August 3, 1914

August 3, 1914  The plan to seize a contested Liège was developed in 1911, a requirement created by avoiding Holland. The plan was known as the Handstreich. The very existence of the Handstreich plan was a great secret, especially kept from the gossipy kaiser. Only the GGS knew of its existence. “Discovery learning” by those who had to execute the plan would be the norm.Task: Second Army would utilize an ad hoc reinforced corps to take Liège. (“Army of the Meuse” was a grandiloquent overstatement.) Purpose: To free the main roads and railroads covered by that fortress. First Army was to follow the movement of Second Army, but the exact timing of the formers advance was not specified. Examined in detail, the Handstreich seems to have been constructed on wishful thinking and hope rather than sober analysis of the most dangerous possibilities. “It might work.”

At higher levels, Bülow commanded Second Army and was directly subordinate to Moltke. One of Bülow’s army corps commanders was Gen. der Infanterie Otto von Emmich. In addition to his own Tenth Corps, Emmich also commanded the ad hoc force that would conduct the Handstreich. It had to begin operations immediately before mobilization, and its components were at peacetime strength: roughly half the wartime mobilized strength.

Germany declared war on France. The OHL began operations in Berlin. Britain ordered the army mobilized. Belgium rejected the German ultimatum. At 1500 hours, General von Emmich gave his first order. He ordered that the Belgian border was to be crossed only on a written order. They could begin their advance across the border on the August 4 at 0900 hours.

The Belgian SHQ issued Instructions for the Concentration of the Army. The Belgian field army would deploy between the Gette and Dyle Rivers: First Infantry at Tirlemont, Second Infantry at Louvain, Fifth Infantry at Perwez, and Sixth Infantry at Wavre. The cavalry division would concentrate at Gembloux. Third Infantry was to concentrate at Liège and defend. Fourth Infantry had the same mission at Namur. Neither division was given a mission statement or an operations order. The German intelligence estimate reported that the garrison of Liège had been substantially reinforced.

Belgian forces in turn conducted early demolitions based on news of German preparations around Aachen, Eupen, and Malmedy, including the rail tunnels leading from Germany. As part of this blocking plan, engineers were sent to Argenteau and Visé to prepare explosives to blow up the bridges. At 2200 hours on August 3, the explosives were set off. Belgian Colonel Dujardin recalled in 1956, “We had been equipped with ‘material’ from the Antwerp Engineer Depot.” The dynamite used on these tunnels and bridges was like that used later on bridges in Halen by the Belgians—it seemed to have lost its strength due to age and improper storage. Later, it was said it had only one-quarter of its power. It took two attempts to destroy the main bridge at Visé, and then only the spans, not the supports. Each of the four rail line demolitions had different significance. Two (Stavelot and Trois-Ponts) were on the same single-track line in the southern portion of the zone. This was not the major rail line. One tunnel (Hombourg) was on the northern single-line track, also a bypass. Although all rail lines were impeded, the most important was the double-track line between Aachen and Verviers blocked at Nasproue.

They damaged but failed to destroy the bridges. New charges were placed later that night. On August 4, the Visé Bridge finally collapsed at 0400 hours, and then the Argenteau Bridge at 0500 hours. A bit later, the bridge at Pont de Arches was destroyed. The bridge at Herstal and all five pedestrian bridges in Liège remained intact. The railroad bridges Val-Benoit and Val-Saint-Lambert were also left intact, but the southern area bridge at Jemeppe-Seraing was destroyed. In addition, the roads to Liège were blocked with fallen trees and rubble. After the Germans crossed the border, the Belgians destroyed three more road bridges upstream from Liège—the bridges of Hermalle-sous-Huy, Ombret, Engis—and affected a derailment on the railway bridge of Val Saint-Lambert.

On the evening and night of August 2–3: German Seventh Jäger Battalion left Bückeburg in two train transports. Destination: Railroad Station Aachen-West. During the next day, the transports arrived in Aachen. The battalion immediately marched via Waldschenke toward Hergenrath. While the battalion’s makes no mention of “opening-night jitters,” there it was—a false alarm pre-invasion. August 3–4 at Hergenrath. That night the battalion was alarmed. A Belgian attack was expected. This did not happen. Distant detonations could be heard as concluded later from the demolition of the bridges by Belgian troops. Sleep deprivation had started.