the OHL, was sent to the headquarters of the Sixth Army in Dieuze to discuss plans for a capture of the French fortifications around Nancy. Bauer left the impression that the strategic victory of the advancing right wing was almost complete and that breakthrough of the French fortress belt was necessary to accomplish a final victory.

30 August—OHL relocated to Luxembourg and took up quarters in a small and completely undersized, inappropriate school building. Koblenz and Luxembourg  were compromise solutions to be close to the decisive Western Front, while avoiding loss of contact with the Eastern Front. There were discussions as to whether or not it was too dangerous to relocate the Kaiser into former enemy territory—Luxembourg was still somehow seen as a part of the Reich.

31 August—German victory at Tannenberg in East Prussia. The Russian Second Army was almost completely annihilated. During the climax of the battle, Guard Reserve Corps and XI Army Corps were still on railroad transport and arrived only after the end of the battle.

31 August—Major v. Xylander was sent as messenger from Sixth Army to the OHL and received word that the capture of Nancy was not as urgent or important as Major Bauer had explained just one day before. OHL gave direction to pin down as many French forces in the Reichslande as possible and to prevent the French Army from deploying significant numbers of troops to other areas. Upon Xylander’s return, Dellmensingen was baffled about the ambiguity, if not contradiction, of the operational directives and goals received from the OHL and decided to continue the operational goal of taking the French positions around Nancy.

1 September—After repeated interventions of Generaloberst v. Kluck, the First Army was no longer under the control of the Second Army.

2 September—Austrian offensive in Galicia failed at the cost of heavy losses. On 2 September, the Russian took Lemberg.

2 September—General-Major Krafft v. Dellmensingen drove to the GHQ in Luxembourg to discuss personally the situation with Moltke and to get an endorsement for the attack on Nancy. Moltke convinced him to delay this attack for a couple of days and to focus instead upon the goal of pinning down as many French troops as possible in the Reichslande. Obviously, Moltke was following two different goals for the German forces in the Reichslande:

1. Prevent further French forces from being deployed to the new French left wing built-up around Paris;
2. Break through the French fortress belt along the river Moselle to catch the bulk of the French army in a giant double pincer movement.

2 September—OHL issued a new directive to all armies of the advancing right wing about continuation of the operations. Due to slow communications by radio and telegraph, this directive only arrived at the army HQs during the night 2-3 September: “It is a major intention of the OHL to push the French forces away from Paris in a southeasterly direction. First Army is to follow Second Army in echelons and resume with the guarding of the right flank of the advancing army.”[9] This directive implied a complete change of direction if compared with that of 27 August: it was no longer the goal to catch all French forces in a giant pincer movement reaching through or around Paris, but to trap them in front of the Second Army and further south. Against the newly formed French forces around Paris, the First Army was intended to act as a flank guard. A follow-on radio message from OHL asked the armies to send strong cavalry forces into the surrounding areas of Paris to destroy all French railroads leading into Paris.

3 September—Commander First Army, Generaloberst v. Kluck, came to his own interpretation of the OHL directive and directed only the IV Reserve Corps as a flank guard oriented towards Paris. He then swung around the bulk of his army southeast to carry the flank of the French Fifth Army in front of Bülow’s Second Army. Kluck was therefore no longer echeloned behind the Second Army but stumbled into the advance of the Second Army.

3 September—Joffre dismissed general Lanrezac from command of the Fifth Army and appointed General Franchet d’Esperey (the British called him “the desperate Frenchy”) as the new commander.

4 September—Radio message by OHL with new directives for the armies in the west. Due to poor radio connections and numerous relay stations this directive did not arrive at most army HQs until the morning of 5 September:

• The enemy escaped the combined attack of the First and Second Army and has managed to keep Paris within its defense line. French army is deploying troops from the area Toul-Belfort; they are also pulling out troops from Third to Fifth Army. Pushing the French army southeastwards and squeezing it against the Swiss border is no longer possible. Instead, the enemy is assembling troops and newly created formations in and around Paris to jeopardize our right flank.
• First and Second Armies are to remain opposite of the eastern front of Paris. It is their mission to oppose any hostile operations out of Paris by counter-attack and to support each other by accomplishing this mission.
• Fourth and Fifth Armies are to push the enemy in front of them into southeastern direction, thus opening the crossing over the river Moselle between Toul and Épinal for the Sixth Army. Whether it will be possible to push significant enemy forces against the Swiss border cannot yet be forecasted.
• Third Army is heading towards Troyes-Vendeuvre. Depending upon the situation, Third Army is either support to First and Second Armies by advancing in a westerly direction across the river Seine or Third Army is to support the left wing by operating in southern or southeastern direction.
• First mission of Sixth and Seventh Armies is to pin down the enemy ahead of them. Then they are to advance against the river Moselle between Toul and Épinal.
• Following these missions, “the Kaiser” ordered:

• First and Second Armies are to remain opposite the eastern front of Paris to meet any enemy action by counter-attack. First Army is to remain between the Oise and the Marne; the Marne bridges around Château Thierry are to be held for future crossings. Second Army between the Marne and Seine is to occupy the Marne bridges between Nogent and Méry sur Seine. HKK 2 is to stay with First Army but is to deploy one cavalry division to HKK 1. HKK 1 is to remain with Second Army and to deploy one cavalry division to Third Army. HKK 1 is to reconnoiter and observe the southern front of Paris between Marne and Seine and push forward reconnaissance towards Caen, Alencon, Le Mans, Tours, and Bourges. Mission aircraft support will be needed. Both HKKs are to destroy all railroads leading into Paris.
• Third Army is to advance towards Troyes-Vendeuvre and push forward cavalry reconnaissance towards Nevers-Le Creuzot.
• Fourth and Fifth Armies are to push in a southeasterly direction to open the Moselle bridges for Sixth and Seventh Armies. Right wing of Fourth Army is to advance towards Vitry le Francois and Montierender. Right wing Fifth Army is to advance towards Revigny-Stainville-Morley. Left wing of Fifth Army is to guard the flank against the French fortifications at the river Meuse. Forts Troyon, Les Paroches, and Camp des Romains are to be captured. HKK 4 is to reconnoiter towards Dijon, Besancon and Belfort.
• Orders for Sixth and Seventh Army remain unchanged.[10]

4 September—Evening report of the First Army reported successful advance in a southeasterly direction towards Coulommiers and Montmirail and announced a further advance in that direction on 5 September. This report together with the goals for 5 September showed how far that army had deviated from the directive given by the OHL.

4 September—OHL sent officers to all army commands to explain the directive radioed the same day and to discuss details of the massive strategic and operational implications. Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch was sent to First Army with the mission to bring First Army back in line with the directives of the OHL.[11]

5 September—Since the directive dating from 4 September created an entirely new mission for the armies advancing on the right wing, the OHL sent further written details to the army HQs.

6 September—The Marne Battle opened with a combined offensive by the BEF, the French Fifth and the newly formed French Sixth and Ninth Armies.

6 September—Start of the Battle on the river Ourcq between the German IV Reserve Corps and the French Sixth Army. First Army informed OHL in a radio message about the intended redeployment of troops to successfully fight at the Battle at the Ourcq. OHL realized that operations were slipping out of control.

6 September—OHL ordered headquarters Seventh Army together with 7th Cavalry Division and two army corps, one each from Sixth and Seventh Armies, to deploy by train towards Brussels.

6-14 September—First Battle of the Masurian Lakes. After the victory at Tannenberg, Hindenburg swung the Eighth Army into a northeasterly direction and attacked the Russian First Army.

7 September—First Army withdrew III and IX Army Corps to the Ourcq and exposed the right flank of the Second Army at Montmirail.

8 September—Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch was sent as a messenger of the OHL to the army commands in the west to establish the detailed situation and to coordinate operations between the armies. Hentsch did not have any written directive with him. It remains unclear whether he was empowered to order a retreat on behalf of Moltke. Hentsch left the GHQ together with captain Koeppen (Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch was the Head of the Intelligence Department and Captain Koeppen was responsible for radio, telegraph and communications in the Operations Department) at 11:00 hrs and visited the HQs of Fifth, Fourth, Third and Second Armies. They did not arrived at Second Army until 7:45 p.m. and spent the night at the headquarters in Château Montmort before they continued to the First Army headquarters in Mareuil the following morning.

9 September—Retreat of the German right wing from the rivers Marne and Ourcq to the Aisne—the so-called “Miracle of the Marne.” Kluck decided to disengage from the Battle at the Ourcq and retreat based upon Hentsch’s reports from the Second Army and from the OHL

11 September—Moltke toured the army HQs of from the Fifth to the First Armies with the intent of obtaining a personal impression about the situation and to coordinate further operations. Lieutenant Colonel Tappen and Lieutenant Colonel v. Dommes accompanied Moltke.[12] After the tour Moltke decided that not only First and Second Armies had to withdraw into positions behind the river Aisne and to Reims, but also that Third, Fourth, and Fifth Army were to withdraw into rear positions. Moltke returned to the GHQ in the morning of 12 September seriously psychologically depressed.

14 September—Hindenburg defeated the Russian First Army in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes. In contrast to Tannenberg, Hindenburg did not manage to completely annihilate the Russian First Army but drove them out of East Prussia with devastating losses. Despite that setback, the Russians still imposed a threat to the northern flank of the Eastern Front.

14 September—Austrian withdrawal in Galicia; Austrian army routed.

14 September—Dismissal of Moltke after the retreat to the river Aisne. Official reason for the dismissal was Moltke’s illness. Moltke was replaced by Falkenhayn but had to remain at OHL to conceal his dismissal from the public.[13] The strategic situation of Germany turned out to be very difficult only six weeks after the beginning of the Great War:

• Schlieffen-style offensive in the west failed at the Marne. German armies retreated to the Aisne;
• Bloody deadlock in Lorraine; breakthrough of French fortress belt impossible;
• Shortages of artillery ammunition already seriously felt;
• German Navy locked in the German Bight; British blockade cut Germany efficiently off from supplies of strategic raw materials;
• New offensive in Northern France intended for autumn 1914; strategic goal unclear;
• Victories in East Prussia (Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes);
• Austrian offensive in Galicia failed after devastating losses; Austrian army retreated in desperate condition. German support needed to avoid collapse;
• Austrian offensive against Serbia failed.

25 September—GHQ relocated to Charleville-Mézières (located in France at the river Meuse, north of Sedan) to be closer to the Western Front

[1] (Kuhl, 1921), p. 8. Please see also (Kluck, 1926), pp. 11-14.

[2] (Generalstab des Heeres 7 Ab., 1939)

[3] Gackenholz, Hermann, Entscheidung in Lothringen, Junker und Dünnhaupt, Berlin 1935, Attachment 1.

[4] (Xylander, 1935), p. 29 and (Kayser, 1942), p. 18.

[5] (Generalstab des Heeres 7 Ab., 1939), pp. 42-62.

[6] (Kuhl, 1921), p. 45 and  p. 77. Kuhl complains that the First Army didn’t have any detailed information about the BEF before the battle of Mons and called this a major malfunction of the HKK 2..

[7] (Xylander, 1935,) p. 108.

[8] (Kuhl, 1921), pp. 87 and 90-91.

[9] (Kuhl, 1921), p. 118

[10] (Reichsarchiv, 1926), pp. 3-5 and (Kuhl, 1921), pp. 130-131.

[11] (Kuhl, 1921), p. 129 and (Haffner, 1982), pp. 48-59.

[12] (Reichsarchiv, 1926), pp. 448-452.

[13] (Reichsarchiv, 1926), pp. 481-485.